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 Abstract 
 
This thesis constructs a concept of socially negotiated art as an emergent 
practice. Displacing a socially engaged art, it uses a methodology of “beside” 
(Sedgwick, 2003) to explore the affective and corporeal relations that are 
made, maintained, and transformed as part of the artistic process. The 
research draws upon queer studies, feminist studies, and affect studies to 
formulate an embodied criticality that self-reflexively confronts the more 
difficult dimensions of these art practices. 
 
The opening chapter analyses and disrupts a selection of influential concepts 
that have shaped the understanding of socially “engaged” art. Their 
“refractions” are interventions on art theories including relational aesthetics 
(Bourriaud, 2000), participatory art (Bishop, 2012), concatenations of art and 
revolution (Raunig, 2007), and the continuing avant-garde project (Léger, 
2012) through the lens of embodiment. A number of refractions, including 
counterpublics and disorientation, recur as important anchor points 
throughout the research. The subsequent three chapters investigate the 
“relational material” of socially negotiated art. Each one of them breaks down 
one of its constitutive aspects: dialogue (chapter two), love (chapter three) 
and praxis (chapter four), which are parameters borrowed from the work of 
radical educator Paulo Freire. Because of the significant overlap between 
radical education and socially negotiated art in politics and practice, and 
because Freire’s pedagogy offers clear demonstrations of situated practice, 
his writings are used to help centre relations within the context of a socially 
negotiated art. Ultimately, the three components are unsettled by corporeal 
and affective proximity: the open inclusivity of dialogue is questioned by 
intimate, frictive forms like gossip and teasing; the mobilisation of political 
love multiplies into attachments, body borders, and caring labour; and the 
transformative urge of praxis is complicated by subjective displacement and 
situatedness. Together, they present a theoretical articulation of a more 
peculiar and textured relational material that contributes towards a socially 
negotiated – rather than engaged – art.   
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 
In this study, I am setting myself the task of looking at the relational material 
of socially negotiated art. What I take to be socially negotiated art has been 
differently framed, theorised, and historicised as the avant-garde, community 
art, relational art, and socially engaged art, amongst many others. The 
lattermost term has been widely circulated for the past decade, and is one 
that this thesis relies on for context and critique. More precisely, it is an entry 
point to examine how the social is “engaged”. Such a formulation presumes 
artists entering into the social realm as part of their practice, motivated by 
different needs or desires to drive concrete, political change, or – at a less 
idealistic but equally important level – to meet people and get paid for their 
work. Some combination of the above is usually the case. Yet the conditions 
of being engaged, i.e. taking part alongside others, in the messy process of 
making art in context of places, politics, bodies of all kinds, etc., are not 
sufficiently examined. Pablo Helguera produced a short “materials and 
techniques handbook” in 2011 that is perhaps the first and only publication to 
reference the “material” of socially engaged art. The purpose, however, is 
primarily utilitarian, as he attempts to present guidelines, situation set-ups, 
interactions with others, potential pitfalls, and other aspects of socially 
engaged art for anyone who seeks a practical overview of its components. 
Likewise, Gregory Sholette and Chloë Bass’ more recent “Art as Social Action” 
(2018) features project descriptions that are collected from artists working in 
different places around the world. They are bite-size and digestable, with 
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each contributor concisely explaining what a particular piece of work sought 
to achieve and what the outcomes were.  
 
My intention here is less to offer a pragmatic overview of approaches found in 
socially engaged art practices than it is to ask what it is like to live out a 
socially negotiated art. The analysis undertaken is therefore less driven by the 
sharing of “useful models [that] better influence and orchestrate desired 
outcomes” (Helguera, 2011, p.xv), and instead, is focused on analysing the 
complexity of the relational material as it emerges from embodied, socially 
negotiated practices. 
 
This means that being “beside” others becomes key, which is an idea 
borrowed from Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s introduction to her essay collection in 
“Touching Feeling” (2003). A recurring theme of the book is the inarticulate 
in-the-midst (of others, atmospheres, doing, etc.) that feels through 
knowledge without always landing squarely on what it is exactly. This is 
found, for example, in her analysis of reparative readings, a formulation she 
uses to contrast with paranoid readings often done in theoretical work: rather 
than engage in a (paranoid) process of unveiling and uncovering deeper, 
greater truths, ways of knowing can co-exist and open / be opened to other 
(reparative) pathways. Encountering this at an early point of the research was 
vital; the surveying of existing theories, arguments, and projects was a 
dizzying endeavour, and the encouragement to work “beside” them made 
possible an emergent and embodied form of knowledge that, at the same 
time, parallels the processes of these art practices.  
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The intention, then, is to propose a different critical framework for thinking 
about art produced in the social realm. This departs from a certain 
categorising of art that falls in line with art historical research, since this tends 
to assess more than question, leaving the ambiguities of art’s social desires 
relatively undisturbed. These are precisely the focus here, which requires 
entering the site of artistic production. The thesis therefore argues for an 
attunement to the discomforts, compromises, and limits that themselves 
produce a critical perspective on the (artistic, social, affective, etc.) relations 
involved. It stands in some contrast to studies that boost or slacken the 
relevance of art practices by emphasising their artistic, political, or historical 
lineages. Hearkening to the reparative research of being “beside”, 
observations like the following one becomes an issue in the context of this 
thesis: “a world of hand-wringing practitioners easily satisfied with the feeling 
of ‘doing good’ in a community”. Taken from Claire Bishop’s endorsement of 
Helguera’s aforementioned “materials and techniques handbook”, the 
disparagement is clear. But are art practitioners really that “easily satisfied”? 
What about the pressure of delivery, the restrictive environments, the playing 
out of (power) relations? Or the under-articulated feelings and menial care 
work that are also part of these practices? The study reincorporates the 
“doing good” within a serious examination of socially negotiated art that does 
not merely write off these practices as naïve.  
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Introducing “beside” as a self-reflexive methodology  
 
This study draws connections between art, theory, feelings, and 
infrastructures to reveal how bodies and relations co-constitute one another. 
A key impetus is the fatigue and lapses of conviction that come as part of 
working in the under-supported peripheries of the art world. Having taught, 
curated, and organised different art projects in these spaces, my professional 
experiences span hugely in terms of practice and emotional investment. The 
latter has been especially important (and difficult) to acknowledge, because 
the “not feeling right” has shaped the very tone, trajectory, and content of 
this research. Yet wrestling with that has enabled the crafting of a different, 
more embodied language that is critical of the transformative potentials in 
social “engagement”. 
 
One question posed of my study is why – in a thesis foregrounding a situated 
“beside” as its methodology – there is little mention of my own practice 
history. The academic answer is that this project needed to zoom out if it 
were to understand relations as an artistic medium more generally; the 
honest answer is that I had been feeling conflicted about my work. As the 
early momentum of a new doctoral project – a renewed optimism and 
fieldwork opportunity in Hong Kong – settled into something slower, I felt 
differently about the original aims of this study, namely: 1. it seemed 
disingenuous to talk about “transformative potentials of socially engaged art” 
given my ambivalence about this kind of work, and 2. it is beyond my limits 
as a researcher to closely analyse the cultural landscape in Hong Kong when I 
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have not lived there in recent years. Despite the broadened scope on 
“transformation”, the same, difficult sentiments would return to interfere with 
the research aim and steer it towards what is actually experienced – or 
towards the relational material of a socially negotiated art. 
 
This was when the aforementioned reparative research started to make its 
mark. In Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s “Touching Feeling” (2003), she describes 
the push-pull of being and knowing from “beside”, a position that “permits a 
spacious agnosticism” of “noncontradiction” but does not “depend on a 
fantasy of metonymically egalitarian or even pacific relations” (Sedgwick, 
2003, p.8). Crucially then, the reparative relationality of “beside” is not about 
progress (like “towards transformation”) or conciliation (like “being 
together”), but about staying with the tension, unease, aggression, etc. of 
contact. The textured materiality of “beside” is found tellingly on the cover 
image of her book: it features the artist Judith Scott – who also happens to 
be a deaf, older woman with Down’s syndrome – in a fierce embrace with a 
sculpture she made. Standing on a plinth at around the same height and 
shape as her upper body, it is made up of compulsively tight tangles of cord 
and string wound repeatedly into an imprecise egg shape. There is a dent on 
one side against which Scott presses her face, eyes open. “There is no single 
way to understand the ‘besideness’ of these two forms, even though one of 
them was made by the other. The affect that saturates the photo is 
mysterious, or at least multiple, in quality” (Sedgwick, 2003, p.23). Multiple, 
for instance, in the way the scene similarly winds itself around words that fail 
to describe what is transmitted (consolation, sadness, understanding, 
ignorance, etc.). As a way of knowing, “beside” invites uncertainties and 
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intuitions as well. This was a crucial point of re-orientation: turning “beside” 
into this study’s methodological approach meant tempering the thrust of 
transformation with negotiations of the social space. 
 
 
On the use of negotiation 
 
In the thesis, negotiation is a way to describe a number of things, most 
notably the effects of contact, in-between spaces, and proximity. This means 
exploring different levels of relational dynamics, which includes those 
between individuals of an artwork (see: 2.2.2. on gossip and teasing as in-
group forms of frictive communication), project infrastructures (see: 3.3.2. on 
art practices within a care chain), and broader affective tendencies (see: 
3.2.1. on the choreography of revolutionary moments). The correlating 
questions would be: what happens when artists, participants, and 
commissioners are made to work together? And what comes out of the 
connections between art, social contexts, and institutions?  
 
The generative and social aspects of negotiation are used to highlight the 
constant pushing and yielding of bodies – something that also defines them in 
return, making them always already in relation. To expand upon this claim, 
negotiation is differently formulated throughout the four chapters. It is first 
introduced to argue for an agency of action (see: 1.1.4. on the material 
discursivity of phenomena) that performatively shapes matter. With this in 
mind, I turn to mostly Anglo-American settings of art, education, and political 
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work, as well as day-to-day life, to describe and critique the ways in which 
negotiation is embodied. Examples include: our bodily orientations in relation 
to the (heteronormative) horizon (see: 1.1.6.); challenging the presumptions 
of dialogue and equality by looking at frictive forms of communication (see: 
chapter two); living out the artistic desire to do something for others (see: 
chapter three); and reconsidering “praxis” with a greater sense of 
situatedness (see: chapter four). In all of these, negotiation is the social act 
that questions, reflects, and situates us “beside” others. 
 
The proposal of a socially negotiated art has also engendered a different 
language, which hearkens to the study’s queer and feminist viewpoint on the 
one hand, and on the other, to the study’s emergent themes that relate to 
embodiment: space, textures, and emotions. As such, the thesis rethinks 
dialogue (chapter two) through the description of “frictive speech”. Such a 
term does not pre-designate the ideal conditions of speech in line with 
Habermasian public discourse, but instead, alerts us to the how we feel when 
we speak with others and figure out the communication possibilities as we go 
along. Similarly, the refraction on love (chapter three) presents “blockages”, 
“impasses”, and “borders”, while a more self-reflexive praxis (chapter four) 
emphasises “disorientation” as an intimate reminder of how contexts push 
back at artistic intentions. The attunement to embodiment has therefore 
come with the crafting of a more concrete language that gives form to 
relations as a material.      
 
This is crucial to the overall aim of the thesis, which is to foreground the 
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entanglements of art and life, something that departs from a more 
straightforward overlap between the two. The use of a spatial, textural, and 
emotional language brings attention to the fact that a socially negotiated art 
facilitates living experiences that are unpredictable and emergent. The 
actions, wants, and stakes of these art practices are thus positioned as 
questions (instead of statements) within the social. To do so is to make plain 
the changing – deteriorating, even – cultural and political atmospheres that 
directly affect socially negotiated art. The rise of nationalism, widespread 
Islamophobia in the West, the climate catastrophe etc. can translate into 
doubt and displacement as much as they incite outrage and action. In the 
end, negotiation addresses an increasingly untenable socially “engaged” art of 
the crisis present by reinstating uncertainty as a critical part of the art’s 
relational processes. 
 
 
 
 
A guide to the theories and art practices used in the study 
 
To think through the “transformative potentials of socially engaged art” as my 
former premise, one of the first reference texts I turned to was Paulo Freire’s 
“Pedagogy of the Oppressed” (1970). Of his earlier writing, this book 
especially recalls the anti-colonial and revolutionary atmosphere that 
pervaded Brazilian leftist politics in the 1960s. This desire to spur change still 
strikes a chord with fringe art workers now, particularly if their practices are 
consciously dislocated from institutional norms. The fact that Freire similarly 
questions the institutional norms of education means that his work has been 
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relevant to such art workers both theoretically and practically. While the 
thesis would deviate from Freire’s thinking, it nonetheless uses three of his 
more prominent concepts – dialogue, love, and praxis – as starting points for 
thinking through art’s desire to be closely intertwined with life’s struggles. 
 
As the research became more interested in the affective and material, so too 
did its theoretical and practical references. The key areas of art and pedagogy 
were being refined from a more embodied perspective, one that was 
articulated through queer, feminist, and affect studies. Works produced by 
scholars and practitioners across these concerns reconfigured the thesis at a 
fundamental level, particularly those of Sara Ahmed, Judith Butler, Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick, and Karen Barad in the first phase of the research 
overhaul. The second half of the thesis sees affect studies take on a central 
role, particularly through Lauren Berlant’s public-making of inarticulate 
feelings that are typically ignored. Their work (i.e. Berlant’s – they / them 
being their preferred pronoun) promotes a kind of emotional rigour, which the 
research adapts to further an embodied criticality of the relational material.  
 
The research gear-change could also be found in the way art practices were 
incorporated. The context of my fieldwork in Hong Kong and the questions 
posed to the artists became problematic as I grew sceptical about art’s 
“transformative” thrust. This led to my putting aside the notes and interviews 
I had collected in Hong Kong until their place in the research were clearer. At 
the same time, my own practice history remained emotionally and 
thematically out of bounds, since the thesis reconfiguration did not (at first) 
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include the exploration of failure or dissatisfaction. Yet these would become 
the most resonant feelings. Their importance gained traction from the 
reading, writing, and above all the word-of-mouth recommendations to visit 
or look up specific art projects. An interest in the hidden labour of social art 
processes was nurtured, e.g. the managing of expectations, the forging of 
connections, the zapping of energy and personal time, etc. The completed 
thesis now features a range of practices that go about these relational issues 
in different ways, from candid conversations (see: Ania Bas and Anthony 
Schrag in 2.2.) to a performative monologue (see: The Atlas Group in 1.1.3.); 
from a post-mortem reflection (see: Hannah Nicklin in 3.3.2.) to the sharing 
of secrets (see: Annette Krauss in 2.2.2.), amongst others. Though disparate, 
the connection between the practices is found in the relations they make, 
maintain, and critique. 
 
The revisiting of the Hong Kong fieldwork was done in chapter four of the 
thesis. Having by then discussed the reparative framework for an embodied, 
socially negotiated art practice, the closing chapter presented an opportunity 
for embodiment in its most literal sense. By that point, I had the perspective 
and language to combine the active doing of “praxis” with the displaced 
feelings that, together, comprised the “live” part of research. The inclusion of 
my fieldwork was a late decision, made because the methodology of “beside” 
had taken on self-reflexivity as a critical part of queer and feminist 
embodiment. The autoethnographical analysis of my time in Hong Kong is 
therefore an attempt to show the reader some of the more personal and 
practical orientations underpinning the thesis. Given more time, there would 
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definitely have been a more thorough reflection of my earlier practice history. 
 
 
 
Socially negotiated art and its relation to other studies of art-political practices 
 
I stated at the start of this introduction that the research remained 
deliberately open to the problems and ambiguities of social art processes. The 
thesis position with regards to art’s socio-political role was therefore 
somewhat suspended over the period of research and writing. Doing so 
helped me feel out relations in their own terms, particularly those that are 
suppressed or trivialised (e.g. socially negotiated art as menial care; as the 
blurring of borders in transgressive and intrusive ways). 
 
But the centring of relations ultimately pointed towards a dilemma, one that is 
so ordinary and expected that it is subsumed within any given socially 
negotiated project: art does not actually have a place within our lived 
contexts, and yet it cannot help trying to make one. This position could only 
have been generated by the writing of the thesis, as it became clear how art 
practices yield in such different ways to art world standards as well as to the 
desire for social impact. Thus, the thesis has an off-kilter – queer and 
feminist, to be exact – orientation with studies that take a harder, defensive 
line, be it of art’s autonomy or political efficacy. There have been many 
notable attempts in the last twenty years to understand or dismiss art 
practices in the social realm, to genre-define art forms more or less invested 
in political change (a selection is featured in chapter one). But more recent 
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studies have focused instead on the situated and descriptive, in order to 
demonstrate an art project’s inseparability from its local context (see: “Living 
as Form”, Thompson, 2012; “Creative Space: Art and Spatial Resistance in 
East Asia”, DOXA collective, 2014; “Strike Art”, McKee, 2015). My research 
approach is found somewhere between these two: it indeed theorises an art 
form, but by focusing on how they negotiate their (ir)relevance by being 
“beside” bodies, places, and desires. This goes back to the inescapability of 
crisis in the last decade, which reiterates the thesis position to be attuned to 
what it means to live in this moment and not merely continue demanding its 
transformation. 
  
 
An overview of the four chapters 
 
This study is made up of two parts, spread over four chapters. The first part 
“reads beside” a constellation of theories to extract and refract influential 
ideas that make up the field of “socially engaged art”; the second (and main) 
part of the study looks into the key components of what I call the relational 
material found in the art practices themselves. The thesis structure attempts, 
first of all, to understand how existing theoretical and political conditions have 
influenced the way “socially engaged art” is understood. Secondly, it is 
shaped by the study’s task of theorising “beside”, which focuses the research 
on the bodies, relations, and feelings of practice. As such, the study 
deliberately bears signs of self-reflexive adjustments to show that these take 
place as much in the research as the practice of art.  
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Chapter one is an investigation and refraction of six theories from the last two 
decades that inform this study’s scope of socially engaged art. They have 
been selected because of the influence they have exerted in field, and a 
reading-beside of these texts would help to eke out the beginnings of a queer 
and feminist perspective. This involves asking more specific questions of the 
core idea within each text: the social interstice in relational aesthetics 
becomes a performative third space via Homi Bhabha and Judith Butler 
(1.1.1.); the community in site-specificity is recast as a potential 
counterpublic of othered, lonely bodies via Michael Warner and Zygmunt 
Bauman (1.1.2.); empathy of dialogical aesthetics unravels into a complicit 
dispossession via the correspondence between Judith Butler and Athena 
Athanasiou (1.1.3.); the antagonism of participatory art is made more 
accountable through Karen Barad’s materially discursive negotiations (1.1.4.); 
the concatenations of art and revolution machines point towards the queer 
rewards of failure by way of Jack Halberstam (1.1.5.); and Marc James 
Léger’s sinthomeopathic art is buffered by John Roberts’ more recent analysis 
of the avant-garde (2015) and their respective theories of discordant 
subjectivity are read beside Sara Ahmed’s queer (dis)orientation (1.1.6.). By 
the end of these six refractions, I have a set of concepts at hand that 
challenges the social as a place to be engaged with; it is reformulated, 
instead, into an emergent space made up of embodied negotiations. This 
insistence on material experience resonates with art and critical theorist Irit 
Rogoff’s notion of “smuggling [as] embodied criticality” (Rogoff, 2006): 
moving contraband from A to B, smuggling takes place illegitimately beside 
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and without regard to established boundaries which, via what she calls “the 
curatorial”, helps to “unthink those binaries of inside the museum and outside 
in the public space” (ibid.). There is therefore a crucial connection to be made 
between the queer, spatial refractions of chapter one, embodied criticality, 
and its ability to introduce (or smuggle) other ways of being / seeing into 
socially engaged art.  
 
Following the refractions, the methodological section that concludes chapter 
one details the influence of Sedgwick’s “beside” on the one hand (1.2.1.) and 
presents on the other a pivotal influence to the original ‘transformative’ focus 
of the study: Paulo Freire’s “Pedagogy of the Oppressed” (1970) and his 
writings on literacy activism (1.2.2.). At the start of the research process, his 
work provided a means of thinking through the intersections between radical 
education and socially engaged art. There is in both fields the drive to depart 
from their respective structural confines in order to be embedded in life and 
its struggles. At the heart of his work is a practical sensibility that is oriented 
towards a socially oriented consciousness-raising (or conscientisation) and 
worldmaking. His focus on collectively produced subjectivities is therefore 
hugely relevant, evidenced above all in what he calls “culture circles” that 
closely resemble the co-productive environments in many art practices within 
the social realm. As part of his broader pedagogical approach, he repeatedly 
tackles dialogue, love, and praxis, which for him are mobilising forces capable 
of enacting change against oppression. These facets end up as the starting 
points for the study’s later analyses and refractions, making up the themes 
for chapters two, three, and four.  
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In chapter two, the opening focus is on the presumed horizontality of 
dialogue argued in Freire’s writing. His activism is discussed at the beginning 
of the chapter, which go hand in hand with his understanding of dialogue as a 
mediating tool for political change (2.1.1.). What follows is the gradual 
rearticulation of dialogue into what I call frictive communication, approached 
in three ways: an examination of art and education theories, a descriptive 
breakdown of two art projects, and a counterproposal of alternative speech 
practices. The turn to education theories outline the possibility of exclusivity 
and disagreement as productive (2.1.2.), while Rancière’s dissenting aesthetic 
regime is softened into something less rigid and more yielding to social 
negotiation (2.1.3.). In the second part of the chapter, I investigate two art 
projects that differently shore up the presumptions of dialogue (2.2.1.); while 
one appeals to its mutuality, the other is deliberately designed to throw off 
any appeals to conciliation. In the final part of chapter two, I indicate towards 
frictive forms of speech as intimate ways of knowing valued above all by 
marginalised in-groups (2.2.2.). Referring to feminist examinations of gossip 
as a social epistemology and the use of teasing in queer domains, I ultimately 
disrupt the equilibrium of dialogue by advocating for a dissenting polyvocality 
(2.3.): gossip poses a challenge to formal paths of knowledge with its 
evaluative informality, while the play-aggression of teasing deliberately 
negotiates new behavioural rules that exist between friendliness and attack.  
 
Chapter three begins with a shift in atmosphere, introducing love as an 
affective intensity that, in Freire’s work, sustains hope for change. The role of 
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love is excavated and aligned with the liberation theology of 1960s Latin 
America, making it a vital, motivating force behind his thinking (3.1.1.). I then 
look at two contrasting perspectives on the political potential of love, 
specifically those of Michael Hardt and Lauren Berlant (3.1.2.). This 
examination comes to a difficult end when it leaves behind the “proper” way 
to love and draws instead on the cruel optimism of intimate publics. Here, the 
crux lies in the ambivalence of attachments and how they cannot be undone 
or explained away with intent. With this in mind, the second part depicts two 
scenes of attachment to account for the different ways that bodies magnetise 
towards one another. They encompass the coalescing swell of protest, which 
is refracted through a choreographic lens (3.2.1.) and the self-defence of 
nationalism (3.2.2.), of body borders and spatial corporeality. Concluding the 
chapter is a section that looks at care as a dimension of loving labour. 
Borrowing a description used by Silvia Federici, I expand upon the possibilities 
suggested by the “extradomestic” (3.3.1.). While she uses this to describe the 
paid labour taken on by women upon being “freed” from (the outsourcing of) 
housework, I also see within it a potential to reflect on the ways that socially 
negotiated art is intertwined with care (3.3.2.). To do so, I go down three 
different paths: the first one puts care beside meniality, often associated with 
caring labour of the body but reappropriated here as a means of questioning 
the position of socially negotiated art within a “care chain” (Hochschild, 
2012). I then alight on the community art movement in the UK of the 1970s 
and examine how its aspirations for cultural democracy was turned into 
service provision and social care. The last path that I explore in 
extradomesticity attempts to understand the infrastructure that props up 
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socially negotiated art practices in two different projects: one that deliberately 
questions the service model with that of exchange, and another that maps 
out the relations between commissioner, artist, and participants within the life 
of five different art projects. 
 
In chapter four, I lay bare the practices that led to the drastic shift in 
research approach and subject. As with the previous two chapters, I begin 
with an orientation point in Freire, who sees praxis as a way out from the 
dehumanisation of oppression (4.1.). This involves taking a closer look at his 
descriptions of culture circles to have a better sense of what his pedagogy 
looks like when it is placed in situ. Further focusing into the “action” of praxis, 
the rest of the chapter revisits the encounter and action of the early fieldwork 
in Hong Kong, done just weeks before the Umbrella Revolution. It confronts 
the scene of dislocation, which is in fact the experiential reference point for 
this study’s embodied examinations throughout. The turn to a more 
autoethnographic voice is explained (4.2.1.) and Hong Kong’s situational 
context explained in brief (4.2.2.). Four interviews are selected, excerpted, 
and analysed in context of the work done in the previous three chapters. 
Some of the most important observations and affective dimensions from the 
trip are presented here as the embodied moments that motivated the study 
to focus on the generative potential of the social in-between. As an epilogue 
to the study, the final chapter provides a glimpse of the research experience 
and what it feels like for pre-defined intentions to go awry. It is also an 
attempt to self-reflectively implicate the researcher in the knowledge they 
produce by showing the twists and (wrong) turns they make in the process. 
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The aim, therefore, is to reconfigure praxis as situatedness negotiations, in 
which change is always tethered to the specific demands of bodies and 
relations.  
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1. From socially engaged to negotiated: refractions of 
theoretical perspectives and a research methodology 
 
 
In an article he wrote for Frieze Magazine in 2012, Lars Bang Larsen 
lamented the slow, protracted death of the 1990s art, which was famously 
epitomised through the “social turn”. Though this shift once “gave visual art a 
new lease of life at a point when it had been declared dead (along with the 
avant-garde, the novel and the author)” (Larsen, 2012, p.93), it also saw the 
corresponding disappearance of “former keywords of artistic and social 
critique – conformism, alienation, negation” (ibid., p.95). Of interest is that he 
states “the social persists as a theme” (ibid.) in the closing paragraph, 
suggesting that indeed, the position of art is firmly dominant over that of the 
social, the latter of which is the object of art’s investigation. From this 
perspective, artists can decide to pick another, more relevant ‘theme’ to mull 
over and with it, a new aesthetic framework that no longer concerns itself 
with sociality. Yet Lars Bang Larsen overestimates the pervasiveness of 
socially engaged practices in the art world wherein celebrity artists are made; 
even within the same issue of Frieze, the focus is clearly on art fairs and 
galleries that are focused above all on medium-specific art. And secondly, if 
the social does indeed persist, it would suggest a more complex reason than 
merely the artists’ resistance to thematic change. It points to the negotiation 
of art and life, and specifically for this study, the former’s complicated desire 
to be situated within the latter. The disparate field of socially engaged art – 
which I intend to reconfigure into a socially negotiated art over the course of 
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this study – has been differently framed and theorised both aesthetically and 
politically. In order to position art practices that draw from aesthetics, politics, 
embodiment, and pedagogy amongst others, there needs to be a clarification 
of their developmental trajectory so far. 
 
As such, there are two tasks in this chapter: the main one is to introduce six 
key theories that have been particularly influential to the discourse of socially 
engaged art as articulated in western European and North American contexts. 
Specifically, I intend to reconsider them from a perspective of embodiment, a 
position that is supported through queer and feminist thinking in the context 
of this study. The eventual focus of this research is on the very social 
engagement-turned-negotiation as a relational material inextricable from the 
bodies that perform it. As a term widely circulated in the last decade, theories 
and criticism of “socially engaged art” already abound. It is not my intention 
here to contribute yet another framework that challenges its currency either 
as an art form or as a political instrument; after all, the field is continually 
shaped and reshaped by the specificities of practice, which keep the debate 
from settling. Rather, the primary aim of this chapter is to look at some of the 
most dominant and pertinent voices within the field in order to re-examine 
them via bodies and relations. 
 
My second task is to spell out a methodology that is built on the re-
examination of these key ideas. By attempting to understand them through 
matters of embodiment, I leave aside matters of art genre definition in order 
to nurture an analysis that encompasses both art and politics as part of a 
 21 
deeply ambivalent, socially negotiated process. I therefore argue for a 
research positioning and self-reflexivity that is rooted in Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick’s spatially-oriented “beside” (2003), which provides an important 
reminder of one’s inevitable contact and relationality.  
 
As such, queer studies in particular offer a “broad critique of multiple social 
antagonisms” that include “race, gender, class, nationality, and religion” as 
well as sexuality (Eng, Halberstam and Muñoz in Eng, 2005, p.1). Eng et al. 
maintain that  
 
sexuality is intersectional, not extraneous to other modes of difference, 
and calibrated to a firm understanding of queer as a political metaphor 
without a fixed referent. (ibid., my emphasis) 
 
By injecting a sense of instability, questioning, and experimentation to sex, 
gender, and bodily norms, queerness is capable of taking on a mediatory 
function that provides the world with a critical lens, especially in subversive 
meaning-making; it allows disobedient corporealities to reconfigure cultural 
phenomena and thus think differently about belonging, marginalisation, and 
identity. Without “a fixed referent”, a queer refraction of socially engaged art 
into socially negotiated art might begin with the following question: how is 
this art form oriented in relation to and in deviance of the art world? To be 
clear, this chapter follows the conventional usage of “socially engaged art” to 
examine more recent aspects of its theory and history. As the argument 
stresses a more embodied understanding, it refers increasingly to a “socially 
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negotiated art” by the end of the theoretical overview to emphasise the 
relational in-between spaces.  
 
 
1.1. An outline of the socially engaged art theories under 
investigation  
 
This chapter takes into account some of the more prominent arguments with 
regards to socially engaged art and reconsider their most pertinent claims 
from a queer and embodied perspective. By selecting these six theories, I 
seek to trace their influence in current perceptions of socially engaged art. 
This is not an authoritative narrative on the theoretical development of the art 
form, but an exploration of the theoretical associations and proximities that 
have been formative to the field.  
 
The art theories examined from 1.1.1. to 1.1.6. are all positioned within a 
western European or North American perspective and often reference and/or 
critique one another. Living and working within this space myself, I present 
some of the more significant concepts and re-analyse them with a lens that 
considers seriously the complexities of lived experience. The six specific 
theories of socially engaged art are placed more or less in chronological 
order; some are in direct conversation with one another and therefore 
positioned one after another, which slightly defies the chronology.  
 
The first theory examined is relational aesthetics, a term coined in the mid-
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1990s by the French curator Nicolas Bourriaud. It was first employed in a 
1996 exhibition he put together for the CAPC Musée d'art Contemporain de 
Bordeaux. Though his subsequent collection of essays in “Relational 
Aesthetics” has been criticised for its lack of theoretical or political insight, his 
aesthetic and philosophical reflections nonetheless function as one of the 
earliest attempts at consolidating a burgeoning field of practices that, for 
Bourriaud, demonstrated “artwork as social interstice” (Bourriaud, 1998, 
p.14). Emphasising the social over the artistic object – or, more accurately, 
the social as artistic object – Bourriaud’s theory was amongst the first to 
pinpoint the co-produced intersubjective space as the site and form of 
progressive art in the 1990s.  
 
Shortly after the English translation of Bourriaud’s essays appeared in 2000, 
art historian Miwon Kwon elaborates the significance of site-specificity in “One 
Place After Another”, which culminates with her description of the 
contemporary socially engaged artist as a nomadic “exotic tourist”. The 
second theory in this overview draws upon site-specific contexts that involve 
people and histories often foreign to the artist. Of note is her critique of 
community engagement and its correlating need to seek out recognised 
commonalities which, in her view, disregards the irreconcilable differences 
between members. Kwon proposes instead the conscious shaping and 
reshaping of community based on its “unworking” (Jean-Luc Nancy’s 
désoeuvré) (Kwon, 2001, p.155), which she provides as a possible framework 
in dealing with the difficulties and negotiations of “collective artistic praxis” 
(ibid., p.7).  
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The third theory turns to the interpersonal space of artistically staged 
encounters. Grant Kester’s 2004 “Conversation Pieces” introduces dialogical 
aesthetics that places consultation, interaction, and listening at the locus of 
artistic production. Unlike Bourriaud, the works he examines deliberately 
refute conventional gallery spaces, taking place instead in socially and/or 
politically driven contexts. Contrasting a historical avant-garde aestheticism 
with an ostensibly more egalitarian positioning that privileges sociability and 
conversation, he situates empathetic forms such as speaking, listening, and 
feminist forms of “connecting knowledges” (Belenky et al, 1986) at the core 
of dialogical aesthetics. The influence of this publication has been especially 
pertinent for artists whose practices articulate localised political concerns 
through informal social processes.  
 
The fourth theory looks into Claire Bishop’s analysis on participatory art, 
which culminates with her 2012 publication “Artificial Hells”. One of her 
earliest texts on the subject came in 2006, in an Artforum article that critiques 
Kester’s dialogical aesthetics and looks at the “social turn” in art. “Artificial 
Hells” is a more extensive critique of socially engaged art and its subsumption 
within socially ameliorative programmes, a move that destroys what Rancière 
has called the “aesthetic regime of art” (Rancière cited by Bishop, 2012, 
p.27). By casting the turn from that of a “social” to an “ethical” one, she 
problematises many artists’ redirected focus from artistic negation and 
aisthesis to efficacy (Bishop, 2012, p.19). Indeed, her intention to steer the 
discourse back to art as a political experience in its own right (again, via 
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Rancière) is found within the “participatory art” referenced throughout her 
text, which calls out the redundancy of socially engaged art: because “what 
artist isn’t socially engaged?” (ibid., p.2). 
 
The fifth and sixth theories home in on the more explicit politicisation of 
socially engaged art. Gerald Raunig’s transversal concatenations rethinks the 
relation between art and revolution via a post-structuralist investment in 
micropolitics (Raunig, 2007), while Marc James Léger’s sinthomeopathy 
formulates a means of resistance that operates firmly within the aesthetics 
and criticality of over-identification (Léger, 2012). These two arguments are 
placed in proximity with one another as the authors are both concerned with 
activist art, which they explicitly name and define in different ways. Between 
an ongoing process of artistic-revolutionary becoming (Raunig) and a 
conscious summoning of a unified opposition of which art is part (Léger), the 
two final theories offer a kind of comparative with regards to the difficult 
positioning of art and politics. 
 
Each of the six theories in this constellation are accompanied with their 
reading-beside (see: introduction; also 1.2.1.) through a queer and feminist 
understanding of embodiment The aim is twofold: to introduce this study’s 
main art theoretical influences and to articulate a framework from which a 
more tangible and embodied socially negotiated art can emerge. The goal of 
chapter one, then, is to confront and refract some of the most defining 
perspectives of the art form so that their lived dimension is better 
underscored.  
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1.1.1. The social interstice of Nicolas Bourriaud’s relational 
aesthetics  
 
At the time that Bourriaud was writing in the 1990s, the computerisation of 
the industrialised world was enabling new forms of connectivity and sociability 
that he observed as susceptible to reification: “The social bond has turned 
into a standardised artefact” (Bourriaud, 1998, p.9). Surveyed in the 
collection of essays on relational aesthetics are works that sought to “inhabit 
the world in a better way” (ibid., p.13). For him, art constitutes the space 
between humans and a world of mechanised and automatised 
communication, one that has the “city streets swept clean of relational dross” 
(ibid., p.16). Written prior to the deeper analyses of affect in late capitalism, 
he focuses instead on the sterility and the mechanisation of human relations; 
the detachment of everyday social routines becomes the problem-site for 
artists. Their focus, then, is on instigating different, more poetic moments of 
sociality comprising variously of group choreography, Fluxus-style 
instructions, role playing, cooking, etc. Borrowing from Marx’s notion of 
interstice in which “trading communities […] elude the capitalist economic 
context by being removed from the law of profit” (ibid., p.16), Bourriaud’s 
relational aesthetics generate social interstices in which interpersonal 
exchanges are no longer only predicated on trade or money, but on desire 
and pleasure.  
 
What the artworks offer are not representations of utopia, but smaller utopian 
possibilities that, for Bourriaud, represent the artistic and political radicality of 
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the 1990s and make them the heir apparent for avant-garde art:  
 
[T]he age of the New Man, future-oriented manifestos, and calls for a 
better world already to be walked into and lived in is well and truly 
over. These days, utopia is being lived on a subjective, everyday basis, 
in the real time of concrete and intentionally fragmentary experiments. 
[…] [P]resent-day art is roundly taking on and taking up the legacy of 
the twentieth century avant-gardes, while at the same time challenging 
their dogmatism and their teleological doctrines. (Bourriaud, 1998, 
p.45) 
 
The smaller intimacies found in a selection of practices are observed and 
grouped into a relational artistic tendency. His curatorial authorship could 
have also been responding to more momentous political shifts at the time –  
namely the ongoing collapse of the Eastern bloc and the accelerating advance 
of neoliberalism. In containing a disparate set of artistic intentions and 
methods, he zooms into social solicitation and performativity in particular as a 
“a space-time frame encoded by the art system, and by the artist him/herself” 
(ibid., p.82). How this artistically supported social interstice questions 
business-oriented transactions is not fleshed out beyond the reiteration of 
art’s role in “subjectivization” (ibid., p.88). Yet his essays have helped 
forecast a specific trajectory of contemporary art in the next two decades. To 
this day, the debate about art’s engagement / entanglement with the social 
continues unabated. Yet by putting together works of art that are more 
different than they are alike, Bourriaud inadvertently prioritises the stylisation 
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of social relations more so than the specific ways in which the relations are 
conceived and produced. He condenses them simply into the “social 
substrate” (ibid., p.15) and remarks “we already know that attitudes become 
forms, and we should now realise that forms prompt models of sociability” 
(ibid., p.58). 
 
As a result, Bourriaud’s critics focus on his failure to engage with the 
particularities of the artists – their positionings, their politics, etc. He does, 
however, alight on a number of important observations related to the 
politicised dimension of relational aesthetics: between his formulation of 
“social interstice” and the continuation of the avant-garde project, he 
presents two recurring questions that would underscore the discourse on 
socially engaged art. The Radical Culture Research Collective (RCRC), a group 
of anonymous artists, activists and researchers working across Berlin, 
Hamburg, London (England), Montreal, London (Canada), New York, San 
Francisco, Tampa, Weimar and Vienna, responds to Bourriaud’s alignment of 
relational art with the avant-garde by stressing the latter’s explicit political 
radicality:  
 
Undoubtedly, the avant-garde tradition continues to be transformed by 
its own process of self-critique.  But it does not give up the radical, 
macro-historical aim of a real world beyond capitalist relations.  And it 
doesn’t settle for the experience of gallery simulations. It’s not that 
experiments in forms and models of sociability are not needed today – 
they certainly are.  But to be politically relevant and effective, such 
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experiments need to be grounded in (or at least actively linked to) 
social movements and struggles. (RCRC, 2007) 
This particular stance regards relational art conversely as a “deradicalisation 
of social desire” (ibid.), uprooted as it is from a conviction to political 
opposition and tamed down as “little services rendered [that] fill in the cracks 
in the social bond” (Bourriaud, 1998, p.36). It is clear that Bourriaud intended 
to contrast relational art with a politically committed art, since the former 
“do[es] not stem from a ‘social’ or ‘sociological’ form of art” (ibid., p.82). The 
sociality is therefore more of an applied one taking place in an artistic 
framework and does not in any way aim to recalibrate realities directly. 
Rather, the space-time of art is exploited in the interstice, the gap between 
our subjectivities and the world by way of the exhibition (ibid.). Instead of 
focusing on whether relational aesthetics is a miscalculated answer of the 
1990s to avant-garde, a more relevant task for the art theoretical overview 
would be to unpack his concept of “social interstice” and how that 
reverberates in the later emergence socially engaged art.  
 
In the mid-1990s, Bourriaud’s explicit concern was to invent “more effective 
tools and more valid viewpoints” to understand the “new artistic behaviour” of 
the time. Unquestioningly embedded within the art institutions and their 
conventions of presentation, he argues that relational art should not be 
viewed as “watered down social critique” but rather, it must be formally 
assessed through the criteria of “the art system” (Bourriaud, 1998 p.82). One 
characteristic most readily associated with relational aesthetics is conviviality, 
which, he emphasises, is not the only defining facet of works like Rirkrit 
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Tiravanija’s dinner parties. He also turns to the ‘product’ of that conviviality, 
which he describes as 
  
a complex form that combines a formal structure, objects made 
available to visitors, and the fleeting image issuing from collective 
behavior. In a way, the use value of conviviality intermingles with its 
exhibition value, within a visual project. (ibid., p.83) 
 
While announcing relational art as the interpersonal microutopia that would 
replace the grandiosity of the old avant-garde, he stops short of positioning it 
in a critical, self-reflexive relation with contemporary art. In fact, his criticism 
falls in line with medium-specific, art historical criticism. Relational aesthetics 
in fact warps and amends social relations as a means of fitting it into an art 
historical canon. What he calls “inter-human commerce” is possible precisely 
because they take place within art-delineated spaces, enabling ways of 
sensing and communicating that are differentiated from the ones he sees as 
dehumanising and mechanised in life. Bourriaud’s intention is not to offer 
some kind of institutional critique, but to introduce the social as an artistic 
substrate (Bourriaud, 1998 p.15), thereby establishing its distinctness from 
the immaterialisation of conceptual art. The works are therefore test grounds 
for synthesised social relations that are realised within the formalities of 
artistic presentation, which verifies their status as art and, at the same time, 
restricts their political situatedness. With regards to the later preoccupation of 
social engagement, relational aesthetics is still a theoretical gesture that 
extends toward it, rooted though it may be within the legitimising spaces of 
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art institutions. His argument relies upon our tapping into sociality as an 
artistic in-joke; only when filtered through the lens of art can the conviviality, 
the collaborations, and the social contracts be interpreted as “micro-utopias” 
and not literally “services rendered” – both are his terminology – through 
cooking or shoe-shining. That relational art is for the art-initiated was 
unwittingly illustrated in a Cologne iteration of Rirkrit Tiravanija’s Untitled 
(Tomorrow Is Another Day, 1996) performance, which was conceived as an 
inviting, open space for all to come together and cook. In a somewhat 
tragicomic contrast, police happened to be shooing away a group of homeless 
people from their makeshift shelter nearby. This was done at the behest of a 
marketing company, who had been hired to promote the rapidly gentrifying 
neighbourhood (Kester, 2004, p.104). The social interstice that was supposed 
to challenge capitalist reification is presented as fictional, used merely to 
present a commercially idealised image of the area. As Stewart Martin asserts, 
this indicates the autonomy that Bourriaud accords art from the world of 
commerce on the one hand, and “relations between people” from “relations 
to objects” on the other: 
 
This non-fetishised space of art underpins the realised utopianism of 
Bourriaud’s account; the sense in which art is a relation of social 
exchange free from exchange-value. But, if this is an antidote to the 
residual late bourgeois melancholy of Adorno’s defence of art as the 
‘absolute commodity’, it is also prone to its own bad conscience, 
namely, the extent to which Relational Aesthetics collapses art’s 
autonomy from exchange-value, leaving the social exchange of 
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relational art subjected to the dominant social relations of capitalist 
exchange. (Martin, 2007, p.376-7) 
 
Martin also points out that by erroneously targeting the object as commodity, 
Bourriaud fails to attend to the social labour that produces value in capitalist 
exchanges (ibid., p.378). By applying a similar duality that separates the art 
world from the one in which we live and trade in, relational aesthetics 
produces a direct, correlative reflection of a neoliberal reality in which 
friendliness is an asset, and service the fastest growing industry. For the 
social interstice to be a possibility, I therefore argue that there needs to be 
room for contradiction, uncertainty, and self-awareness; and for conviviality 
to just be one amongst other frictive relations that differently resist against 
(and, indeed, also comply with) capitalism. The idea of friction is explored 
more extensively in chapter two, particularly with regards to disagreement 
(see: 2.1.3.) and communication (see: 2.2.). 
 
To reflect upon what this elaborated social interstice entails, conviviality is put 
aside to focus on the generative process of what Homi Bhabha calls the “third 
space”. Speaking from a postcolonial perspective, or “the border work of 
culture” (Bhabha, 1994, p.10), Bhabha insists on a hybridity that takes place 
at “the overlap and displacement of domains of difference” – what he also 
calls “interstices”, though pluralised (ibid., p.2). Later on in the text, he 
becomes more specific about the conditions of this nebulous territory, which 
he refers to as “Third Space” (ibid., p.54) and capitalises in the style of a 
proper noun. Here, Bhabha defines third space as a site of refutation:  
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Such an intervention [of Third Space] quite properly challenges our 
sense of the historical identity of culture as a homogenizing, unifying 
force, authenticated by the originary Past, kept alive in the national 
tradition of the People. […] It is only when we understand that all 
cultural statements and systems are constructed in this contradictory 
and ambivalent space of enunciation, that we begin to understand why 
hierarchical claims to the inherent originality or ‘purity’ of cultures are 
untenable, even before we resort to empirical historical instances that 
demonstrate their hybridity. (ibid., p.54-55) 
 
What he emphasises is the persistent emergence of translations and 
interpretations in an uncontainable third space, whose form and function are 
both susceptible to “enunciative” processes. If indeed artists were to make 
the most of the “social interstice”, then the conditions of this place must be 
discussed beyond the defensive confines of art. Following Bhabha, the 
pluralised interstices of cultural intervention, translation, and innovation make 
up the activities of the third space. For the “social interstice” to gain greater 
traction, it must likewise recognise itself as a generative and liminal territory 
of difference that does not exist independently. 
 
Moreover, the creation of that space must consider not only the blurring 
boundaries between the two domains of art and life, but the complicated 
encounter of embodied being as well – typically of people when talking about 
socially engaged art, but this should not be limited to that. Encounters are 
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capable of performing situational contradictions, i.e. producing the differences 
at hand while mitigating them at the same time. Bhabha notably sees this 
third space as one that also “splits” into multiple subjects, since “[t]he 
enunciatory moment of multiple belief is both a defence against the anxiety of 
difference, and itself productive of differentiations. Splitting […] is a strategy 
for articulating contradictory and coeval statements of belief” (Bhabha, 1994, 
p.188, original emphasis). The third space of cultural hybridity thus hinges 
upon this ambivalence of negotiation. While Bhabha’s reflections are 
concerned with cultural intertextuality on a broader scale, I would like to 
situate this within embodied relations that are more specific to the art 
practices of this study. What would it mean, then, for living, breathing 
enactments to be open to appropriation and translation?  
 
To better articulate the bodily implications and the interstitiality of socially 
negotiated art, I turn to Judith Butler’s examination of embodied 
consciousness. In an early exploration of ideas that Butler would later call 
performativity and citationality, “Variations on Sex and Gender” looks at the 
legacy of Simone de Beauvoir’s oft-quoted assertion that one is not born but 
becomes a woman. Part of this involves a re-reading of existentialist choice 
that, following Sartre, is “existed” (as a transitive verb) through continuous, 
embodied interpretations (Butler in Salih, 2004). This is the very site of 
gender creation and subversion, as the binary of man / woman (and its 
attendant transcendent / corporeal assignations) is variously confirmed, 
questioned, and mutated through mimicry and repetition. Elaborating upon 
Beauvoir’s formulation, she notes how Sartre’s consciousness is embodied –
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or rather, how it takes place as the body: “the body itself [as] a surpassing” 
(ibid.). The body is thus transcendent and corporeal in the “choosing” and 
living out of gender, which is “an impulsive yet mindful process of interpreting 
a cultural reality laden with sanctions, taboos, and prescriptions” (ibid.). 
Neither something one is born into or properly chosen, gender is both a 
reiteration and reorganisation of behavioural norms. In this way, the 
embodied processes of bodily becoming coincides with the continuation (of 
tradition) and innovation (of difference) within Bhabha’s third space.  
 
While Butler’s transitive, Sartrian “existing” applies specifically to a gendering 
process that leads to a woman, it sheds light more broadly on the important 
contradiction that is found in the “impulsive” yet “mindful” mimicry by which a 
body makes and displaces itself socially. This is in line with the postcolonial 
border work that Bhabha is concerned with, for both cases insist on a going 
“beyond” of (normative) conventions in space and time. Interweaving these 
two perspectives, the potential of the in-between becomes more intimately 
tied in with the bodily enunciation of subjectivities. In the explicit recalibration 
of a socially engaged to a socially negotiated art, I stress such transitive co-
existing in order to locate what kind of border work is at play in art practices: 
between bodies of all kinds, including individuals, organisations, localities, and 
ecosystems that end up in contact (see also: 3.2.2. on the corporeality of 
space and the making of body borders). 
 
The focus, then, is understanding the innovation of the third space specifically 
through the experience of encounter. Between Bhabha and Butler, I propose 
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embodiment as the site of adherence as well as difference-making, which 
means that bodies can simultaneously submit to and resist the pressures of 
social norms. Bourriaud’s social interstice refracted into this embodied third 
space would be in the position to challenge the contingent – transitively 
existed – norms found in the in-between. This can mean, for example, the 
defamiliarisation of social norms through an “impulsive” and “mindful” making 
negotiation of relations. As such, the social interstice that artists work within 
is not necessarily destined to be relational micro-utopias; it is a space wherein 
propositions are made and responded to in unpredictable ways. It also 
depends on an active form of co-existing that sustains and destabilises, 
upholds and reinvents systems of operation. By drawing attention to the 
possibility of art attuning itself to the complexities of relations as enunciated 
and embodied, the interstice is no longer the service-providing social glue of 
Bourriaud’s imagination, but a disruptive joint of the third space that 
questions how structural norms come to be. 
 
 
1.1.2. The unworked community of Miwon Kwon’s community 
as site-specificity 
 
Examining the proliferation of “site-specificity” in contemporary art, Miwon 
Kwon questions how the laying bare of production, presentation, and 
curatorial contexts in “vanguardist, socially conscious and politically 
committed art practices” have been “domesticated by their assimilation into 
the dominant culture” (Kwon, 2001, p.1). The purpose of her study is to 
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reevaluate site-specificity in the more recent phenomenon of “cultural 
mediation” and its implications on “urban life and urban space” (ibid., p.3). 
Locating the genesis of site in 1960s North American and European art, she 
proceeds to draw the contours of its metamorphosis from an initially physical, 
sedentary concern of institutional critique to a durational, nomadic one, 
bringing us to contemporary projects that are conducted by mobile artists in 
localised settings. She cites the restaging of works by artists like Carl Andre 
and Donald Judd, whose claims of artistic forgery “present an unprecedented 
strain on established patterns of (re)producing, exhibiting, borrowing / 
lending, purchasing / selling, and commissioning / executing art works in 
general” (ibid., p. 43). The immovability of the work became a point against 
which later artists have variously reacted: authenticity would, instead, be 
found in nomadic forms. 
 
But Kwon is also critical of the artist as exotic tourist, shedding light on the 
tension between what she calls “mobilization and specificity” (ibid., p.166). 
Privileged with the ease of travel and communication, the artist (typically a 
well-educated temporary incomer with greater cultural capital) is a delegate 
of an art system that must attend to  
 
the uneven conditions of adjacencies and distances between one thing, 
one person, one place, one thought, one fragment next to another […] 
so that the sequence of sites that we inhabit in our life’s traversal does 
not become genericized into an undifferentiated serialization, one place 
after another” (Kwon, 2001, p. 166, original emphases).  
 38 
 
Her call for a more spatial, situated analysis came just before the term 
“socially engaged art” gained wider usage. In supporting her theoretical 
argument that is based on a history of site-specificity, she turns to 
“community in new genre public art”, a formulation that hearkens to artist 
Suzanne Lacy. Defining new genre public art as “an intensive engagement 
with the people of the site, involving direct communication and interaction 
over an extended period of time” (ibid., p.82), Kwon attends to the site-
specificity of the community form in the projects of Culture in Action (1993), a 
large-scale exhibition programme held in different locations around Chicago 
curated by Mary Jane Jacob. Through her observations of the eight projects, 
she arrives at “four distinct categories” of community at play: community of 
mythic unity is “an abstract projection of commonality” in which an artist’s 
“search for a common denominator” overrides the differences in personal 
situations (ibid., p.119-20); sited communities invite the participation of 
existing organisations in preconceived projects that have little to do with the 
participants’ lives, i.e. participants “perform a relatively incidental role” under 
the guidance of both artist and commissioner (ibid., p.124); invented 
communities (temporary) generate short-lived communities that last only as 
long as the project (ibid., p.126); and invented communities (ongoing), on 
the other hand, have lifespans independent of the project framework and 
“realistic” – i.e. not “hypothetical” – expectations that have been discussed 
with the group. These are often led by artists with “home-team advantage” 
(ibid., p.135), i.e. a “sited insider”.  
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What emerges from Kwon’s typological delineation is a triadic relationship 
between the institution, the artist, and the people who constitute these 
groups or communities. The dynamic of each model is defined by different 
degrees of delegation and collaboration that are accompanied by shifting 
notions of (non-)membership, representation, and ownership. According to 
Kwon’s thinking, these would be further compounded by the instabilities both 
within the group and the individuals, whose identities are under constant 
negotiation:  
 
[Collective artistic praxis] involves a provisional group, produced as a 
function of specific circumstances instigated by an artist and/or cultural 
institution, aware of the effects of these circumstances on the very 
conditions of the interaction, performing its own coming together and 
coming apart as a necessarily incomplete modeling or working-out of a 
collective social process. (ibid., p.154) 
 
The four configurations she identifies demonstrate some possible attempts at 
being a community that are paradoxically undone at the same time. The 
categories are, therefore, not to be read generally, but are instead localised 
snapshots pertaining to the “Culture in Action” context from which they were 
taken. Yet the potentials of an unstable, conflicted, and potentially 
disobedient “unworked” community — “a community that questions its own 
legitimacy is legitimate” (ibid., p.155) — is one that warrants greater 
examination in the context of this study.  
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The question of self-reflexive legitimacy leads to counterpublics, a concept 
that queer studies scholar Michael Warner uses to reference bodies that 
understand themselves to be normatively illegitimate. Proposed in reference 
to the subcultures that defy heteronormativity, counterpublics are concerned 
with the socialised implications of “public” and “private” realms as well as the 
gendering that correlate to them (Warner, 2002). In accordance with the 
normative conventions of the gender binary, masculinity is assumed to be 
outward-facing and of the public domain (providing free movement to political 
subjects and breadwinners) while femininity is, conversely, inward-facing and 
of the private domain (for exclusively domestic, biologically reproductive 
subjects). This opposition has been both refuted and reclaimed, not least by 
the very existence and examinations of spaces organised and frequented 
specifically by women and queer people as unacknowledged publics. Yet it 
remains important to note the more insidious blurrings between public and 
the private domains that demonstrate a different kind of inseparability of the 
two, e.g. the debate on reproductive rights or the unease associated with 
public disclosure – outings – with regards to one’s gender non-conforming 
body:  
 
[W]hile the personal is “political” in a broad sense, state regulation 
may not always be appropriate. And while the private realm of the 
home should often be a matter of public care and concern, the market 
– like the state and like the majoritarian public of the mass media – 
has its own destructive tendencies and may be a bad model of “the 
public”. (Warner, 2002, p.36) 
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The political public is thus neither completely outside of or merged with the 
domestic private, for the difficult relationship between them produces the 
very contentions that must, in fact, be made public – or, as with the 
embodied third space (see: 1.1.1.), transitively existed. This, however, cannot 
merely be resolved by state or legal intervention, which suggests the need for 
structural legitimization (and thus control). While legal recognition is crucial 
for day-to-day survival, the “unworking” of community is concerned with the 
slippages between private and public domains as they enunciate a new 
counterpublic energy. Rather than a unifying “commonness” of being, the 
“being-in-common” is found in the active articulation of difference as it comes 
into frictive contact with “the majoritarian public” (Warner, 2002), the latter 
of which is revealed to be a socially negotiated / disciplined terrain.  In what 
follows, I propose two possibilities of rethinking the counterpublic as a 
functional unit: in terms of coherence and individuation. The first proposes a 
desire for community that results from an embodied sense of loneliness 
(Bauman, 2000) and the second presents a contrasting notion of multitude, 
whereby sociality is a necessary process that precedes individuation (Virno, 
2004). 
 
Describing the disconnected, hyper-mobile individual of “liquid modernity”, 
Zygmunt Bauman points out that the rising appeal for “communitarianism” is 
inversely proportional to the loss of security and social institutions: “[T]he 
volume of individual responsibilities […] grows on a scale unprecedented for 
the post-war generations” (Bauman, 2000, p.170). He argues that the 
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“stripped harness[es]” with which communities operate in the present time is 
the only form they can take, reasoning that “the facility with which they can 
be put on in the morning and taken off in the evening (or vice versa)” (ibid., 
p.169) makes belonging flexible. Given how contemporary life is governed by 
speed, communities that had to be slowly built up are now quickly cobbled 
together by easily identifiable, common attributes. Whereas they once 
provided a situated sense of duration and continued belonging, local and 
social institutions are now lighter than ever. “Community” is a longing in a 
time of “unstructured, fluid state of the immediate setting of life-politics” 
(ibid., p.8). The individual’s body and assertive “self” serves as the last 
bastion of security in such a climate. Bauman explains this shift: 
 
The body and its satisfactions have not become less ephemeral since 
the time when Durkheim sang the glory of durable social institutions. 
The snag, though, is that everything else — and those social 
institutions most prominently — has now become more ephemeral yet 
than the ‘body and its satisfactions’. (ibid., p.183) 
 
In other words, the body is seen as the last safe zone in an environment that 
has done away with systemic responsibility. This feeling of being unmoored is 
a crucial addition in the consideration of counterpublics, which is revisited at 
the end of this analysis. For now, what exactly is “the new loneliness of body 
and community” (ibid., p.184)? Like Kwon’s interpretation of Nancy’s 
“unworking”, Bauman recognises in the notion of community “an emergent 
unity […] which is an outcome, not an a priori given condition, of shared life, 
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a unity put together through negotiation and reconciliation, not the denial, 
stifling or smothering out of differences” (ibid., p.178). While Kwon sees in 
“unworking” an optimistic potential for radical togetherness, Bauman also 
considers how the contingent communities are a product of uncertain times, 
the only meaningful togetherness that can cope with “the volatility of 
identities” (ibid.). To put it differently, he believes that no other community 
practices are viable today except that of the contingent. Yet we cannot help 
but fret at the exposure of our bodies and long for something to hold on to, 
for sustained reciprocation, dependence, and roots. That this scenario has 
been made increasingly impossible everyday only further deepens the body’s 
yearning for community. Therefore, Bauman links the body and the 
community in their shared fate of loneliness:  
 
Body and community are the last defensive outposts on the 
increasingly deserted battlefield on which the war for certainty, 
security and safety is waged daily with little, if any, respite. They need 
now to perform the tasks once divided among many bastions and 
stockades. More depends on them now than they are able to carry, 
and so they are likely to deepen, rather than to allay, the fears which 
prompted the seekers of security to run to them-for shelter. (Bauman, 
2000, p.184) 
 
The susceptibility of the contemporary body engenders a greater desire for 
security and protection. This is how Bauman arrives at neo-tribal communities 
shaped by nationalist tendencies and racist divisions – something he 
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emphatically situates within the liquifying present. Such belonging latches 
onto simplistic similarities that “contains just one rubric”, e.g. of nationalism. 
(ibid., p.176; see: 3.2.2. for an elaboration on the affective draw of 
nationalism). 
 
But this “loneliness” is neither new nor merely in the service of nationalist 
self-preservation. This positioning of body and community within Bauman’s 
argument of liquid modernity neglects to examine the othering effects of such 
single-rubric belonging, for nationalist belonging also means xenophobic 
exclusion and “foreigner” non-members. In other words, these are the bodies 
that constitute a different, other(ed) “loneliness” with an equally different 
counterpublic affect. While he notes how a delineation of a nationalist we 
marks out a they at the same time (Bauman, 2000, p.176), he fails to look at 
how this is manifested. The argument here is that there are repercussions 
that occur in the wake of a generalised “liquid modern” loneliness, ones that 
are crucial for my refraction here: the loneliness of one group’s single-rubric 
belonging creates at the same time their non-belonging groups, and thus 
other rubrics for counterpublic making. Beyond the precarity of the body as 
the last safe zone of a neoliberal present, there is the precarity of being 
marked as a racial, sexual, disabled, etc. other. It is this reverse reading of 
bodily loneliness that is useful for extending Kwon’s unworked community, for 
the community enabled under something like nationalism also gives life to its 
potential counterpublics. Importantly, this also recalls the ambivalence of the 
reiterative yet innovative third space (see: 1.1.1.) by showing how an 
adherence to a normativising convention (of state and race) is also 
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simultaneously a splitting into new subversive subjectivities. 
 
A counterpoint to thinking about the counterpublic as bodies-drawn-together 
is the concept of a multitude, which Paolo Virno suggests is a meeting of the 
many meeting not as an end goal, but as part of an individuation process: 
 
We could say—with Marx, but against the grain of a large segment of 
Marxism—that the radical transformation of the present state of things 
consists in bestowing maximum prominence and maximum value on 
the existence of every single member of the species […]. Marx's theory 
could (or rather should) be understood, today, as a realistic and 
complex theory of the individual, as a rigorous individualism: thus, as a 
theory of individuation. (Virno, 2004, p.80) 
 
For Virno, social relations therefore function as a site as well as a means for 
the performative negotiation of a “pre-individual reality” (ibid.). However, by 
inverting the goal of coming-together (community) into a radical going- 
asunder (multitude), Virno leads to the real crux of his argument which 
concerns the mining of our innate social capacity within post-Fordist 
capitalism (ibid., p.83). He identifies a “society of labour”, wherein our time 
with friends and family – or “social time” – has “come unhinged because 
there is no longer anything which distinguishes labor from the rest of human 
activities” (ibid., 102). This is something he reiterates as a point of caution, 
given how examinations of community typically assume a magnetism that 
brings a group together (even if only momentarily and problematically) rather 
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than the enunciation of an individual from the many. Indeed, the multitude 
shuns everything that the politically unified, state-based “people” stands for. 
It also throws into question the very notions of public and private, critiquing 
in particular the political left’s tendency to turn the latter into an issue of 
“deprivation” (ibid., p.24). By questioning the presupposition that the 
individual is powerlessly set adrift, he spins into perspective a sociality that is 
related to an individual-in-the-making. This is a relevant point that challenges 
what it means to be on one’s own, because the potential forces that set an 
individual apart from the many can constitute new rules for the social, leaving 
behind current disciplinary governmentalities. As such, Virno’s 
individualisation gives pause to the way an individual is seen as untethered, 
left alone.  
 
But as Antonio Negri reminds us in his reflections on the multitude, its sense 
of self and its constitutive bodily singularities “[do] not exist except in relation 
to the other”, for “[t]here is no possibility for a body of being alone” (Negri, 
2008, p.120). The emphasis, then, is on bodies that are enunciated from the 
multitude, which returns us to sociality as the site of contention. Though 
Bauman and Virno offer different ways of rethinking community, neither 
seems particularly interested in locating their respective theory within lived 
experience. What happens, for instance, when different lonely bodies 
encounter one another on a daily basis? Or if we were to take Virno’s 
argument – that social relations are a prelude to an unending process of 
individuation – where can we find them? Publics shift, appear into and 
disappear from view, and are sometimes so transient that they are not seen 
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as one, e.g. bus passengers, pedestrians on a street, museum visitors, 
hospital patients, etc. I draw attention to these prosaic forms not to suggest 
that their seemingly random and spontaneous gathering are necessarily of 
artistic or political consequence, but to re-materialise other “contingent” 
circumstances in which bodies actually meet. Where do our bodies linger, 
where do they hurry by? The weight of impressions and the trajectories of our 
bodies provide important situated cues to supplement the frameworks of 
contingent community and multitude. Returning to Warner, he emphasises 
the looseness of publics generated “through mere attention” or “stranger 
sociability”, which requires the minimal awareness and proximity to a public 
discourse, e.g. an unplanned incident, an audible speech, etc.: 
 
It promises to address anybody. It commits itself in principle to the 
possible participation of any stranger. […] The projective character of 
public discourse, in which each characterization of the circulatory path 
becomes material for new estrangements and re-characterizations, is 
an engine for (not necessarily progressive) social mutation. (Warner, 
2002, p.113) 
 
These “estrangements” are not euphemistically equated to progressive 
worldmaking, but highlighted as potential moments in which interventions of 
(counter)publicness can be made. To situate what he means: the pervasive 
call for heteronormativity, for a gay, white man like Warner, is an instance of 
what he calls “the projective character of public discourse”. Its effects are felt 
daily on queer bodies that are subsequently estranged in more or less 
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aggressive ways. Warner cites the eighteenth century group of gender-
bending men, the She-Romps (ibid., p.109), as a historical example of a 
counterpublic forming around a specific estrangement of gender non-
conformity, one that finds its embodied realisation (and co-recognition) in a 
cluster of similarly othered bodies. This goes to show that loneliness as a 
response to the absence of social support is not as new as Bauman posits, 
and is certainly not unique to this “liquid modernity”. While the generalised 
bodies of his analysis may feel “a new loneliness” (Bauman, 2000, p.184) by 
the breakdown of social institutions, this sense of loss or loneliness is a 
significant part of the histories of counterpublic struggles.  
 
In reading beside Kwon’s thoughts on communities that question themselves, 
I arrive at a formulation of counterpublics and lonely, othered bodies that are 
produced in maladjustment to social norms. I would like to stress again that 
the embodiment of loneliness needs to look more closely at the situated 
effects of neoliberal precarity, beyond even sex, gender, and race in a 
recommitment to bodies “outside the boundaries of sanctioned time and 
space, legal status, citizen-subjecthood” (Eng, Halberstam and Muñoz in Eng, 
2005, p.13). This is because neither a liquid, contingent community nor a self-
fulfilling individuation heed their actual repercussions; the “one rubric” of 
Bauman’s nationalist belonging, as it has been argued, also engenders 
multiple differences around which counterpublics form. These, in turn, 
complicate how the body, community, as well as individuation function as 
premises for reflecting upon the social. Bodies marked as different also 
experience different valences of precarity, and the multitude still needs to 
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concentrate on the social as the conditions for individualization. In line with 
Eng et al. (2005), queerness in its broadest sense has the capacity to remind 
us of the bodies that are unaccounted for, and this is especially relevant in 
situations that summon the spirit of community.  
 
To take seriously the marginalisation of race, sex, gender, disability, etc. 
means looking at how counterpublic belonging is negotiated in real time and 
space. For context, an anti-trans lesbian group “Get the L Out” led the Pride 
in London march in 2018 for much of the time and organisers felt unable to 
stop them as they handed out flyers to the crowd (Dommu, 2018). In pushing 
hard for inclusivity, diversity, and exuberance, what is overlooked? Pride in 
London issued at least two different apologies in which they attempted to 
explain their lack of action. Of note is the earlier one in which a spokesperson 
provided specific statistics from the organisation’s “Pride Matters” report, 
including how 24% of the LGBTQ+ respondents saw the event as a “protest” 
(ibid.). Implicit was that “Get the L Out” had the right to do what they did, as 
Pride is perceived to be a protest platform for LGBTQ+ issues; their other 
apology cited “hot weather” and safety as reasons for not intervening. Caught 
in a muddle of apology and defence, the spokesperson showed how supposed 
counterpublic organising just as easily fumbles at the intersection of trans 
awareness, lesbian separatism, law, and public display. For socially engaged 
art practices that are positioned within or beside counterpublics, they can 
easily find themselves in similar predicaments where poor decisions need to 
be addressed. A socially negotiated art therefore emphasises a self-reflexive 
rigour that takes stock of the bodies, relations, and interests it is most 
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accountable for. Art workers must learn to continually attune, abandon, and 
re-attune to the bodies and connections around us in order to recognise who 
“we” are in relation to others, which also means accounting for who we do 
not – and cannot – include.  
 
 
1.1.3. Empathetic insights of Grant Kester’s dialogical 
aesthetics  
 
The third theory of socially engaged art I turn to is Grant Kester’s dialogical 
aesthetics, which appears in his 2004 publication “Conversation Pieces”. He 
focuses on dialogue as a site of aesthetic experience by positioning it as a 
radical departure from the avant-garde lineage of “semantic labour” (Kester, 
2004). Through a discursive experience of shared intersubjectivity, he directly 
challenges the individual aesthetic experience which, in its opacity and 
insularity, means to counteract the “malevolent other (kitsch, mass culture, 
etc.) that threatens to destroy or compromise [art] in some way” (Kester, 
2004, p.30). In his argument, dialogical art practices are grounded within 
idiosyncratic patterns of speaking and listening that are defined through  
 
a complex process of political self-definition. [They] unfold against the 
backdrop of collective modes of oppression (racism, sexism, class 
oppression, etc.) but also within a set of shared cultural and discursive 
traditions. (ibid., p.150) 
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His intention to theorise art practices from a more situated perspective is 
something this study also seeks to achieve. Yet Kester’s approach differs in 
his attempt to position dialogical aesthetics within as well as away from a 
larger avant-garde legacy. This is something that his critics have addressed in 
different ways, from his neglecting the revolutionary history that is part of the 
avant-garde (Léger, 2007, p.41-42; see also: 1.1.6. for Léger’s 
psychoanalytical approach to avant-garde art practices) to his downplaying of 
aesthetic criteria as part of the process. One of his more prominent critics is 
Claire Bishop, whose analysis of participatory art based on aesthetic negation 
is something this study also looks into (see: 1.1.4.).  
 
Much of the criticism against Kester stems from his attempt to present 
dialogical art practices as socially oriented, which he puts in distinction to the 
supposed insularity of avant-garde art practices. The latter, he argues, takes 
into account the aesthetic “emancipatory communication” (Kester, 2004, 
p.29) of a singular viewer. His account of dialogical aesthetics is therefore 
positioned as a departure of this approach rather than a continuation of it; in 
so doing, he is also seen to undermine the political project of avant-garde art. 
His is a difficult claim to defend, because Kester’s dialogical aesthetics is not 
only a break from the avant-garde, but pronounces an intersubjectivity that is 
the site of this art form’s political meaning-making. Even as he concludes that 
dialogical aesthetics “is part of a more venerable tradition of self-critique 
within the history of modernism” (ibid., p.188), his project is undeniably built 
out of its supposed political obsolescence, resulting in a great deal of 
theoretical backlash. The point of bringing up the criticism is to demonstrate 
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the ways in which art theorists have attempted to define practices in line with 
(or against the grain of) lineages, reshaping the latter in the process. Part of 
what this study seeks to do is to rethink what it means to contribute to these 
lineages – or narratives – which, in this case, looks at the practices for what 
they do without pledging its exact location in the art and social entanglement. 
Recalling Bhabha’s enunciated reinvention of tradition (see: 1.1.1.), this study 
is invested in the ambivalent potential of cultural articulation that elides 
definitions of the artistic as well as the social. As such, Kester’s exploration of 
how his dialogical aesthetics takes place is of greater salience. 
 
Referencing feminist studies on “active listening” via Gemma Corradi Fiumara 
and “procedural” ways of knowing via Mary Field Belenky, Kester homes in on 
a horizontality that takes place between speakers and listeners, extending to 
artists and collaborators. For Kester, the possibility of art’s autonomy is put to 
test in these encounters, because in the midst of creating new 
understandings, dialogical artists must be “defined in terms of openness, of 
listening, and of a willingness to accept a position of dependence and 
intersubjective vulnerability relative to the viewer or collaborator” (Kester, 
2004, p.110).  
 
Kester builds his case for dialogical aesthetics partly around the socially and 
discursively constructed identity in Habermas’s ideal speech situation. In 
doing so, he critiques the latter’s reliance on “ontologically stable agents”, 
who are capable of “bracketing” their material differences as they take part 
and debate in the public sphere (ibid., 109-113). In response to that, he 
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advocates a more empathetic communication:  
 
It is through empathy that we learn not simply to suppress self-interest 
through identification with some putatively universal perspective, or 
through the irresistible compulsion of logical argument, but literally to 
redefine self: to both know and feel our connectedness with others. 
(ibid., p.114) 
 
He argues for an “empathetic insight” that is achieved by imagining and 
“approximat[ing]” another person’s subject position, though he cautions the 
“arrogance of speaking for others” (ibid., p.115). While Kester turns briefly to 
Bakhtin’s “dialogical situation” and Levinas’s “responsibility” to underpin what 
he means by empathetic insight (ibid., p.120), he ultimately returns to 
specific practices in order to illustrate the “cumulatively experienced 
transformation passing through phases of coherence, vulnerability, 
dissolution, and recoherence” (ibid.). Yet the experience of imagining or 
confronting the experience of another remains underexplored in his 
argument. What I would like to carry through are the terms he highlights 
above – coherence, vulnerability, dissolution and recoherence – which gives 
shape to the relational textures and affects of “empathetic insights”.  
 
The task here is to formulate a meaningful approach that accounts for the 
desire to feel and/or understand the position of another in a different and 
more precise way. In the published correspondence between Judith Butler 
and Athena Athanasiou (2013), they re-examine the term “dispossession” by 
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problematising its straight-forward association with extreme privatisation and 
growing precarity: social institutions are disappearing as systems of state and 
public support morph into privately run, profit-driven services. This leads to 
an increasingly vigilant guarding of our assets as well as subject positions, 
which the two theorists seek to challenge through a critical deployment of 
dispossession. There is a conscious interplay of double meanings in Butler’s 
and Athanasiou’s analysis:  
 
We recognized that both of us thought that ethical and political 
responsibility emerges only when a sovereign and unitary subject can 
be effectively challenged, and that the fissuring of the subject, or its 
constituting “difference,” proves central for a politics that challenges 
both property and sovereignty in specific ways. Yet as much as we 
prize the forms of responsibility and resistance that emerge from a 
“dispossessed” subject – one that avows the differentiated social bonds 
by which it is constituted and to which it is obligated – we also were 
keenly aware that dispossession constitutes a form of suffering for 
those displaced and colonized and so could not remain an 
unambivalent political ideal. We started to think together about how to 
formulate a theory of political performativity that could take into 
account the version of dispossession that we valued as well as the 
version we oppose. (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013, p.ix-x) 
 
The “sovereignty” of “self-poietics” concerns, for Butler and Athanasiou, the 
struggle of self with and against norms as well as alterity. As a concept, 
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“sovereignty” has been extensively explored, more notably as the decision-
making that creates an exception in the order of the law (Schmitt, 2010) and 
as the creation of political life that structures the chaos of bare life (Agamben, 
1998) amongst other theories. More recently, Wendy Brown points to the 
fiction of political sovereignty that is only given credence through 
“theatricalized and spectacularized performance” practices such as “walling” 
(Brown, 2010). A similar understanding of sovereignty-in-practice is found in 
Butler and Athanasiou, with the self and subjectivity as sites. Indeed, they 
reflect on the impossibility of enclosing one’s self by looking at its socially and 
politically regulated emergence. Rather than submit to a defensive position of 
the bounded and limited body that puts sovereignty into practice, Athanasiou 
argues that the “self” 
 
does not refer to an autological and self-contained individuality, but 
rather to responsive dispositions toward becoming-with-one-another, 
as they are manifested, for example, in the various affects that throw 
us ‘out of joint’ and ‘beside ourselves,’ such as indignation, despair, 
desire, outrage, and hope. These are all affective dispositions that are 
‘owned’ not only by ourselves (if, in fact, it can ever be claimed that 
they can be assumed as ‘one’s own’), but by others as well. 
(Athanasiou in Butler and Athanasiou, 2013, p.71) 
 
The self thrown “out of joint” is a sense of bodily and subjective dispossession 
that can also be found in this study’s later examination on orientation and the 
difficulties of being properly aligned (see: 1.1.6.). Responding to Athanasiou, 
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Butler analyses our belonging to others by posing a deceptively 
straightforward question, “who are you?” (Butler in Butler and Athanasiou., 
p.73). The ways in which it is asked, however, betray any number of 
(dis)possessed corporealities, for the question can be posed reflexively (“who 
are you, this body I inhabit?”) or to a situation outside of oneself, amongst 
other ways. By asking “who are you?”, the contours of the self and the social 
are drafted and redrafted. This negotiation is relentless and takes place within 
“a normative horizon” that, following Foucault, “determine[s] who can and 
cannot be an intelligible subject” (ibid., p.67).  
 
As a result, “who are you” is a crucial question in tackling how one might feel 
for another, or socially. But who asks, who responds, and what is their 
answer? These are negotiated by the body in terms of how it enacts a 
subjective position within the world and vice versa. Specifically, how exactly is 
a body thrown “out of joint” or “made intelligible”? Butler returns the reader 
to the scene in which Fanon is seen by a French boy. “Look, a negro!” he 
points and exclaims. The question, “who are you?” reverberates here in a 
number of ways, including: 1. the boy answers his own question of who 
Fanon is, reducing him to a spectacle of racial otherness; 2. Fanon asks 
himself who he is in the eyes of the boy; 3. Fanon asks who the boy is as a 
response to the latter’s remark. 
 
As the body learns its limits within the world, so too does it come to surpass 
them (see: 1.1.1. on the existing of gender). To this end, Butler sees the 
question “who are you?” as an act of self-interrogation, as if one is speaking 
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to another “that emerges from the resources of the body”. Reappropriating 
Fanon, she refers to this appellation as “o you, o my body” in order to 
reinforce the social agency of the body, for it “becomes the ‘you’ at the same 
time as the world of others becomes the ‘you.’” (Butler in Butler and 
Athanasiou, 2013, p.81). This is a moment when dispossession can be seen 
to split, simultaneously disciplining and crafting the body. In refracting 
Kester’s empathetic insight into an embodied and socially negotiated 
dispossession, I focus on the emergent potential that recalibrates self, 
subjectivities, and relations. 
 
However, the struggle against sovereignty and the identities that regulate it 
can sometimes lead to horrific forms of dispossession. For example, Jasbir 
Puar describes the body of a suicide bomber as one that is “transformed into 
a weapon, not in a metaphorical sense but in a truly ballistic sense” (Puar, 
2005, p.129). No longer the last safe zone (Bauman, 2000; see: 1.1.2.), the 
body is now literally explosive:  
 
Temporal narratives of progression are upturned as death and 
becoming fuse into one: as one’s body dies, one’s body becomes the 
mask, the weapon, the suicide bomber, not before. […] The body-
weapon does not play as metaphor, or in the realm of meaning and 
epistemology, but rather forces us ontologically anew to ask: what 
kinds of information does the ballistic body impart? (Puar, 2005, p.129) 
 
In this interval before the dust settles, the carnage sends out intensities that 
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fail to come together cognitively but nevertheless constitute the foundation 
for fleeting situated knowledges, what Puar calls “queer assemblages”. The 
ballistic body is capable of “scrambling the terrain of the political” (ibid., 
p.136), making nonsense out of self and other, dispossession and 
sovereignty. It is a total disintegration, for “[t]he dispersion of the boundaries 
of bodies forces a completely chaotic challenge to normative conventions of 
gender, sexuality, and race, disobeying normative conventions of ‘appropriate’ 
bodily practices and the sanctity of the able body” (ibid., p.131).  
 
As such, Puar’s depiction of suicide bombing helps to critique and situate the 
double edges of dispossession. On the one hand, the loss of bodily self has 
been taken to its fullest consequence, resulting in its annihilation as well as 
everything that it was defined by. On the other, the explosion not only 
“throws [things] out of joint” (Athanasiou in Butler and Athanasiou, 2013, 
p.71), but completely “scrambles” the correlations with regards to bonds, 
terror, and identities into “unknowable” queer assemblages. This suggests 
that subjective dispossession is limited, for there is a point where the social 
can feel “unknowable” even as the affective repercussions in this space is 
keenly felt. 
 
In closing, I turn to a video work by The Atlas Group called The Bachar Tapes 
(2000). While this piece is not a “socially engaged” art project – there is no 
explicit group process shown – it does imply an extremely close and 
confidential negotiation with one sole collaborator. As with most work by The 
Atlas Group, there is much to speculate: under what circumstances did they 
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meet? How did they work out the process? Is the collaborator even real? Most 
relevantly here, however, is the narrated depiction of an event, which 
involves violent forms of othering. The video shows a man sitting in a bare 
room talking to the camera about the 1985 “Western Hostage Crisis” in 
Lebanon, wherein five white American men were taken captive and he, a 
Lebanese man, was the sixth. The American hostages returned home after 
their release, and all went on to publish books about their experience. Invited 
by The Atlas Group, the sole Lebanese hostage Souheil Bachar purportedly 
made a total of 53 videos that detailed his time in captivity. Of all the 
recordings, he has apparently authorised only two to be shown outside of his 
home country. In this particular one, he describes the captives’ anxiety and 
the (sexual) aggression he experienced directly to the viewer: 
 
David would get very angry if Terry’s feet touch his. They would come 
up with the strangest ideas to make sure that their bodies did not 
touch. After a few weeks, all this changed. No one seemed to care 
anymore. But they had a different relation to me from the beginning. 
They were clearly disgusted with my body. But they touched me all the 
time. I remember one night in particular, one very hot summer night 
when the room was filled with our stench. As usual, we were all on the 
floor sleeping. Or trying to sleep. I felt someone’s ass rubbing against 
my crotch. Someone was rubbing himself on me. I became hard and I 
don’t know why, but I pressed myself against his ass. It felt good. 
Seconds later, he punched me in the groin, as if my hard-on had 
provoked him. I stayed quiet. (Atlas Group, 2000) 
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Following Puar, the assault was enabled by the normativising power of 
stabilised identity frameworks that not only etch Bachar’s body with 
differences — “they were clearly disgusted with my body” — but turn it into 
the site of disciplinary reterritorialisation (Puar, 2007, p.158). As an artwork, 
his re-telling depicts a particularly desperate situation in which dispossession 
is happening in two bleak ways: as attempted rape and as a subjective 
undoing of the victim. Firstly, the rub of the man’s rear-end in the darkness of 
the cell violently parallels (and exceeds) the pointing finger in Fanon’s 
narrative to not only exclaim at Bachar’s otherness, but to take it by force. 
Secondly, the victim responds surprisingly and queerly, with a conflicted 
openness that he fails to explain — “I became hard and don’t know why”. Of 
course, it must be emphasised that I am not presenting Bachar’s reaction as 
exemplary, nor am I suggesting submissive reciprocation as a survival tactic. 
What is crucial here, however, is how the second mode of dispossession can 
be seen as his self-weaponising in a way that occurs to him, rather than a 
conscious act like that of the suicide bomber’s. Refracting Butler’s “who are 
you?”, Bachar’s queer desire paradoxically confronts his rapist — his racial 
power, heterosexuality, and sovereignty. Unintelligibility has become a queer 
assemblage that questions back, scrambling the scene. The rapist’s intention 
has also been dispossessed and he retreats.  
 
Bachar’s and Fanon’s experiences of racialised and/or sexualised 
subordination provides some important groundwork for articulating the 
textures of dispossession, an idea used here to refract Kester’s empathetic 
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insight. As discussed, his examination points to some of its most crucial 
affective stages – “coherence, vulnerability, dissolution, and recoherence” 
(Kester, 2004, p.121) – but does not examine the complexities of the process. 
And while dialogical art “facilitates a reciprocal exchange that allows us to 
think outside our own lived experience and establish a more compassionate 
relationship with others” (ibid., p.150), he notes how difficult and problematic 
this becomes the further the artist travels. What is exposed in dispossession is 
the inescapability of the social, which posits existing contact between bodies 
and contexts. But this is complicated by one’s position with relation to 
complicity of power and security structures. This is, in the end, the queerness 
of dispossession; it opens up relations at the same time as being restricted by 
them. If dispossession is to critically challenge empathy by the “scrambling” 
of norms in self-poietics, it must tune into the ways that affects make – or fail 
to make – meaningful connections. Within the context of art practices, 
dispossession is nonetheless in a better position to question the limits as well 
as the possibilities of the social. Rather than aiming for a horizontal 
reciprocity, the focus is on emergent experiences of the in-between space and 
how they reverberate back into bodies and situations. 
 
 
1.1.4. Artistic antagonism of Claire Bishop’s participatory art  
 
Following the publication of Kester's “Conversation Pieces”, Claire Bishop 
wrote an article about the “social turn” in contemporary art for Artforum 
(Bishop, 2006b). In an effort to theorise the use of social situations within the 
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context of art, she challenges the political correctness of “interventionist, 
activist and socially engaged art” while recuperating the aesthetic evaluation 
of these practices, an argument she fleshes out more extensively in her 
publication “Artificial Hells” (2012). An important note here is her adaptation 
of the term “participatory art” throughout the text, which is commonly used 
by cultural organisations working with defined groups of people. By the 
1990s, the community arts of the 1970s and 1980s that had grown out of a 
cultural democracy movement was tapering off due to its waning political 
momentum (Hope, 2011). One of its unintended legacies was to provide a 
model for “individual-focused arts programmes supported by public funds in 
the UK today” (Matarasso, 2013, p.2), which many grants-giving 
organisations refer to as “participatory” arts. Bishop's usage of “participatory”, 
however, is a deliberate move against the notion of socially engaged, to 
which she asks, “what artist isn't socially engaged? Her book is therefore 
organised around a definition of participation in which “people constitute the 
central artistic medium and material, in the manner of theatre and 
performance” (Bishop, 2012, p.2). In moving away from social engagement, 
Bishop intends to reconsider participatory practices within an aesthetic 
framework. 
 
In “Artificial Hells”, she presents a historical timeline of such a participatory 
art, the appearance of which is linked to different moments of political 
upheaval. Despite grouping a wide selection of projects around three pivotal 
moments in twentieth century history from Europe and South America, she is 
critical about the collapsing distance between art and life. She turns to 
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Jacques Rancière’s theory of the aesthetic regime in particular to reinforce her 
scepticism of “well-meaning advocates of socially collaborative art” (ibid., 
p.25): 
 
In insisting upon consensual dialogue, sensitivity to difference risks 
becoming a new kind of repressive norm – one in which artistic 
strategies of disruption, intervention or over-identification are 
immediately ruled out as “unethical” because all forms of authorship 
are equated with authority and indicted as totalising. (ibid.) 
 
She seeks to clarify the critical and political role of art without imposing upon 
it the responsibility to be socially efficacious, admitting that “we [of the art 
world] need to support the progressive transformation of existing institutions 
[…] whose boldness is related to (and at times greater than) that of artistic 
imagination” (ibid., p.284). For Bishop, many artists working in the social 
realm are reluctant to deal with aesthetic, historically avant-garde concerns 
that foreground negation and antagonism, preferring instead to offer 
platforms for convivial exchange. She argues that they have carved out an 
impossible position in being tethered to a history of artistic dematerialisation 
and performance, while claiming at the same time not to be making art; 
Turkish artist group Oda Projesi, for instance, consider aesthetics to be “’a 
dangerous word’ that should not be brought into discussion”, because their 
goal is to create “dynamic and sustained relationships” (ibid., p.21). The 
problem for Bishop, then, is when ethics are brought in as means of assessing 
art. As such, “art enters a realm of useful, ameliorative and ultimately modest 
 64 
gestures, rather than the creation of singular acts that leave behind them a 
troubling wake” (ibid., p.23). 
 
In pointing to the slippage between art and life, especially the subsumption of 
art under ethics, Bishop highlights the debate that surrounds the critical role 
of art within life. By this, she appears to include everything from day-to-day 
encounters to political movements. Given the loss of systemic support and the 
pervasiveness of ethical consumerism and neoliberal voluntarism, Bishop’s 
critique of the altruism that underpins many socially engaged practices is not 
at all unreasonable. Art projects are often included as part of market and 
state aligned urban renewal schemes that promote a sense of well-being, of 
improvement. To combat what, in her view, is the ubiquity of earnest and 
conciliatory art practices, she turns to the exploitative (Sierra’s 250cm Line 
Tattooed on 6 Paid People, 1999), antagonistic (Schlingensief’s Please Love 
Austria, 2000), and contradictory (Hirschhorn’s The Bijlmer-Spinoza Festival, 
2009) capacities of art. Bishop presents some key aesthetic approaches of de-
alienation by emphasising the artist’s determinative role of the process, 
responsible as she (the artist) is for coming up with the terms by which the 
participants are expected to behave. In arguing for the artist as author 
seeking to make her mark – in this case, through the medium of people – 
Bishop is clear. That may very well be the point for some of the artists 
mentioned above, as the tension of exploitation makes up a significant part of 
their practice. Particularly in Sierra’s case, the subjects are paid to be 
permanently tattooed by artistic desire. Thus, the murkiness of participation 
rears its head through the question of consent: to what extent do the 
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participants of this piece agree to becoming Sierra’s medium? While 
deliberately hovering at the edges of such a permission, does it (not) matter 
that he draws the sinister tension for his work from bodies with real traces of 
suffering? 
 
The gap in Bishop’s antagonistic aesthetics lies in her dismissal of the 
unpredictable, multilayered dynamics between bodies that artists working in 
the social realm are, in fact, looking to explore. Art critics from Josephine 
Berry Slater to Morgan Quaintance critique this as neglectful of “a politics of 
the subject” (Berry Slater, 2013) and that “using human beings as medium 
and material rings alarm bells because people are complex thinking and 
feeling beings” (Quaintance, 2012). Despite it being a valid endeavour, 
putting bodies within prescribed conflict situations is equally (if not primarily) 
a series of ethical decisions. So if part of the artistic process involves 
experimenting with new and potentially uncomfortable social paradigms and 
the re-negotiation of bodies and perspectives, what specific skills and 
sensitivities would the artist need to exhibit? In emphasising the “troubling” 
antagonism of participatory art, Bishop correlatively downplays the intricacies 
of relations, viewing them as an ethical duty that compromises – rather than 
enhances – artistic imagination.  
 
Given its vital position in collaborative work, negotiation is under-
problematised as fraught and difficult. Bishop’s insistence that “participatory” 
works be assessed as art alone is symptomatic of the desire to protect the 
autonomy that keeps art, in her words, “at one remove” from life (Bishop, 
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2012, p.199), which then overlooks the potential of emergent socio-aesthetic 
possibilities that exist in between. As such, it is less about the banishment of 
ethics in the name of critical aesthetic distance than it is about taking 
seriously the porosity between art and life, i.e. how is this surface-border 
continually challenged and what is going on when we work with others? Claire 
Doherty, who founded and until recently directed the public art 
commissioning organisation Situations in Bristol, UK, asks in her June 2014 
talk at KORO (Public Art Norway), “what is the artist’s role in allowing 
something to happen?” and “how does [the practice] change the nature of 
the place? How does it unsettle the space?” (Doherty, 2014) These are 
questions that no longer position the art or the artist at the centre of a 
practice, but as a co-existing element – indeed, an affective nodal point, 
alongside Ahmed (2004) – in a situation amongst other bodies.  
 
Socially “engaged” art is replete with difficult relations, the most obvious of 
which concerns the artist and her collaborators. Of course, this extends to 
include relations between artist and commissioners, commissioners and 
collaborators, not forgetting the histories, cultures, and other specificities of 
place that a project calls up. That these are not examined by art theories as 
embodied processes means the very criticality of the work – the working out 
and feeling through bodies and contexts – goes missing. The focus, crucially, 
should extend beyond making a project legible to art historical reflection – 
e.g. the examination of form, medium, etc. as suggested by Bishop. Instead, 
a recognition of an art project’s relational processes would help recalibrate 
what is at stake, namely the in-between negotiations that displace the 
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certainty of the artwork. It is therefore necessary to stress making, 
maintenance, and critique of this co-generated space as the artist’s most 
important (and unrecognised) socio-aesthetic task. 
 
Part of the labour involves challenging the containment of the self (see: 
dispossession in 1.1.3.), and with that, the idea that we are separate entities 
at all that “come together”. A focus on embodied relations means attending to 
their living materiality, giving it the ability to know or to reflect in its own way. 
Certain feminist thinkers of new materialism, the most prominent of which is 
Karen Barad, posit an agency of matter that is significant here. Her 
perspective provides some significant insight into understanding how matter 
(and the world as such) exerts itself as we make different attempts to 
encapsulate it as knowledge. As such, Barad’s “intra-active” reconsideration of 
discourse and material sheds light on how embodied negotiations both exceed 
and limit our understanding of relations. While a “usual ‘interaction’ […] 
presumes the prior existence of independent entities/relata” (Barad, 2003, 
p.815), she proposes instead an intra-action to question the extent to which 
physical bodies are separate, if at all. This means enmeshing discursivity 
within materiality and vice versa, producing a “material-discursive” paradigm 
that is in constant flux; knowledge and the world are thus seen as taking 
place, not as things. They cannot be forced through filters of representation, 
but rather come to find their shape, form, and embodiment through 
enactments. It is a kind of performativity that, 
 
properly construed, is not an invitation to turn everything (including 
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material bodies) into words; on the contrary, performativity is precisely 
a contestation of the excessive power granted to language to 
determine what is real. (ibid., p.802)  
 
The critical engagement of Barad’s intra-action in phenomena opens up new 
kinds of materiality and agency. Via her thinking, a socially negotiated art 
would be centred around the material-discursivity of relations and thus the 
agency of embodiment and experience. In presenting an “ethico-onto-
epistem-ology” (Barad, 2007, p.89) where there is no prior separation 
between ethics, matter, and knowledge, she locates a much more 
inter/intrawoven connection of what she calls “phenomena”. Boundaries are 
then performatively differentiated by “agential cuts”, enabling the appearance 
of “components” (ibid., p.335): 
 
[T]he relationship of the cultural and the natural is a relation of 
‘‘exteriority within.’’ This is not a static relationality but a doing — the 
enactment of boundaries — that always entails constitutive exclusions 
and therefore requisite questions of accountability. (ibid., my 
emphasis) 
 
Enactment turns agency from a fixed attribute into an emergent articulation, 
with resulting part – components – that are brought into sharper focus 
(Barad, 2003, p.815). The boundaries of bodies, subjectivities, and individual 
aspects of the world, therefore, are negotiated out of materialist-discursive 
practices. Sceptical of the representations that keep “things” (passively) apart 
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from the “words” that (actively) speak for them, Barad opts for an “agential 
realist ontology” that considers phenomena (“relations rather than ‘things’”) 
and configurations (“discursive practices / (con)figurations rather than 
‘words’”) through the material (ibid., p.814).  
 
In proposing socially engaged / negotiated art as a material-discursive 
practice, we need to refract tendencies to think of it simply as the purposeful 
coming-together of individual bodies. This also reinforces the study’s focus on 
embodiment and affect as productive, self-determining forces that emerge 
through contact, or what Barad calls “the iterative differentiatings of 
spacetimemattering” (Barad, 2007, p.179), wherein the three ostensibly 
separate dimensions of space, time, and matter are much more intertwined. 
In this, she is indebted to Niels Bohr’s research in atomic physics, which 
posits an “inseparability of ‘observed object’ and ‘agencies of observation’” 
(Bohr cited in Barad, 2003, p.814). Given her own background in theoretical 
physics, her analysis of entanglement – especially of phenomena and 
apparatus – is clearly influenced by his work. Elaborating upon his insight, she 
understands apparatuses not merely as “human-constructed laboratory 
instruments that tell us how the world is” but as “specific material 
configurations (dynamic reconfigurings) of the world that play a role in the 
production of phenomena” (Barad, 2007, p.335). This enlarges the 
significance of apparatuses to include not only the scientific tools used but the 
environment within which the study takes place: the atmospheric conditions 
of the lab, the researcher’s affective disposition, etc. The moment phenomena 
is divided into smaller, specific premises is also the moment we determine the 
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frameworks within which they make sense.  
 
Yet Barad’s “ethico-onto-epistem-ology” has faced the criticism of dissolution 
and generality, since her argument for intra-acting phenomena risks 
neglecting how creatures endure and what their “relative pre-existence” 
might mean “with respect to [new relations]” (Savransky, 2016). Her critics 
take issue with the generality of phenomena as the primary unit of relations, 
from which “relata” are produced impermanently. This makes it difficult, 
sociologist Martin Savransky’s cautions, to consider the localised, material 
limitations that define the possible “becoming[s] of a phenomenon” (ibid.). To 
illustrate this, he hearkens to a scene in which an old, brown-skinned man is 
injured in a traffic accident. Witnesses come forward from every which way, 
“mobilizing physics, engineering, law, environmentalism, psychology, 
economics, and racism” to “[construct] multiple versions of the event” (ibid.). 
The concern is that, in emphasising the emergence of matter and knowledge 
from indivisible and therefore unsituated phenomena, the old man cannot 
exert the set of relations most relevant and pertinent to him; or the old man 
as “society”, following Savransky, remains unseen as he is wheeled away as 
an old, brown-skinned man, battered by reductive rubrics of identity. 
Crucially, this example warns how an overemphasis of emergent relations can 
also turn into dissociation and/or simplification, like when they all meet at the 
scene of the traffic accident. He therefore argues for a greater precision in 
Barad’s relational project, as “the challenge of becoming response-able to the 
becoming of such a phenomenon is that of affirming the adventure of the old 
man as a society capable of enduring” (ibid.). This caution to endure is a 
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useful addition to Barad’s agential material-discursivity, which is otherwise an 
important theoretical move away from a thought and matter divide. But 
“endure” can take on a spatial as well as temporal emphasis, which would ask 
a different question of bodies: how do they absorb and move on from, indeed 
physically endure, the over-eager movement of phenomena? It is an eerie 
coincidence that the man of the car accident so closely embodies the figure of 
Kimberlé Crenshaw’s intersectionality (1991) as he lies injured in the middle 
of the road. In this light, he might be also be seen as an actual, physical 
blockage to the seemingly frictionless flow of relata (see later: 3.2.2. on the 
corporeality of space and the bodily feeling of intrusion). 
 
This is why Barad’s argument is as confounding as it is enabling, because the 
framework she offers suggests that the attempt to describe things is 
concurrent with its remaking. As a result, these are seen as “cuts” happening 
within a larger mass, not rubbing points of contact. But this is also where her 
thinking is most brazen and affirmative. Material-discursivity insists on socially 
negotiated reinvention and as such, the artist, collaborator, context, and 
artwork are just some of the apparatuses of an art project that are 
reconfigured – with the added consideration to their enduring relations that 
already position them somewhere in the world. In applying her “diffractive 
reading” (Barad, 2007) that accounts for the queer behaviours of wave-like 
optics to disrupt reflective reading and its directly correlative optics, art 
practices of the social realm can flourish in the “inseparability of ‘observed 
object’ and ‘agencies of observation’” that Niels Bohr describes. Both refuting 
and exceeding claims that merge art with aspects of life, a socially negotiated 
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art departs from a socially engaged art by understanding its potential to 
propose new parts out of a whole and with them, new “apparatuses” that will 
shape meaning in as yet unforeseeable ways. Together with dispossession 
(see: 1.1.3.), counterpublic belonging (see: 1.1.2.), and third space 
enunciations (see: 1.1.1.), this research is slowly forging a path towards a 
more embodied theorisation for a socially negotiated art, one that heeds the 
shifting articulations of who and where we are. There is an ongoing need to 
rework art’s agency into something more expansive, which material-
discursivity is in the position to do; it foregrounds the enactment of relations 
over the intersection of separate parts and bodies, of art and life, artist and 
participant, etc. Barad’s thinking shakes up the obstinate self-sufficiency of 
bounded subjects, spaces, and temporalities, thus foregrounding the actively 
emergent dimension of a socially negotiated art. Rather than limit the 
discussion to the antagonistic merits of a participatory art that treat bodies as 
a matter of form, there would be a perspective and language developed 
around the negotiation of relations. We need to pay greater attention to 
processes of differentiation, to the conditionality of self, other, and (not) 
belonging. As this thesis unfolds, it comes to articulate the very push and pull 
— what I eventually call the frictive — of the in-between as the generated 
material of a socially negotiated art. 
 
 
1.1.5. Failure as the byproduct of Gerald Raunig’s 
concatenating art and revolution machines  
 
The final two points of this chapter’s art theoretical overview focus specifically 
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on the political agency of some socially engaged / negotiated art forms. This 
concerns artwork and theories that deal explicitly with art’s critical potential in 
politics. In the following two sections, the theories under examination turn to 
forms of art that break away from the intersubjective notions behind 
“negotiated” processes to assertive declarations that are not only subversive 
but overtly oppositional.  
 
This examination looks at Gerald Raunig’s “Art and Revolution” (2007), which 
explores the “concatenations” between art and revolutionary “machines”. For 
him, the meeting of the two is characterised by instability and impermanence; 
whatever happens depends on the conditions of the two. By insisting that art 
and politics remain as separate zones means that they only ever meet 
temporarily – never fusing – to engage in a process of “revolutionary 
becoming” (Raunig, 2007, p.204). One of his stated goals is to counter the 
large political ruptures of the short twentieth century with more incremental, 
molecular events of the long twentieth century (ibid., p.20). As such, his 
theory is rooted in “a post-structuralist theory of revolution” in order to 
“illuminat[e] the other pole” (ibid., p.24). To do so, he re-reads Deleuze and 
Guattari’s Foucauldian notion of “transversality”, which describes relations in 
terms of diagonal movements across a non-hierarchical space-time 
continuum:   
 
Contrary to models of totally diffusing and confusing art and life, this 
book investigates other practices, those emerging in neighboring 
zones, in which transitions, overlaps and concatenations of art and 
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revolution become possible for a limited time, but without synthesis 
and identification. […] The way and the extent to which revolutionary 
machines and art machines work as parts, cogs of one another is the 
most important subject of investigation in this book. (ibid., p.17-18) 
 
He problematises the “one dimensional constraint of the revolution to a single 
point” (ibid., p.27), suggesting that the “Marxist-Leninist discourse” posits a 
“temporal sequence” with one step following the next in the takeover of state 
control (ibid., p.28). The opportunities for revolution exist instead, for Raunig, 
in the localised, varied, and dispersed micropolitical. Without the singular 
event that definitively overthrows and replaces power, there is a “permanence 
of actuality”, which Raunig boils down to three elements: resistance, 
insurrection, and constituent power (Raunig, 2007, p.54). Revolutionary 
praxis therefore takes place at a “granular” level as attempts at antagonising 
different manifestations of systemic blockages, together, make up the active 
present participle of the adjective “constituent” in power.  
 
His analysis therefore concerns the transience of becoming: how the 
overlapping of art and revolutionary machines briefly interrupt precise points 
in a system. We might imagine concatenations to materialise and dissipate 
repeatedly, in various degrees: 
 
The concatenation of revolutionary machines and art machines is 
actualized in more or less well developed forms in the practices that 
are analyzed here. In some cases the overlapping remains murky or 
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fragmentary, sometimes it is only a potentiality. Yet even where the 
rapprochement of art and revolution fails, traces of the overlap can still 
be recognized. (ibid., p.18-19) 
 
Of note to this study is his acknowledgement of failure: in his view, activist 
art is prone to failure because it directly challenges “repressive state 
apparatuses” while also being at the same time “marginalized by structural 
conservatisms in historiography and the art world” (ibid.). The combination of 
radical politics and new modes of meaning-making also works against the 
grain of broader political and aesthetic practices, suggesting that failure is 
something that haunts much of activist art. Implicit in concatenation are both 
meeting as well as chance, because the interaction between art and 
revolution are mechanically merged through “cogs [in] machines” that 
“intertwine, extend into one another” in ways that are “permanent and 
transversal” (ibid., p.265). With meeting and chance underpinning his thinking 
on concatenation, failure is inevitably generated as part of its process. This is 
noted and mentioned as part of his case studies, but there is no focused 
investigation on the ramifications of failure itself; after all, Raunig’s thesis is 
built on the more felicitous results of concatenating art and revolution 
machines, not the failures. In “Communist Hypothesis” (2010), Alain Badiou 
begins with reflections on the global collapse of communism and, pertinently 
here, on the meaning of failure when placed in conjunction with an ongoing 
anti-capitalist struggle: 
 
What exactly do we mean when we say that all the socialist 
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experiments that took place under the sign of that hypothesis ended in 
‘failure’? Was it a complete failure? By which I mean: does it require us 
to abandon the hypothesis itself, and to renounce the whole problem 
of emancipation? (Badiou, 2010, p.6)  
 
For him, it is necessary to historicise failure, to make it “the proof of the 
hypothesis, provided the hypothesis is not abandoned” (ibid., p.7). This is the 
process of communism as it fights its way towards victory against our 
subjective tendencies, the latter of which is disposed to fear “not of fighting, 
but of winning” (ibid., p.32). He argues that “[f]or a politics of emancipation, 
the enemy that is to be feared most is not repression at the hands of the 
established order. It is the interiority of nihilism, and the unbounded cruelty 
that can come with its emptiness” (ibid.). For Badiou, politics is ultimately 
about what is done – the deeds – and not the names of things, which are 
devoid of content (ibid., p.8). Failures are therefore a part of deeds, and 
these acquire meaning when situated within a revolutionary history that, he 
reminds us, does not give up on itself. But in context of this study, the focus 
lies in fact on what we need to supposedly “get over”, as Badiou puts it (ibid., 
p.16). Why is failure seen as a terrible disorientation that needs to be 
replaced by more practical affective dispositions? I would like to argue that 
failure finds meaning not only in its historicisation, but above all, in embodied 
practices that are capable of holding onto meaning in different ways. 
 
In his pathbreaking historical examination of failure within an American 
historical context, Scott A. Sandage positions it as the inverse to capitalist 
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success (Sandage, 2005). Specifically, he argues that a conflation of meaning 
between financial ordeal and self-deficiency occurred as “entrepreneurship 
became the primary model of American identity” (ibid., p.4). Those who are 
maladjusted to capitalism are not only involved in failing endeavours, but are 
themselves seen as failures. People like 
 
bankrupts, deadbeats, broken men, down-and-outers, bad risks, good-
for-nothings, no-accounts, third-raters, flunkies, little men, loafers, 
small fries, small potatoes, old fogies, goners, flops, has-beens, ne’er-
do-wells, nobodies, forgotten men. (ibid., p.5-6) 
 
Hearkening to Max Weber’s 1905 text on the connection between capitalism 
and the Protestant work ethic, Sandage’s selection of insults listed above are 
steeped in the familiar concoction of ambition and sexism that demonstrates 
the social irrelevance of unproductive men. Women would not have played a 
role, much less bodies of queer sexualities; in both cases, failure to 
participate in public discourse was inscribed as a matter of course. The drive 
for “equality” that so marks feminism has been as necessary as it has been 
disenchanting, smacking of a similar capitalist ambition to claim one’s 
relevance in a world shaped by patriarchal norms. Jack Judith Halberstam 
sets himself the task of staying close to failure in his 2011 text, summoning 
the Benjaminian flâneur as he “strolls down unchartered streets in the ‘wrong’ 
direction” (Halberstam, 2011, p.6). By foregrounding the value of “intuition 
and blind fumbling” (ibid.), Halberstam challenges what learning means and 
with it, epistemic authority: 
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These alternative cultural and academic realms, the areas beside 
academia rather than within the intellectual worlds conjured by losers, 
failures, dropouts, and refuseniks, often serve as the launching pad for 
alternatives precisely when the university cannot. (ibid., p.7, my 
emphasis)  
 
Tying in failure with Foucault’s antidisciplinary knowledges – the contents and 
ways of knowing deemed illegible and illegitimate in the eyes of academia – 
Halberstam portrays the “subversive intellectual” who excels in disqualified 
and/or autodidactic approaches that prioritise completely different 
importances. In confronting the university as a “site of incarcerated 
knowledge” (ibid., p.15), he aims to “resist mastery” while “privileg[ing] the 
naïve and nonsensical” in order to develop “oppositional pedagogies” that test 
out counterhegemonic possibilities (ibid., p.12). The description is just as 
crucial and applicable for Raunig’s activist artists who, in their search for 
radical alternatives to art and politics, must fail to adhere to conventional 
markers of skill or expertise. At the same time, their inability and/or 
unwillingness to comply makes space for contingencies and experimentality, 
which exert a disobedient pressure on regulatory systems beyond the art 
world.  
 
Not merely redeeming failure with a winsome attitude of resistance, 
Halberstam reminds us of queer unbeing that sees the subject yielding to 
dominant ideologies at the same time as opposing them (ibid., p.23). In the 
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“murky waters of a counterintuitive, often impossibly dark and negative realm 
of critique and refusal” (ibid., p.2), failure is also fraught with loss, a familiar 
terrain that comes as part of being unintelligible to a disciplinary 
heteronormativity. In his queer analysis, this is a different yet complementary 
argument to that of Sandage’s: failure must be examined with processes of 
subjectification vis-à-vis capitalist and normative structures. Taking a 
photographic series by Brassaï as a point of departure, Halberstam feels out 
some of the socio-cultural contours of lesbian life in 1930s Paris. He focuses 
specifically on a set of images from Le Monocle that depicts lesbians 
interacting and partying at a nightclub. Despite that, he acknowledges the 
“backward feelings” (following Heather Love’s examination of queer loss, 
2007) that pervades the scene: 
 
The photographs of Le Monocle are shrouded in darkness, shadowy 
even though the scenes they depict are quite upbeat and joyful. In this 
way the images are able to capture both the persistence of queer life 
and the staging of queer life as impossible. […] What remains 
unattainable in the butches’ masculinity, we might say, is what remains 
unattainable in all masculinity: all ideal masculinity by its very nature is 
just out of reach, but it is only in the butch, the masculine woman, that 
we notice its impossibility. Brassaï’s photographs thus capture three 
things; the darkness of the night worlds within which queer sociability 
takes place; the failure of ideal masculinity that must be located in the 
butch in order to make male masculinity seem possible; and a queer 
femininity that is not merely dark but invisible. (Halberstam, 2011, 
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p.99-100) 
 
As if haunted by failure, lesbian desire is enacted here through heterosexual 
courtship, which gives form to the non-platonic affection. Even though the 
masquerade is a means to an end – the action performatively normalises the 
love, lust, and desire between the women – failure looms as long as these are 
still an enculturised impossibility. Despite queer tools of adaptation and 
subversion that contort social threats into new opportunities and social 
critique, precarity remains unchallenged; one’s legitimacy persists unresolved 
through performative iterations such as these, which at the same time puts 
one in the position to undermine it. The crux, then, is that queer failure has a 
clarity that can be tapped into for “a truly political negativity” (ibid., p.110). 
As dark as it might feel, failure is a way out.  
 
This arguably still allows success to seep back in as failure becomes a means 
to achieve. While Halberstam’s reading offers cues to taking seriously those 
affects proximal to loss, rage, and disappointment, is there a way of thinking 
through failure in more liminal terms, to dwell on its discomfort without 
succumbing to trauma or the lure of moving on completely? The activist 
artists of Raunig’s argument do not happen to fail merely as an inevitable 
consequence of concatenation’s moving cogs. Instead, the meetings – or 
negotiations, to emphasise social emergence over a meeting of separate 
entities – of his art and revolution machines are affectively textured with 
doubts and mistakes. In attending to an embodied criticality with regards to 
socially negotiated art, this study asks whether art practices can live out its 
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own failure by queerly subverting conventions of art and sociality, indeed, but 
importantly also by undoing “the toxic positivity of contemporary life” 
(Halberstam, 2010, p.4). At its best, art practices are able to material-
discursively (see: 1.1.4. on the meaning-making performativity of things) 
reconfigure the obligation to keep up a can-do attitude, and instead, 
articulate discontent, ruts, and uncertainties. The lesson afforded here is how 
illegitimate learning is enabled precisely when one does not seek to eliminate 
but live with failure. To this end, Ann Cvetkovich’s study on depression 
indicates what this could entail: 
 
The linkage between depression and political failure is relevant not just 
to queer politics; it also pertains to the politics of race in the wake of 
the incomplete projects of civil rights and decolonization. The limits of 
political representation and legal recognition in eliminating racism 
require not only new visions for the future but the affective energy to 
sustain disappointment. The turn to public cultures of memory that 
address transnational histories of genocide, colonization, slavery, and 
diaspora stems from the need to connect with histories of trauma that 
have not yet been overcome […] A depressive antisociality can 
accompany an insistence that the past is not over yet. (Cvetkovich, 
2012, p.7) 
 
Affect under capitalism is medicalised as depression in Cvetkovich’s reading, 
which also corresponds to the subjectivisation of failure in Standage’s text. At 
stake in the productive potentials of failure, then, is staying with it; what 
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needs changing or disturbing, rather, is the simplistic view that posits a 
success and failure axis in order to make more out of difficult feelings. 
 
Be it activist or socially engaged art, the opportunities to sit with failure as 
something important or critical are few. Instead, there is a celebratory 
tendency to organisations like Creative Time, who now have the reputation to 
collate and publicise projects at an international level through their 
publications and annual summits; or The Visible Award, whose first 
Temporary Parliament took place in 2015 in Liverpool. For the latter, the 
directors of the Visible project held the parliament in order to short-list and 
ultimately award funding and recognition to a worthwhile project from 
anywhere in the world. To their credit, the artistic director Matteo Lucchetti 
opened the process reflecting on how awards can “make” artists; “they can’t 
not make artists” (Lucchetti, 2015), given the ripple effect that comes with 
the acknowledgement. These are organisations with significant institutional 
leverage, which they use to influence a project’s cultural value and its ability 
to “travel” – Lucchetti’s term – beyond its localised context. As such, success 
acts as a lubricant for expansion and mobility where failure, on the contrary, 
weighs down, encumbers. Faced with back-to-back Power Point presentations 
of projects that are literally competing for political urgency, impact, and 
artistic relevance (which, along with sustainability and fictive engagement 
were the five named criteria for assessment), a discomfort was palpable 
amongst the parliament members: what if we split the award money equally 
amongst all the projects, the parliament ask? But then, Lucchetti explains, the 
award would fail to resonate; he reminds us not to “underestimate the 
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political leverage of the prize” (Lucchetti, 2015). In doing so, we were 
coerced not to question any further the ramifications of recognition or their 
concerns, if any, of anointing a project with success. Undoubtedly, these are 
issues that they must have been confronted with before, which they must be 
equally tired of addressing. The Visible organisation’s desire to take part in 
the constructive redistribution of cultural (and monetary) currency betrays an 
understandable drive to progress, untether, and enable those who are not in 
the position to do so. Instead of providing assistance with a distinctly colonial 
resonance, what would happen if Visible also took their relational position and 
complicity as seriously as they did their ambition for “sustaining socially 
engaged art in a global context”? This can then be seen as an examination of 
systemic failure that can take place beside their current work to self-
reflexively show how their organisation have come to possess such a power. 
There is value in the dwelling-on that recentres those negative affects 
associated with being called out, as much as with one’s own disappointment, 
grief, etc. In particular, bodies, institutions, and other subjective “nodal 
points” (Ahmed, 2004) that have made themselves invulnerable to negative 
affects and impressions should learn to seize them as opportunities for self-
reflection. Failure is a necessary pause that feels heavy, forcing us into doubt 
but also greater consideration. It is a consuming feeling that can nonetheless 
dislodge the mandate often placed on socially engaged art to provide 
solutions or positive outcomes. Instead, we can make space for uncertainties 
and emotional ambivalences that actually accompany aesthetic and political 
processes. 
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1.1.6. Sinthomeopathy and over-identification of the 
continuing avant-garde in Marc James Léger 
 
In his 2012 publication “Brave New Avant Garde”, independent art theorist 
James Léger argues for two main things: an artistic reclamation of political 
radicality using a psychoanalytical analysis of subjectivity and a more unified 
vision on the political left to define the task at hand. What he goes on to 
describe is in fact a rehabilitation of an avant-garde, which has historically 
brought together art and praxis:  
 
The avant garde idea continues to operate as the repressed underside 
of the contemporary forms of extradisciplinary practice. […] I stand in 
opposition to new times cultural studies, that the left has to be 
absorbed into strategies of postmodern complicity: a contemporary 
avant garde is one that seeks a path beyond what Hal Foster has 
termed the “double aftermath” of modernism and postmodernism and 
responds to Mao’s injunction: Reject your illusions and prepare for 
struggle. (Léger, 2012, p.2-3) 
 
Concerned that a cohesive class-based struggle has unravelled into seemingly 
irreconcilable difference politics, Léger is calling for a unified movement that 
recognises a common enemy in advanced capitalism. In so doing, he re-
emphasises class as the most crucial political battle of the present. Central to 
his idea of an avant-garde cultural praxis is “sinthomeopathy”, a 
psychoanalytic term he borrows from Lacan to refer to the way in which 
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subjectivity establishes critical distance by means of fantasy, used here in 
reference to the “impossible exit from the institutionalized artworld” (ibid., 
p.42). For Léger, artists too often rely on the straight-forward correlation 
between ideological, aesthetic, and poetic contents (ibid., p.146), which make 
many practices immediately legible and susceptible to institutional cooptation. 
Léger draws from Barthes’ descriptions of “myth on the left” and “myth on 
the right” to account for the prevalence of earnest directness in socially 
engaged art: the left “has only one language, that of [its] emancipation” 
whereas the language of the right “is rich, multiform, supple, [and] has an 
exclusive right to meta-language” (Barthes cited in Léger, 2012, p.146-147). 
He repudiates the notion of a singular language on the left, of activist modes 
of communication as confrontation, seeking instead to recuperate a linguistic, 
artistic, and textu(r)al complexity through sinthomeopathic praxis. In other 
words, the avant-garde of his argument would fully commit to an oppositional 
politics and work towards structural change by exercising its aesthetic 
aptitude upon subjectivisation.  
 
Léger’s starting point is the negotiation of agency, which is evident in his use 
of sinthomeopathy to describe a particular kind of subjective attunement 
against neoliberalism. However, the “avant-garde practitioner” is less 
concerned with delivering outcomes through direct action than with 
performances of subjective subversion. The author’s key concerns are 
therefore rooted in the aesthetic and political potentials of subjectivity, which 
he investigates through a Lacanian psychoanalytic lens via the work of Žižek. 
As mentioned earlier, Léger seeks to recentre class from the cacophony of 
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difference politics as the central political problem (Léger, 2012, p.42). Yet he 
realizes that artists cannot sever their ties with the institutional art world – 
“we are the institution”, quoting Andrea Fraser (Léger, 2012 p.17) – and must 
therefore come to terms with their political desires through the an aesthetic 
framework: 
 
The proper orientation for critical practice is not to find in the 
autonomy of the aesthetic sphere a free space for the figuring of 
utopian social possibilities, but to recognize in aesthetic autonomy an 
already compromised class practice, a self-relating that takes its own 
denial into account and that is constructed around its own constitutive 
void. (ibid., p.90) 
 
Lacking the distance to transgress and create spaces for alternative means of 
production, artist-facilitators cannot deny their place within the institutional 
art system. In order to sustain criticality, they must create a fantasy of 
separation through processes like “over-identification” (ibid., p.102). Be it in 
the form of a docent giving an emotionally overwrought museum tour 
(Museum Highlights, Andrea Fraser, 1989) or a deliberately absurd 
community art project that purports to teach elephants how to paint (Asian 
Elephant Art and Conservation Project, Komar and Melamid, 1995-2000), 
over-identification is a means of artistically – or fantastically – occupying 
familiar institutional personnel and characters, methods, and motifs. By 
contriving a different relational possibility through a fantasy of aesthetic 
autonomy, the avant-garde artist both acknowledges and struggles against 
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her inextricability from an “art class” that is always already complicit with 
neoliberalism – a self-reflexivity that certainly resounds with the research 
done here. 
 
While the focus on “subjectivisation” rather than on “a programme of 
advanced art production” (ibid., p.44) is akin to this study’s departure from 
artistic categorisation, Léger stresses the sinthomeopathic articulation of 
political discontent rather than the criticality of embodiment. Of interest, then, 
is his positioning of the artist as an over-identifying subject, one that 
“expos[es] the unwritten social codes that double the official identifications of 
the Law as, today, post-ideological” (ibid., p.113). Following the thinking of 
Brussels-Rotterdam artist collective BAVO, Léger locates possibilities of doing 
so when artists “over-identif[y] with the worst features of late capitalism” 
(ibid., p.114), which crucially and perversely – his use of Žižek’s term – 
performs a space of resistance in the absence of one. Without an ideological 
and organisational antagonism, the avant-garde practitioner performs a 
subjective one in order to create that necessary alienation. Relocating artistic 
autonomy into fantasy, the over-identifying artist must work against her 
subjective desire for direct action and be compelled to call bluff on late 
capitalism in a way that exaggerates her adherence to it (ibid., pp.105-106). 
His vision of the artistic avant-garde, then, is bound to perverse performances 
that are directed at the unveiling of complicity.  
  
To think through and refract Léger’s over-identifying subject that is locked in 
such emotionally deliberate and taxing labour, I turn first of all to John 
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Roberts’ more recent analysis of the avant-garde. In it, he also advocates for 
artistic autonomy but, following Adorno, stresses above all its social relation 
(Roberts, 2015, p.54):  
 
Autonomy can practice its strategies of negation only in messy 
negotiation with these dominant conditions of production and 
exchange. As such, heteronomy is precisely that which provides the 
conditions of possibility of the production of the illusion of autonomy. 
(ibid.,p. 84) 
 
The avant-garde, then, is characterised as the ongoing struggle to emerge 
from heteronomy by posing a challenge to “a debased communicability or 
sociability”. For Roberts, this puts the “use value” of art in inextricable and 
negotiated terms with life (ibid., p.85). While he insists on art being a “thing 
apart” (ibid., p.84), the caveat is that it is only ever conditional, with the 
avant-garde acting as placeholder. As such, it instates an uncertain division 
between “autonomy” and “heteronomy”, which renders the argument more 
proximal to the embodied experience of this study. Particularly striking is his 
description of avant-garde’s disobedient temporality – specifically an “anti-
historicism” that refutes a capitalist deadening of connections between past, 
present, and future – and how it calls forth an “asocial subject” that acts “in 
discord with the situation within which it finds itself” (ibid., p.89). Found in 
the very title of his text, the avant-garde constitutes a “revolutionary time” by 
enfolding “futures past” into the present while allowing it to remain an 
ongoing project in excess of time (ibid., p.257). In turn, it is the asocial 
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subject who enacts a “historical obstinacy” by refusing the deadening 
separation between past, present, and future. It restores an “alertness 
[against a] total historicist lockdown” (ibid., p.49) being out of joint not only 
with the self (in a process of self-negation) but with the cultural traditions 
that limit her conditions (ibid., p.89). What the asocial subject produces is 
therefore necessarily new and othered by the fact that it disobeys the 
compartmentalisation of capitalist time. As such, it is a subjective struggle 
that is not necessarily pre-defined by performative possibilities as fantasy. 
 
In both cases, the avant-garde posits a subjective dislocation as criticality. 
That this has to take place autonomously in order to properly constitute a 
subversive position might ring true if a disclocated subjectivity is not already 
embodied on a day-to-day basis; not already marked by asociality and thus 
already has to over-identify with normative conventions as a matter of 
survival (since you must learn to “pass” within your surroundings). For this 
study, therefore, the resonance of the avant-garde’s subjective dislocation 
has less to do with its (emergent) separation from the real or from 
heteronomy than it does with an existing, present sense of dislocation that 
constitutes queer embodiment.  
 
In refracting what this means, it is argued here following Sara Ahmed that the 
ways we are dislocated make different objects and possibilities within (or just 
out of) reach. This means how we become is intimately tied to what we do, 
articulating where we are positioned. What I want to reiterate here is the 
work that goes into normativising a conventional, neoliberal orientation in the 
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first place. How do our relations to other bodies and objects intermingle to 
shape desire and what is possible? In her phenomenological analysis to queer 
orientation, Ahmed cites Husserl’s positioning of himself at the writing table. 
To attend to the table means relegating other rooms and things within the 
house to a “dimly apprehended depth or fringe of indeterminate reality” 
(Husserl cited in Ahmed, 2006, p.549), turning them into the supportive 
“background” that renders his philosophical work possible. Her interest, then, 
falls on the table’s orientation and its “conditions of emergence or arrival […] 
as the thing that it appears to be in the present” (ibid.). How the table makes 
itself available to him as a writing device relates to what he does on it and the 
accompanying objects he repeatedly gestures towards, all of which shapes his 
own becoming as well as that of the table’s; the latter is never seen as a 
place for play or food, for instance. The how and what intertwine to make the 
where, which Ahmed calls “tendencies” that do not have any originary locus 
but rather, inherit proximities that shape our spheres of influence. Each of our 
bodies is a “zero point” that tends and unfolds in relation to these objects. 
The spatio-temporality of orientation not only enunciates bodies and objects, 
but in particular endows or disables the former’s ability to properly take up 
space. Failing to do so contributes towards a queer relation – literally bent, 
slanted – to the “bodily horizon” (ibid., p.552) The straightly aligned 
orientation, then, requires effort that over time (paradoxically / ideally) 
appears as effortless. 
 
This is not to claim that the becoming of queer bodies is an absence of effort, 
for different tendencies often leads to painful and unhappy objects that 
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bodies have to navigate again and again. The process, however, eventually 
opens up other possibilities that are experienced as belated, untimely, or 
both; realisation often feels both like a dawning and an always-been at the 
same time. This is another dimension in Heather Love’s “backwardness” 
(2007; see: 1.1.5. on staying with failure), which rethinks queer attachment 
in terms of camp, immaturity, and memory that turns its back, so to speak, 
onto the future. Indeed, the queering of time is taken to its most pessimist 
conclusion in Lee Edelman’s critique of “reproductive futurism” (2004), 
wherein queer sexualities are presented not only as disorientations but 
embodiments of the death drive and as such, the end of the subject as 
defined by heteronormative inheritance. Such a refusal of time thus 
constitutes an important dimension of what this refraction argues as 
disorientation. 
 
In this navigation of proximal objects and bodies is where subjective 
dislocation takes place, which is more readily experienced than Léger’s 
separate space of over-identification. By refracting his argument for an 
elsewhere based in fantasy, I locate it much closer to our lived and living 
experiences. In a socially negotiated art, the focus is on the attunement of 
disorientation beside other bodies and objects that enunciates where we are 
by means of what (is nearby) and how. In other words, it is a critical 
proximity, not critical distance, that is crucial to understanding counterpublic 
affect. Rather than consigning nearness to a simple matter-of-fact, 
disorientations are highlighted as a factor in the making / remaking of bodies, 
objects, and worlds. 
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1.2. Towards a methodological “beside” and an embodied 
examination of socially negotiated art 
 
The main body of this chapter consists of a theoretical overview of socially 
engaged / negotiated art, which attempts to plot out a few key ideas with 
regards to its perception and development. In doing so, it provides the basis 
for an embodied analysis and refraction done through queer and feminist 
thinking. The aim is to draw out the initial contours for the rest of the study, 
to generate the positionings that introduce the relational material that forms 
the heart of the research. By turning the attention to the in-between, the field 
opens up to a different kind of critical intervention, one that is not poised to 
defend its artistic or political contribution, but considers what emerges 
relationally in the process. 
 
This section presents the study’s methodology, which is premised on a 
prepositional focus extracted from Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s “Touching 
Feeling” (2003). Before doing so, a summary of the six theories is given in 
order to clarify the research trajectory so far. The first concerned Bourriaud’s 
social interstice of relational aesthetics and a proposed third space re-
imagining via Bhabha and Butler; the second looked at community as an 
outgrowth of site-specificity and gave a reassessment of its counterpublic 
potential; the third reworked Kester’s empathy in dialogical aesthetics into a 
dispossession that is cognisant of power and complicity; the fourth attended 
to material-discursivity as a critique of the Rancièrian aesthetic regime 
adopted by Bishop; the fifth accounted for the significance of (queer) failure 
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as a byproduct of Raunig’s concatenating art and revolutionary machines; and 
finally, the sixth re-examined the oppositional avant-garde in Léger’s 
sinthomeopathy and argued for an embodied disorientation that would make 
the most out of our critical proximity. The reason for undertaking such a 
theoretical overview has also been a generative exercise to assert this study’s 
point of view; to make the adjustment from socially engaged to socially 
negotiated via embodiment is to invest in the validity of experience and the 
uncertainty of bodily and affective epistemologies. This includes investigating 
textural realms that are often too slippery for words and locating means of 
attending to them with sensitivity. Taking cue from the six queerly embodied 
interventions of socially engaged art theories, then, what does this sort of 
investment entail methodologically? 
 
 
1.2.1. “Beside” as a prepositional research approach  
 
Spurred by the idea of social negotiation, Sedgwick’s challenge to think 
“beside” in her introduction to “Touching Feeling” (2003) is a particularly 
important reminder for the way in which research can happen. In the 
introduction to her essays on feelings, she talks about her retreat from more 
conventional academic habits of the time. This involves putting into place 
“tools and techniques for nondualistic thought” that she regards as crucial to 
the examination of difference. For Sedgwick, reading “beneath” and “behind” 
subjects for deeper meaning correlates to a “paranoid” impulse (Sedgwick, 
2003, p.27), which is predicated on expert analysis and revelation on the one 
 94 
hand and “an infinite reservoir of naïveté” (ibid., p.141) on the other. Instead 
of an understanding based on depth, she proposes an alternative by way of 
example: siblings in bed side by side. Their interaction can fall anywhere 
along a spectrum of   
 
desiring, identifying, representing, repelling, paralleling, differentiating, 
rivaling, leaning, twisting, mimicking, withdrawing, attracting, 
aggressing, warping, and other relations” (ibid., p.8).  
 
Central to Sedgwick’s proposal in her idea of “beside” is precisely this capacity 
to encompass different relations in tension with one another. She references 
anthropologist Esther Newton’s floor plan in “Mother Camp” (1972), a study 
of drag and gender performance in relation to use-delineated, physical 
spaces. The meticulousness with which Newton attended to the structuring of 
space brought to life a particular ecosystem of drag, which itself supports the 
possibility of the drag performance. This spatio-temporality is something that 
Sedgwick wants to transmit in context of her research, given the living 
dynamic it offers. Equally, I seek to apply a spatially aware “beside”, as this 
study’s methodology because of its closeness to the site of social negotiation. 
 
With regards to “nondualistic thought”, Sedgwick recognises the gravitational 
pull that produces a “law of the excluded middle” (Sedgwick, 2003, p.8), the 
point and counterpoint of comparative analysis. She problematises the 
reliance of scholarship on the “drama of exposure” based on this paranoid 
binary of façade and (a covered) hidden truth, while at the same time 
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emphasising a textural perception that “is always, immediately, and de facto 
to be immersed in a field of active narrative hypothesizing, testing, and re-
understanding of how physical properties act and are acted upon over time” 
(Sedgwick, 2003, p.13). This study does not seek to write off exposure or 
revelation as modes of research, for there is still the need to disprove badly 
formulated theories. What it does want to do is to open up the possibility of 
reparative research and explore how a haptic sensibility can be foregrounded 
in art theorisation. Textures offer a different in-road to understanding that 
heeds the intensities and affective energies of sociality. Indeed, by gravitating 
towards the beside (spatial) and its textural (felt) corollary, the study 
positions them as inseparable from and inextricable from more cognitive 
readings of art’s political endeavours. This spatiality allows the research to 
consider a socially negotiated art – which is how these art practices will be 
described in the upcoming three core chapters of my study – with finer 
material and embodied attunement. As such, the aim here to propose a 
different framework within theoretical discourse: beside arguments of artistic 
legitimacy or political efficacy is the possibility to theorise immersively, to 
think through the relational material as generative spaces for self-reflection, 
transformation, and critique. Along with its productive potential, it also 
enables the transmission of affective economies (Ahmed, 2004). The 
changing scenes of collective feeling take place in this in-between, in the 
circulation of energies that form temporary (counterpublic) clusters.  
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1.2.2. Queer and feminist refractions of Freirean dialogue, love, 
and praxis  
 
The remaining three chapters of this study examine the in-between that is the 
site and material of socially negotiated art practices. They each focus on a 
specific facet of relationality that carries with it a wide set of assumptions and 
desires, namely dialogue, love, and praxis. These ideas are taken from radical 
educator Paulo Freire’s writings on critical pedagogy, most notably from his 
seminal text, “Pedagogy of the Oppressed” (1970). Borrowed as a starting 
point for deeper theoretical and practical analyses, each of the three facets 
help to unfold relevant ideas and definitions that suggest, together, how a 
socially engaged art can be reconceived as a socially negotiated art. Freire’s 
desire to pedagogically think through and enact upon a shared socio-political 
reality parallels many art practices’ desire to do the same. Compounded by 
my own experience as an art teacher and worker, his practical focus on 
dialogue, love, and praxis was deeply resonant, which this study eventually 
recalibrates with “beside” as a methodology.  
 
On a structural level, however, the link between critical pedagogy and socially 
“engaged” art can be found in the political potential that is enunciated in co-
produced subjectivities. Its current instrumentalisation notwithstanding, art in 
the social realm has clear connections with the avant-garde (see: 1.1.6.) as 
well as early community arts of the “cultural democracy” ilk in the UK (see: 
3.3.2. for a short overview of the 1960s and 1970s community arts 
movement). There is a deliberate merging of art and life, which is echoed in 
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the Freirean ambition to transform life through education. That pedagogy 
presumes sociality in its scene of learning makes it, following Sedgwick, an 
important “sibling” reference point for conceiving the emergent potentials of 
socially negotiated art. While “pedagogy” is etymologically linked to the 
teaching of a child, Freire extends it towards a political praxis. Beyond his 
work, the word is now associated with learning and education more broadly, 
as “the contemporary semantic resonance of both these terms is rich and 
overlapping” (O’Neill, 2010, p.16). This “educational turn” in art explored by 
curator Paul O’Neill and other art workers, practitioners, and theorists in 2010 
was a significant gauge for the development of socially engaged art, providing 
the field with the tools to rethink how art can be bolstered (or exhausted) by 
leaning into pedagogy and education. An extensive study of education 
projects led by artists or art organisations around the world was also recently 
compiled by curator and researcher Silvia Franceschini, who reframes co-
learning into a “politics of affinity” against the precarity of life (2018). Both of 
these valences – the crossover of radical education and art; the forms of 
proximity it enables – are important to this research. Moreover, education as 
a sector is an important part of the current neoliberal climate, wherein school 
pupils as young as eleven take standardised tests in accordance to syllabi and 
university students expect to learn “skill sets” valuable to the free market. As 
such, education works to enable as well as restrict alternative points of view. 
How do radical education and socially engaged art work in relation to this 
ambiguity? 
 
Thinking alongside Freire’s pedagogy, which was conceived specifically for the 
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enactment of change, is one of many possible first steps in grasping how 
social processes function in art. His writing both defies and spans across 
disciplines, including philosophy, candid conversations, autobiography, and 
liberation theology. He has personally noted how open his work is to 
(mis)interpretations, of which this research is wary as it renegotiates the 
space between social change and desire. In fact, Freire distanced himself 
from many works that referenced him, because educators often neglected to 
situate his writings within the context of oppression and liberation. He 
becomes increasingly pointed about education’s radical potential, which is 
seen in the following conversation taken from a later “talking book” co-written 
with frequent collaborator Ira Shor:  
 
Paulo (Freire): For me, education is always directive, always. The 
question is to know towards what and with whom it is directive. This is 
the question. I don’t believe in self-liberation. Liberation is a social act. 
Liberating education is a social process of illumination. 
 
Ira (Shor): There is no personal self-empowerment? 
 
Paulo: No, no, no. Even when you individually feel yourself most free, 
if this feeling is not a social feeling, if you are not able to use your 
recent freedom to help others to be free by transforming the totality of 
society, then you are exercising only an individualist attitude towards 
empowerment or freedom. (Shor and Freire, 1987, p.22-23, original 
emphasis) 
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The value he places in education lies specifically in its social capacity to 
liberate – or negotiate new possibilities, to remain specific to this study’s 
position. His talking books are part of this endeavour as he and various 
interlocutors “[open] up to each other in the adventure of thinking critically” 
(Freire in Freire and Macedo, 2000, p.187). Such a commitment to 
encounter’s adventurous spontaneity is also taken up in a significant way by 
artists working in the social realm, as evidenced in the prevalence of 
workshops and conversational roundtables in their practices. As we have 
explored through material discursivity (see: 1.1.4.), the very openness of 
intersubjective exchanges is a matter of negotiation, destabilising whatever 
intentions artists might have. 
 
The reparative approach of socially negotiated art takes a different look at 
these points of intersection to consider what happens when bodies, ideas, 
and institutions are in (difficult, uncomfortable) contact with one another. 
Freirean understandings of dialogue, love, and praxis function as analytical 
starting points, beside which queer and feminist perspectives are developed 
to make sense of the relational material and textures. As mentioned in the 
end of 1.1.6. on the subjective dislocation of the avant-garde, the key 
concern of this study is to take seriously the possibility of a critical proximity 
that offers an alternative to the need for critical distance. The motivation 
comes from knowing that, for many of us, difference is openly declared by 
our bodies and by the ways we are (dis)oriented in relation to the bodily 
horizon (see: 1.1.6.; Ahmed, 2006). What would it look like, then, if we were 
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to re-examine the thinking and assumptions that underlie Freirean concepts 
such as dialogue, love, and praxis? The hope is that their refractions enable 
the self-reflexivity to understand the draw and generative potential of the 
social; to feel how this space of the in-between shapes us; and to locate 
other, more embodied and intimate ways of speaking (chapter two), loving 
(chapter three), and enacting change in the world (chapter four) that can be 
foregrounded in socially negotiated art practices. 
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2. Reconsidering dialogue: making a case for frictive 
speech in socially negotiated art 
 
 
The first of the three core chapters on the relational material of socially 
negotiated art examines dialogue. It is divided into two main sections that are 
focused on: 1. providing a theoretical basis and deconstruction of dialogue, 
and 2. the analysis of artistic and speech practices. The focus on dialogue 
comes not only from Freire’s pedagogy, but from a desire to understand its 
influence as an ideal mode of communication in the many art practices that 
centre around “talking” as a critical process. Through speaking and listening, 
it is hoped that perspectives can be shared, new points of view made, and 
differences clarified. This intersects significantly with the pedagogical use of 
dialogue in social movement work, specifically as advocated by Freire against 
the “banking” teaching methods that see learners “receiving, filing, and 
storing the [information as] deposits” (Freire, 1970, p.72). Contrary to this 
passive mode of learning, Freire’s dialogical education encourages learners to 
take part in “the encounter among women and men who name the world” 
(ibid., p.89) by “speaking their word” (ibid., p.88). Dialogue is therefore not 
merely the communication but the making of (new) meaning.  
 
The analysis in this chapter is focused on this desire to speak and be listened 
to with and beside others. More precisely, it questions the egalitarian 
presumptions that premise the speaking and listening: what of the many 
differentials that work on the bodies of artists and collaborators, or teachers 
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and learners, all of whom occupy the same space at the same time? How do 
these colliding valences of power and privilege show up in the verbal 
negotiation between parties? And how might styles of speech influence those 
who are listening? The primary motivation of this chapter, then, is to question 
horizontality and dialogue as goals for ideal communication. This involves 
interrogating dialogue from the position of embodied difference. Doing so 
here involves two stages: the first is the theoretical dimension, comprising 
education perspectives on dialogue as well as dissensus and agonistics in art 
theory; the second is speech in practice, looking at the role of dialogue in two 
art projects and followed by an examination of two frictive speech forms.   
 
As noted in 1.2.2. on the intersection of Freire’s critical pedagogy and socially 
negotiated art, the concerns of the three core chapters attend closely to the 
social in-between as a site for meaning-making. Dialogue, then, is intended to 
be the most direct strategy that invites discursive negotiation on a topic of 
interest; this is emphatically repeated in Freire’s writing as a socially oriented 
praxis. But as a broader question of responsibility, dialogue has been explored 
extensively in the philosophical writings of Bakhtin and Levinas respectively 
that must be acknowledged. For Bakhtin, dialogue is recognised as a 
relationality both in life as well as in art, though there remains a shifting 
centre from which the perception as “I” or author is differed from other points 
of view – or its “surplus of seeing” (Bakhtin in Holquist, 1994, p.36). The 
concern lies in seeing oneself through dialogue in order to complete the 
perspective that revolves around “me” or the author as zero point, which sees 
the in-between as a social means to a self-centred end. In contrast, Levinas 
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sees responsibility in terms of other-orientation, even a “hostage situation” as 
he states in “Otherwise than Being” (Levinas, 1991). He refutes “incarnation 
as an avatar of the representation of oneself” (ibid., 78) and insists on “face-
to-face” confrontation with an other as total exposure to external forces. Our 
subjectivities are thus called to respond without end as an ethical imperative, 
not so as to live beside others, but to reach the “hither side” (ibid., p.92) of 
the incarnate. This once again leapfrogs over the in-between, the difficult 
middle ground of negotiation that is only there to lead towards somewhere 
else. How might the responsibility so crucial to dialogue be critiqued in ways 
that are more resonant with its form, with speech, mediation, and desire for 
proximity? In a climate wherein animosity is encouraged and xenophobia is 
masked as making something “great”, what of dialogue remains salvageable 
and what of it should be replaced? More simply, (how) can we talk with one 
another and generate new meaning in the midst of hostile relations? 
 
 
2.1. Theories of dialogue in pedagogy and art  
 
The first section of this chapter comprises three subsections that differently 
examine and challenge the potentials of dialogue. The first subsection opens 
with a brief introduction to Freire’s radical education activism and pedagogical 
thinking that locks into dialogue as one of his key concepts. As a means of 
action as well as reflection, dialogue takes place between “actors in 
intercommunication”, who “name” – and possibly re-name – the object that 
mediates their encounter (Freire, 1970, p. 129). Embedded within the 
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activism of rural Brazil in the 1960s, his literacy-as-worldmaking programme is 
geared towards consciousness-raising as a goal, making dialogue a liberatory 
tool that re-humanises both the oppressed and the oppressor.  
 
Putting this within educational practice, dialogue refers to a mode of teaching 
and learning that is broadly understood to contrast with “monological models” 
(Burbules and Bruce, 2001). Educational theorists Nicholas C. Burbules and 
Bertram C. Bruce argue that dialogical approaches in the classroom can be 
better understood by being devolved into different communication motives, 
such as inquiry and debate (ibid.). The assertion here is that the classroom 
context from which they write already demand a constructive dimension of 
speech, which makes it hard to address or allow more confrontational forms. 
Using a classroom experiment that permits the exclusive grouping of “non-
white” Maori students (Jones in Boler, 2004), the “fantasy” of speaking to one 
another (ibid.) on equal terms is addressed. 
 
The third and final subsection unpacks disagreement with regards to artistic 
production. Rancière’s thinking of dissensus within an “aesthetic regime” is 
examined, specifically its fictional capacity to counter a “policed reality” 
(Rancière, 2011). This is then discussed alongside the multiple artistic 
“agonistics” that work in different counter-hegemonic ways (Mouffe, 2007, 
2013). The intention is that these perspectives on productive conflict can offer 
insight to the frictive potential of communication. 
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2.1.1. Paulo Freire’s literacy activism and the co-naming of the 
world in his use of dialogue  
 
[A man of about forty] fixed me with a mild, but penetrating gaze, and 
asked: “Dr. Paulo, sir – do you know where people live? Have you ever 
been in any of our houses, sir?” And he began to describe their pitiful 
houses. He told me of the lack of facilities, of the extremely minimal 
space in which all their bodies were jammed. He spoke of the lack of 
resources for the most basic necessities. He spoke of physical 
exhaustion, and of the impossibility of dreams of a better tomorrow. 
He told me of the prohibition imposed on them from being happy – or 
even of having hope.  
 
As I followed his discourse, I began to see where he was going to go 
with it. I was slouching in my chair, slouching because I was trying to 
sink down into it. And the chair was swiveling, in need of my 
imagination and the desire of my body, which were both in flight, to 
find some hole to hide in. (Freire, 2004, p.17-18) 
 
Freire’s theoretical and activist work both significantly contributed towards the 
development of critical pedagogy and reconceiving how social struggles are 
fought. The aforementioned anecdote comes from an experience early on in 
his career as a social service administrator in Brazil’s northeastern state of 
Perambuco. Upon being invited to give a talk at a local social centre, he chose 
to address the prevalence of corporal punishment in the area by advocating 
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for more “dialogical, loving” parent-child relationships. The confrontation, 
which took place at the end of the presentation, was for Freire a moment that 
“seared [his] soul” and showed him that “even when one must speak to the 
people, one must convert the ‘to’ to a ‘with’ the people” (ibid.). This would 
become an essential part of his world-making methodology that began with 
talking and listening – with what he referred to as dialogue. Yet what caused 
this shift in thinking was not a dialogical exchange, but a stunning 
disagreement that engendered a critical moment of emotional dispossession: 
it is in Freire’s experience of frictive discomfort that led to a re-evaluation. 
Over the course of the chapter, the “frictive” is increasingly taken up as a 
more precise and complex means of communicating.  
 
Returning to Freire, his understanding of dialogue as part of a larger project 
that brings the oppressed closer to their human potential1 happens more 
deliberately and constructively. He believes in the corresponding human 
“vocation” to create an effect on a “concrete reality”, which turns action into 
social change (Freire, 1970). In other words, he homes in on an exclusively 
human act to exert ourselves upon a real, material world, ideally by making it 
more livable for everyone. In our wilful, ethically motivated enactment lies the 
crux of the Freirean subject: a being who is in control of his/her actions and 
heeds his/her duty to intervene in an objective reality. His own literacy work 
in northeastern Brazil in the 1960s testifies to this conscientização 
(consciousness-raising or conscientisation) project which is, in the end, 
                                                             
1 His embrace of the “human”, in the end, is not problematised despite there having been important 
critical perspectives to complicate the category. Freire conceives of a learner as progressive, becoming 
“more human” as his/her consciousness is raised from a “magical” fatalism. 
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oriented toward the cultural situatedness of those living in the rural margins 
of the country. Fellow critical pedagogue Henry Giroux reminds us that 
Freire’s literacy oriented activism stems from a specific postcolonial history 
and military violence in Brazil that, “in the heat of life-and-death struggles”, 
see “[his] recourse into binarisms such as the oppressed vs. the oppressor, 
problem-solving vs. problem-posing, science vs. magic” (Giroux, 1992, p.19). 
A large part of his work during this time concerns the learners’ ability to read 
and write as a worldmaking process, or what Giroux calls more precisely “a 
politics of literacy forged in the political and material dislocations of regimes 
that exploit, oppress, expel, maim and ruin human life” (ibid., p.18). 
Conscientisation is likewise more than just awareness, but an ongoing process 
that always brings you closer to human fulfillment. To do so, Freire advocates 
education through dialogue, which is described as a horizontal relationship 
between beings “who cannot be truly human apart from communication” 
(ibid., p.128).  
 
The seed of his dialogue-based pedagogy was sown in the late 1940s, when 
he was first appointed as the director of Brazil’s newly formed Division of 
Education and Culture within the national Social Service of Industry (McLaren, 
2000, p.142). Between then and his arrest in 1964 — which led to his sixteen-
year exile — Freire worked in a number of influential capacities: he was the 
director in the Division of Culture and Recreation of the city of Recife and also 
co-founded the Movement of Popular Culture (ibid., p.143). Reflecting upon 
this period in one of his last texts “Pedagogy of Hope” (2004), he talks about 
shattering the “culture of silence”, that “[the peasants] had discovered not 
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only that they could speak, but that their critical discourse upon the world, 
their world, was a way of remaking that world” (Freire, 2004, p.30). In the 
process of teaching others how to “read the word”, he recognised the need 
for them to learn first of all how to “read the world”: “the teaching of the 
reading and writing of the word to a person missing the critical exercise of 
reading and rereading the world is, scientifically, politically, and pedagogically 
crippled” (ibid., p.66).  
 
As an educator who wielded influence in his official government capacity, 
Freire’s literacy programme implemented across rural areas of northeastern 
Brazil employed unconventional approaches and developed a kind of non-
institutional education as political praxis. They would form the foundation for 
his seminal work, “Pedagogy of the Oppressed” (1970). The text focuses on 
dialogue as a means of establishing mutuality between revolutionary and 
oppressed subjects, or – in more general terms of education – between 
educators and learners. The term “dialogue” encompasses at least three 
recurring elements in Freire’s pedagogy: (verbal) communication, equality, 
and social processes. According to him, “[d]ialogue with the people is neither 
a concession nor a gift, much less a tactic to be used for domination. 
Dialogue, as the encounter among men to ‘name’ the world, is a fundamental 
precondition for their true humanization” (Freire, 1970, p.137). To have two 
bodies meet in the co-production of knowledge directly opposes the 
dominating top-down prescription of information from educator to learner. In 
his “talking book” conversation with Ira Shor, Freire notes how dialogue 
functions between the “teacher” and “student”: 
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Instead of this cordial gift of information to students, the object to be 
known mediates the two cognitive subjects. In other words, the object 
to be known is put on the table between the two subjects of knowing. 
They meet around it and through it for mutual inquiry. (ibid., my 
emphasis)  
 
Freire provides a very specific image of dialogue at work: that it is both a 
place for gathering (“a table”) and a generative possibility (“mutual inquiry”) 
imagined to be as horizontal as possible. For the purpose of this study, 
however, there is a need to zoom in on another commentary in his 
conversation with Shor:  
 
Dialogue does not exist in a political vacuum. It is not a free space 
where you may do what you want. Dialogue takes place inside some 
kind of program and context. These conditioning factors create tension 
in achieving goals that we set for dialogic education. (Freire in Freire 
and Shor, p.16) 
 
This is a particularly crucial observation for the study, given its emphasis on 
embodied criticality as part of learning. Further on, Freire reiterates the 
directive role of the teacher, adding that they must possess the wherewithal 
to be humble and listen where necessary (ibid.). This is certainly applicable, 
to the extent that they are sensitive enough to do so. But what if the student 
refuses to accept what you are saying? Or even to talk when you want to step 
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back and listen? Giroux observes how Freire’s earlier work merely reverses 
the workings of the colonialism as a way of struggling against it:  
 
[W]hat happens when the language of the educator is not the same as 
that of the oppressed? How is it possible to be vigilant against taking 
up a notion of language, politics, and rationality that undermines 
recognizing one's own partiality and the voices and experiences of 
others? How does one explore the contradiction between validating 
certain forms of ‘correct’ thinking and the pedagogical task of helping 
students assume rather than simply follow the dictates of authority, 
regardless of how radical the project informed by such authority? 
(Giroux, 1992, p.19) 
 
Indeed, Giroux adds that this earlier tendency to “totalise” is made more 
complex in Freire’s later reflections and talking book publications; the 
anecdote provided at the start of this subsection might be counted as one. 
This attention given to his own materiality — the “slouching in [his] chair”, 
how it “swivel[led]”, his impulse “to find some hole to hide in” (Freire, 2004, 
p.17-18) — is something I hope to latch onto further. What does this 
discomfort do to dialogue? Or rather, what does discomfort enable in terms of 
other talk and communication modes that dialogue cannot? In light of this 
study’s interest in embodiment and the research possibilities of a lived 
“beside”, how might we attend to the multi-dimensionality of the 
“programmes and contexts” when dialogue fails to meet up to its promises of 
horizontality? These are all questions that are pertinent to the unfolding of 
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the chapter. It must be acknowledged that the socially negotiated art projects 
taking place within the Anglo-American and European contexts most proximal 
to this study are far from the realities from which Freire develops his 
pedagogy. However, there are important points of contact where the 
mediation of vast differences are concerned, particularly with regards to the 
negotiations of tension and power that so affect the relational material. 
 
 
2.1.2. A problematisation of dialogue in educational contexts  
 
In order to apprehend some common conceptions and practices of dialogue, 
one need only glean over some news headlines: dialogue is typically “called 
for” or “entered into” as a means to resolve conflict. The assumption is that a 
meeting is necessary for the negotiation of political differences. This concept 
of dialogue attributes neutrality to debate as a discussion platform, giving all 
parties the same space and conditions for expression. But just how are 
marginalised bodies supposed to fit into the discursive arena? If that proves 
to be impossible, what counterpublic alternatives are there? This is touched 
upon later on in this chapter (see: 2.2.2.); of relevance here is to think 
through dialogue as a practice, specifically as examined through the lens of 
education studies. The focus is on verbal communication and its conditions: 
what are the assumptions, intentions, and circumstances for dialogue with 
regards to its desired outcomes? 
 
In the co-authored text “Theory and Research on Teaching as Dialogue” 
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(2001), education philosophers Nicholas C. Burbules and Bertram C. Bruce 
propose four possible versions that attempt to typologise some possible 
shapes and forms of verbal communication that complicate the generality of 
dialogue within a classroom setting. They do so by defining aims and then 
assigning each of them with a corresponding approach. The intention is to 
“distinguish” them “from ‘monological’ models” (Burbules and Bruce, 2001), 
but not in a “dichotomous characterization” that reduces the lecture form 
entirely (ibid.). The effort here, they acknowledge, is restricted by the needs 
of a school environment that prescribes a certain kind of teacher authority, 
but it is one they also seek to shake up somewhat. Indeed, they caution “the 
idea that a teacher can individually hold sway in the classroom, directing the 
interests of students along pathways that he or she can control, is 
increasingly outmoded”, with “contexts of diversity vastly complicat[ing] the 
preference for any particular pattern of pedagogical communicative relation” 
(ibid.). In clarifying their awareness of multiple discursive perspectives that 
redistribute attention and recalibrates who gets to speak (on top of when, 
where, and how), they propose a number of different approaches to dialogue 
that ultimately remain invested in “implicit norms” (ibid.) – i.e. expectations 
and behaviours expected within a school. 
 
The effort to multiply the significance of dialogue, then, is still pragmatically 
beholden to the optimisation of the learning experience withing a school 
setting. This means that their thinking is directed towards certain learning 
outcomes, rooted as dialogue is in the clarification of “implicit norms” that are 
shared, in this case, in the classroom. It must be emphasised that the 
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reference to education studies here is not a call for their direct application in 
socially negotiated art, but rather an attempt to grasp how dialogue is 
obstinately linked to a particular understanding of communication: one that 
presumes pedagogically constructive relations. The four speech types 
proposed by Burbules and Bruce are therefore more telling of the generally 
positive aims that teachers have of their learners – and similarly art 
commissioners of their projects – than they are indicative of the range of 
communication possibilities between speakers (which parallels the idea of 
“resolution” hearkened to at the start of this subsection): 
 
Inquiry involves a co-investigation of a question, the resolution of a 
disagreement, the formulation of a compromise, all as ways of 
addressing a specific problem to be solved or answered. 
 
Conversation involves a more open-ended discussion in which the aim 
of intersubjective understanding, rather than the answering of any 
specific question or problem, is foremost. 
 
Instruction involves an intentional process in which a teacher “leads” a 
student, through questioning and guidance, to formulating certain 
answers or understandings (this approach is often seen as the 
paradigm of the “Socratic method”).  
 
Debate involves an exchange less about reaching agreement, or 
finding common answers, to testing positions through an agonistic 
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engagement for and against other positions; it may include a process 
of problematizing even the terms of discussion themselves. The aim is 
that alternative points of view can each be clarified and strengthened 
through such an engagement.  (Burbules and Bruce, 2001) 
 
By stressing the four different dimensions that dialogue multiplies into, 
Burbules and Bruce shed light on modes of exchange between the teacher 
and student. As such, the specific axes that connect the speakers are based 
largely on authority and compliance, trust and patience, all of which are 
centred around the student’s experience of learning. In a conversation with 
fellow art producers and curators working in art education for galleries, 
Serpentine Gallery curator Janna Graham questions the distinction between 
the affective and spatial “subject formation” that art is concerned with, versus 
“becoming a learned person” through education (Graham in Steedman, 2012, 
p.95). This meeting of artistic and educational endeavours in the formative 
capacities of subjectivity is just one of many cusps upon which socially 
negotiated art finds itself. Not surprisingly, the four communication strands 
proposed by Burbules and Bruce – inquiry, conversation, instruction, and 
debate – are all readily recognisable methods used in contemporary art 
contexts. By pluralising the forms and intentions of dialogue, Burbules and 
Bruce aim to “move beyond ‘speech act’ analyses – who speaks, how much 
they speak, etc. – to look at the discursive content and how it is heard and 
responded to by others” (Burbules and Bruce, 2001, my emphasis.). They 
caution that not all communication is constructive, thus substantiating their 
call for a more self-aware and critical discursive space in which educators are 
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able to align the value of conflict beside the constructive teaching of skills 
(ibid.). Their observation critiques education’s underlying obligation to provide 
and facilitate an environment in which ideas are controlled by standardised 
syllabi. Therefore, despite the best intentions of many teachers to supplant 
lecturing with dialogue, Burbules and Bruce caution the coercive capacity of 
the oversimplified question-and-answer model of classroom communication 
by expanding the scope and meaning of dialogue.  
 
Yet there are some problems with their characterisation: as much as it 
attempts to bring conflict into consideration, it still sidesteps what 
confrontations actually mean for teacher and student, and it also assumes 
that everyone is willing to participate. Moreover, dialogue is now imposed 
upon many education contexts by the very same performance-led authorities 
(e.g. Office for Standards in Education – OFSTED – here in the UK) that 
Burbules and Bruce are implicitly flagging up. Driven by quantifiable targets, 
dialogue is then reductively understood as a superficial conversation that 
keeps articulations of difference at arm’s length. While the chapter 
increasingly focuses on the shape and form of “difference” in speech, the 
examination here begins with the voice as a direct correlation of 
representation and inclusivity. 
 
Our voice is frequently coupled with our “rights”: to speak up is a 
fundamental entitlement, which supposedly demonstrates our social and 
political inclusion. But what if speaking up feels more oppressive than 
liberatory? Related to this question is who ultimately benefits from speaking 
 116 
up, from engaging in dialogue. What is the cost of taking part, especially for 
bodies that are marginalised in broader social contexts? Education sociologist 
Alison Jones takes a critical lens to representative inclusion in her essay 
“Talking Cure: The Desire for Dialogue” (2004). In it, she deliberately 
separates a classroom of students into two discussion groups: one group of 
white students and another group of primarily Maori students in this New 
Zealander context. While the white students perceived this to be 
discomforting, the Maori students welcomed the opportunity to chat more 
honestly. Jones’s experiment underscores a greater assumption about the 
availability of the marginalised – most typically the racialised and gendered 
other – in the production of new knowledges. “The fantasy of talking together 
and the romance of access [require] the embodied presence of peers” (Jones 
in Boler, 2004, p.64), which means the strategic ethnic segregation in this 
classroom is inevitably felt as a loss by white students: 
 
[W]here nonwhite peers are absent, the possibility of hearing the 
voices, of access to the marginalized other, is denied to white students. 
[…] Therefore, the removal of the possibility of gaining knowledge of 
the other from the other (assured through their presence, and 
therefore their potential engagement) means that the white students 
and parents accurately sense a powerful loss. (ibid., p.63) 
 
In locating the gaps of embodied understanding in the constructive and 
conciliatory in dialogue, we need to also consider what is abandoned as 
unconducive to it and why, namely what is regarded as destructive and 
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exclusionary. To be sure, the intention is not to set up an opposition, nor is 
this a contrarian gesture meant to redeem the merits of quarrel. It is rather to 
tease apart what is (not) accepted discursive practice and for what reasons, 
as well as to remind us of the situations in which dialogue is summoned: at 
the failure or absence of communication; at the beginning of a relationship or 
collaboration. Doing so opens up disagreement for investigation and makes 
more of the incommensurabilities between bodies, allowing the coercion that 
takes place in communication to be better illuminated. 
 
Returning to the socially negotiated art practitioner, the processes of co-
production, co-learning, and other social negotiations are means by which an 
art project performatively constitutes itself; it enacts and responds to the 
desires of a localised group. But are her working conditions as restrictive as 
the classroom teacher whose primary aim is to encourage constructive 
communication? The assumption is that there would be greater allowance for 
uncomfortable modes of communication, inasmuch as art practices embody 
different modes of experimentation. But how does that work out in practical 
terms? And, having to answer to commissioning curators, project partners, 
and participants all at the same time, what sort of reflection and 
accountability should she (not) assume? Chapter one touched upon Claire 
Bishop’s Rancièrian aesthetic negation and its role in leaving behind an 
affectively “troubling wake” (see: 1.1.4.). In “Artificial Hells” (2012), she 
specifically discussed Artur Żmijewski’s painting workshop Them (2007) to go 
against the dialogical mandate of communication. What happened was a 
painful breakdown of relations in the face of enforced togetherness (even if 
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the participation of different groups was voluntary to begin with). The video 
documentation of the painting workship is a hard watch. Led by Żmijewski, 
the workshop involved members from various organisations, representing 
nationalists, Christians, Jewish, and young socialists. Their task was to paint 
images depicting their group’s values and in doing so, the tense atmosphere 
of the workshop gradually deteriorates. Żmijewski encouraged participants to 
go around the room to amend the paintings done by other groups, which 
escalated into series of aggressive acts: slicing through work, taping other 
participants’ mouths shut, even setting fire to a painting. Many had to walk 
out, visibly shaken by the experience. As a viewer, you are consumed by a 
kind of voyeuristic “troubling wake” that is now made over-familiar by semi-
scripted reality television. By lumping groups together with “one rubric of 
belonging” (Bauman, 2000, p.176; see: 1.1.2. on “unworking” community), 
Żmijewski deliberately creates a greenhouse environment that demonstrates 
how the best dialogical intentions can be unravelled when they are confronted 
by embodiments that are strangest to them. This points to the inevitably 
ethical considerations of socially negotiated art and the need to better 
articulate an artwork’s accountability to those taking part in its relational 
processes. 
 
But such a critique of dialogue as its mirror opposite – violent irresolution – 
cooked up in a confined space by an artist whose aim was to emotionally 
overexpose his participants, seems to be a simplification of what else is 
possible. That is, beside the opposition of dialogue and conflict, what else is 
there? The following chapter section (2.1.3.) deals specifically with the friction 
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engendered from the meeting of multiple perspectives and disagreements. It 
turns to Rancière’s thoughts on dissensus in art and politics as well as 
Mouffe’s agonistics as an opportunity to heed communication differences; or, 
more precisely, as an opening that takes one away from the coercion of 
consensus. 
 
 
2.1.3. Renegotiating fictional dissensus 
 
To think through uncomfortable communication as a refraction of dialogue’s 
idealised horizontality, we need to look at Ranciere’s notion of “dissensus” to 
orient the politically and aesthetically productive stake of disagreement. For 
him, “[t]he exceptionality of politics is the exceptionality of a practice that has 
no field of its own but has to build its stage in the field of police” (Rancière, 
2011, p.11). Politics is apt to be found in the disagreeing collision of multiple 
worlds away from our normal, policed understanding of what makes sense. 
What is normalised by the state as politics is therefore, for Rancière, a state 
of restriction rather than a fully active platform for the participation of all. 
Instead, greater potential lies in the realm of “fictions” (Rancière, 2010). A 
volatile site outside and in excess of police, politics only becomes tangible 
when certain groups begin to initiate a “reconfiguration” of life: 
 
What I mean is that politics, rather than the exercise of power or the 
struggle for power, is the configuration of a specific world, a specific 
form of experience in which some things appear to be political objects, 
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some questions political issues or argumentations and some agents 
political subjects. I attempted to redefine this ‘aesthetic’ nature of 
politics by setting politics not as a specific single world but as a 
conflictive world: not a world of competing interests or values but a 
world of competing worlds. (Rancière, 2011, p.11) 
 
Compared to Paulo Freire’s humanistic and collaborative project discussed at 
the beginning of this chapter – which requires a facilitated process of 
consciousness-raising – Rancière’s vision of fictions is rather a “competition” 
between worlds as they emerge, which encourages a flourishing of 
dissonance between them. Recalling the loneliness of bodies and 
counterpublic affect (Warner, 2002; see: 1.1.2.), both Rancière and Warner 
identify the restrictions of the public space (or a “state of police” via Rancière) 
and how it enacts the limits against which alternatives can be lived out, 
formulated. In these generative spaces of counterpublic fictions, other rules, 
practices, and meanings are able to flourish. But where a counterpublic 
harnesses resistance from being subordinated, Rancière’s fiction is embedded 
within an aesthetic space that attends to “the equality of speaking beings” 
(Rancière, 2011, p.14), or to an ideal that is practically impossible in a state 
of police. Yet a poetic elsewhere is not completely contained from everything 
that keeps our subjectivities in check. His expanded definition of fiction is as 
follows: 
 
It is not a term that designates the imaginary as opposed to the real; it 
involves the re-framing of the ‘real’, or the framing of a dissensus. 
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Fiction is a way of changing existing modes of sensory presentations 
and forms of enunciation, of varying frames, scales and rhythms; and 
of building new relationships between reality and appearance, the 
individual and the collective. (Rancière, 2010, p.141, my emphasis)  
 
For him, fiction contributes towards a “commonsense” by “rearticulating the 
connections between signs and images, images and times, signs and spaces” 
(ibid., p.149). In other words, between seeing, hearing, feeling, and the 
meaning-making is the possibility of rupture, the space wherein art – fiction – 
must operate. Art then becomes a temporary habitat for enacting different 
political reveries that, in the end, cannot properly re-enter our policed reality; 
after all, Rancière’s understanding of reality is a “consensus” that, by 
definition, effaces dissensus (Rancière, 2010, p.144). Because of this, 
dissensus has to take place elsewhere, e.g. within the aesthetic regime, and 
poetic forms are in fact non-life forms in their refusal of policed sense-
making. It is this very “aesthetic indifference”, he reminds us, that must be 
reiterated in a new “critical art” unconcerned with its own political efficacy 
(ibid., p.138). 
 
The space of fiction is therefore as limited as it is provocative, seeing how its 
liberties are coupled with its non-realised status. But in distancing himself 
from politics as a struggle for power, Rancière is more focused on the 
dissensual multiplicity of fiction in which art is most political when it shows no 
pretence of the political. That way, Rancière’s “emancipated spectator” 
(Rancière, 2009) is able to rupture the connection between what they sense 
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and the meaning construed; the safe zone of fiction enables dissent to take 
place. What of the permeability of this space though? The fact that it “re-
frames” and does not “oppose” the real suggests a certain susceptibility. 
There are indeed some considerations of such negotiation found in his earlier 
text “Disagreement” (1995), in which he describes a “surplus subject”. 
Conceived as a figure external and responsive to an ongoing discussion, the 
surplus subject can be used to unsettle the boundaries of fiction more 
explicitly. While Rancière means for it to embody “the point at which the 
logos splits” and “what can be thought of specifically as politics” (Rancière, 
1995, pp.xii-xiii, my emphasis), the surplus subject is just as applicable to his 
understanding of fiction. Arguably, fiction is a “split” as well, with resonances 
of the third space adherence to and splitting from norms (see: 1.1.1.). He 
explains:  
 
The play of the third person is essential to the logic of political 
discussion, which is never simple dialogue. It is always both less and 
more: less, for it is always in the form of a monologue that the dispute, 
the gap internal to the logos, declares itself, and more, for 
commentary sets off a multiplication of persons. (Rancière, 1995, p.48) 
 
The surplus subject specifically disrupts the pendulating to-and-fro movement 
between two interlocuting points. The addition of this crucial third person 
position embodies a dissensual polyphony that questions order, authority, and 
normativising demands. In other words, it is able to see and say something 
that neither interlocutor is capable of. The following is an extract from the 
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Working Artists and the Greater Economy (W.A.G.E.) manifesto from 2008 
which puts the role of the surplus subject into context: 
 
W.A.G.E. (WORKING ARTISTS AND THE GREATER ECONOMY) WORKS 
TO DRAW ATTENTION TO ECONOMIC INEQUALITIES THAT EXIST IN 
THE ARTS, AND TO RESOLVE THEM. 
W.A.G.E. HAS BEEN FORMED BECAUSE WE, AS VISUAL + 
PERFORMANCE ARTISTS AND INDEPENDENT CURATORS, PROVIDE A 
WORK FORCE (W.A.G.E., 2008). 
 
By speaking of the collective from the outside and taking it as a third person, 
W.A.G.E. artists are both present (as themselves) and represented (by 
referring to themselves externally) as a delegate, to whom the group 
attributes power while owning it at the same time. In terms of Rancière’s 
surplus subject, being present and at the same time representing is “both less 
and more”: it is speculative and it breathes life; it questions the constraints of 
“we”, “you”, or “they” into new forms of identification, counterpublics, etc.; it 
is a mechanism that redirects the speaker, the addressee, as well as the act. 
In this particular case, the third person surplus and singular plural subjects 
enact other possibilities by venturing into a fictional, collectively lived 
presence. Regarding the complications of “we” in statements like the above 
W.A.G.E. manifesto, it is “[n]either the we or the identity assigned to it, nor 
the apposition of the two”, but rather 
 
modes of subjectification only in the set of relationships that the we 
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and its name maintain with the set of ‘persons,’ the complete play of 
identities and alterities implicated in the demonstration and the worlds 
– common or separate – where these are defined. (Rancière, 1995, 
p.59)  
 
The playfulness opens up the possibility of reconstituting who “we” are, thus 
highlighting how Rancière’s dissensus is emergent, negotiated. By resituating 
his surplus subject into his argument for fiction, a more permeable 
understanding of his aesthetic regime is brought to light. The multiplicity of 
subjects in competing, frictive processes of reconfiguration then resonates 
widely, including in Chantal Mouffe’s reflections on agonistic art practices 
(2007; 2013). She is concerned with the “the fostering of new social 
relations” in a co-generated public space “where conflicting points of view are 
confronted without any possibility of a final reconciliation” (Mouffe, 2013, 
p.92). Her agonistics depend on this “discursively constructed” criticality that 
veers away from the assessment of political efficacy, and instead asks how 
the “common sense” (also found in Rancière’s writing) is made and remade 
(ibid., p.90). Of note in Mouffe’s assessment is how art is capable of moving 
us and of attending to desire, which parallels the affective dimension that is 
inseparable from this study’s focus on embodiment (see: chapter three on the 
political ramifications of love). “From the point of view of the theory of 
hegemony”, she argues, “artistic practices play a role in the constitution and 
maintenance of a given symbolic order” (ibid., p.91). As such, their role in the 
formation of subjectivity comes from the friction of unsettling norms and, 
crucially for this study, from the dissimilarities between the practices 
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themselves. If the notion of dialogue suggests an all-too compliant position 
with dominant discourse, then what I propose in this chapter is the nourishing 
of other, dissenting subjectivities that alert us to alternative possibilities.  
 
To end, we can consider Rancière’s critique of a particular project by the 
French-Australian collective of artists and architects Urban Encampment 
(Campement Urbain) called I and Us (Je & Nous, 2003-2008). The group 
carves out a place of solitude in the middle of a satellite Parisian town called 
Sevran, which was built in the 1970s for immigrants primarily from around 
North Africa. For Rancière, the deliberate suspense materialised by the 
contemplative space is in itself a crucial aspect of an aesthetic sensibility that 
permits “embracing” as much as “splitting” (Rancière, 2008) – the latter of 
which hearkens not only to his surplus subject, but is also found in the 
enunciated third space (Bhabha, 1994; see: 1.1.1.) of cultural reiteration and 
innovation. However, as it has been discussed earlier, Rancière tendency is to 
insist upon the fiction of dissensus, of a non-existent “paper life” (Rancière, 
2011, p.13). Its presence is first and foremost only ever in conditional terms, 
never breaking into everyday experience (Rancière, 2008, p.9). As much as I 
and Us is a situated art project, it paradoxically takes part within its 
surroundings by being separate from it. Quoting the artist group, the space 
was meant to be “extremely useless, fragile and non-productive” which, for 
Rancière, perfectly embodies that rupture of art: in “constructing a place for 
solitude, an ‘aesthetic’ place appears as a task for engaged art” (Rancière, 
2008). However, François Daune offers the following explanation in an 
interview about the project with art and architecture scholars Peter 
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Mörtenböck and Helge Mooshammer: 
 
We proposed creating an object where an individual could be alone but 
that would be everyone’s responsibility at the same time. All the 
communities would take care of the object while allowing people to get 
away from their respective communities. In other words, people 
entering the object exit their communities. This means their 
communities have to accept that they’re taking (an individual) time out 
when they go away and stay there. It’s a place that might be able to 
trigger new practices. Though, since the project is the responsibility of 
the community, it exists only as long as people agree to keep the 
physical object intact. They have to discuss how to do this, how to use 
it, maintain it and so on. If discussion stops, the object will disappear. 
So discussing the meaning of such a space actually constitutes its 
beginning. (Campement Urbain, 2008, my emphasis) 
 
This is where Rancière’s idea of an aesthetic dissensual community becomes 
difficult, for this space of possibilities is in fact made to exist, and is not 
merely a guarded territory that subsequently allows things to take place. The 
emphasis turns to the discursive performativity between bodies and how they 
create or destroy objects / potentials through negotiation, a situated process 
that is largely overlooked in Rancière’s reflections on art and politics as 
dissensus. Recalling Mouffe’s co-existing artistic agonisms, this particular 
space has to be discursively produced and maintained. Rancière later clarifies 
his thinking in his 2011 essay by stating that “the truth about the Truth can 
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only be told as myth”, which is something he “refuse[s] to ontologize” 
(Rancière, 2011, p.15, my emphasis). This, he contends, is what underpins 
aesthetics, politics, and philosophy: none of them can be successfully given a 
form. Yet a project such as I and Us clearly makes something – a physical 
place – out of fiction’s social performativity, ushering other forms of life that 
are tangible even if only momentarily, continuing to exert some kind of 
influence even after they disappear. Even though the result is an aesthetic 
break, or an “exit” from “communities” as the artist says, it is still a space 
within life, and it is one that is brought to life through discursive negotiation. 
 
It can be said, as Rancière argues, that “critical” art practices must always fall 
short of delivering actual political change. What they do in the context of this 
study’s socially negotiated art is explore and speculate, freely associating 
imaginations of different subjectivities. As examined above, this negotiation is 
also materially constitutive of a political reality that breaks into new ground. 
Socially negotiated art is, at its best, as committed to testing the material 
restrictions of reality as it is to nurturing non-life forms of fiction; as serious 
about the failures of the real as the imagining of new possibilities. The 
“socially negotiated” element then involves the critical consideration of 
embodied, physical experience that breathes meaning into flourishing and 
livability. In supplementing Rancière’s dissensus with embodiment, I am 
seeking and marking out a communicative and relational possibility for a 
permeable yet frictive socially negotiated art; the very “I and us” only ever 
come-to-be performed through social contact, yielding, and resistance. In the 
next section, two art projects are described and examined (2.2.1.). They each 
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demonstrate in different ways how dialogue fails to achieve discursive 
equality between speakers. The intention is to understand the hopes and 
difficulties of dialogue when it is sought in practice, which leads to the 
question of other possibilities if dialogue is, in fact, not the answer. The 
breakdown of the two projects are then followed by the analysis of two 
frictive forms of speech – gossip and teasing – that argue for their 
counterpublic and epistemic potential (2.2.2.). 
 
 
2.2. Dislocating dialogue: two socially negotiated art projects 
and two frictive modes of speech 
 
In “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy” (2001), feminist writer Iris 
Marion Young attempts to portray two characters “in dialogue” with one 
another: a deliberative democrat and an activist. Below are some notable 
traits that she assigns to each: 
 
The deliberative democrat thinks that the best way to limit political 
domination and the naked imposition of partisan interest and to 
promote greater social justice through public policy is to foster the 
creation of sites and processes of deliberation among diverse and 
disagreeing elements of the polity. […] Through critical argument that 
is open to the point of view of others, she aims to arrive at policy 
conclusions freely acceptable by all involved. (Young, 2001, p.672) 
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The activist opposes particular actions or policies of public or private 
institutions, as well as systems of policies or actions, and wants them 
changed. Sometimes he also demands positive policies and action to 
reduce injustice or harm. […] Often activists make public noise outside 
when deliberation is supposedly taking place on the inside. Sometimes 
activists invade the houses of deliberation and disrupt their business by 
unfurling banners, throwing stink bombs, or running and shouting 
through the aisles. (ibid., p.673) 
 
Though the descriptions convey two political characters as if they could only 
be separate, Young’s essay brought forth many overlapping intentions and 
concerns harboured by both. What tears them apart into two characters is the 
different evaluations they have on being reasonable, where on the one hand 
it is indispensable (for implementing policies) and on the other, it is 
impossible (when discussion is based on false premises). This once again 
points toward discursive conditions – e.g. where, how, why is this exchange 
taking place – and how they can complicitly legitimate the power imbalances 
that the activist calls out, struggles against. Young’s definition of deliberation, 
in light of the chapter so far, reflects the desire for an idealised, rationally 
argued dialogue, while her activist speech interrupts the implicit normativising 
processes that dialogue demands. Yet this delineation of the “deliberative” 
and “activist” tends to portray the latter as a reaction to dominant order, 
which in itself is also crucial. But given this study’s emphasis on negotiation as 
a generative space, it is important to examine speech modes that do 
something other than rationally deliberate an issue or disrupt discussions. 
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This chapter section (2.2.) proposes a different, more multiple understanding 
of non-dialogical types of communication. This means turning to speech that 
deviate from deliberation and activism as opposite poles, resulting in 
something altogether more ambiguous. To do so, the second half of chapter 
two is focused on refracting egalitarian presumptions of dialogue in two ways: 
firstly, by looking at how dialogue is explicitly pursued and denied as a 
relational device in two art projects by Ania Bas (2012) and Anthony Schrag 
(2015) respectively; secondly, by examinng two intimate forms of speech that 
both defy and comply with reason as well as disruption. Specific to this 
study’s context, such negotiability is described as the frictive. In examining 
speech in situ, the art and speech analyses show how spoken negotiation 
function as critical, investigative sites; they are reflections produced through a 
kind of dissent that, following performance studies scholar Shannon Jackson, 
enact the “co-imbrication” between art and the “props” – the bodies and 
situations – that support it (Jackson, 2011). I then turn my attention to two 
types of speech that are generally trivialised and overlooked – gossip and 
teasing. Doing so is an attempt to argue for a mutuality that is based on the 
exclusivity of marginalised identities, and to advocate a more intimate in-
group circulation and evaluation of knowledge. To do so, I refer to two modes 
of speech: gossip, which is positioned as a social, feminist epistemology that 
runs parallel to more official undertakings of research; and teasing, with an 
examination of works by poet and performance artist Marlon Riggs to explore 
the use of play-aggression as queer bonding and critique. The aim here is to 
emphasise modes of communication that are built upon their markers of 
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difference. By highlighting these multiple, variable moments of the spoken, I 
seek to reinvigorate them as part of an affectively robust and complex space 
wherein the social is less presumptuously engaged and differently negotiated. 
 
 
2.2.1. Undoing the “dialogical” in two socially negotiated art 
projects  
 
This section examines two art projects in which the following are explored: 1. 
dialogue is highlighted as a tool for exploring situated narratives and 
identities; and 2. agonistic measures are used to bypass dialogue and invite 
more honest thoughts with regards to differences (especially those related to 
hidden power relations). The former demonstrates an earnest attempt to 
establish mutual communication, while the latter employs aspects of agonism 
and dissent that are concepts explored in the earlier part of this chapter. 
Artist Ania Bas uses conversation to establish and facilitate the relations in her 
I Love PX (2012) project, while Anthony Schrag employs group play as a 
means of problematising universal inclusivity. Bas’s project grew around a 
commission from Yorkshire Artspace (YAS) to understand the possibilities of 
an artist in the process of “urban regeneration”. As such, the trajectory of the 
project depended on the making and sustaining of conversations over the 
course of the one-year residency. Schrag’s work, rather, debunks the working 
relations between artists, participants, and institutions, which finds shape in a 
series of different artistic actions related to physical contact, endurance, and 
confrontational encounters. As such, Bas assumed the role of incomer-cum-
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temporary delegate, whereas Schrag consciously embodied disruption in order 
to put to test the boundaries that keep bodies and institutions apart.  
 
 
I Love PX – Ania Bas, 2012 
 
In Bas’s project, the challenge lay in being a nomad, i.e. an itinerant stranger, 
whose task was to figure out her place in Sheffield’s working class suburb of 
Parson Cross. Invited as an outsider-artist, she is asked to weave herself 
within the life of the neighbourhood. According to Rachael Dodd, Programme 
Manager for the YAS, the residency was based on the following question: 
“what role can artists and art play in a neighbourhood?” and that “it was 
about building networks and relationships, engaging people, and creating 
work in relation to the social context” (Dodd, 2015, pers. comm., 27 April).  
Any response to that hinged upon a process of familiarisation, both in terms 
of the artist settling into the area and vice versa. The main challenges 
included figuring out her indeterminate role and accorded power (as an 
artistic “expert”), which was done in gradual stages of immersion and careful 
negotiation. As it unfolded, blogging and talking with people face to face 
ended up being the main means of reflection and reaching out respectively. 
By the end of the residency, a co-authored book was also produced.  
 
Bas was brought in from the outside – a “nomadic” artist (Kwon, 2001) – and 
as part of her brief, she had to situate herself within a locality with which she 
had no prior connection. This means orienting oneself in a number of ways, 
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including getting to know the street names, the landmarks, and the social 
spaces specific to Parson Cross, as well as the psychogeography associated 
with place. This entanglement of place, people, and meaning exists in 
embodied relation with one another, which cannot be easily accessed over a 
short span of time. During the residency, she opted for an “easing in” 
approach that would introduce her (in)to the area. Armed with a bright blue 
chair, she talked with passers-by who were curious about why she was there. 
It became her “signature action and silent announcement of [her] presence”: 
 
A gentleman who lives by the island approached me to check "What is 
all of this about?" He found it weird that it was all about sitting, 
reading and enjoying the green spot. I was directed towards the park 
that had "millions spent on it" and surely must be a better spot to 
enjoy greenery and fresh air. (Bas, 2012) 
 
Her observations, questions, aims, and doubts were all recorded onto a blog 
in a diaristic manner. It was a self-reflexive process in which research, 
preparation, and reflection all took place beside one another. The blog entries 
tell her readers how she passed a few months “brewing” while being out with 
her blue chair and talking to people; they also tell us that a book of fictions 
was published towards the end of the residency. It contained the texts of 
those who took part at the writing workshops and tours that she organised. 
The workshops were attended by residents as well as art colleagues, although 
most of the writing contribution was done by the former. Relaxed and 
informal, an author from the area also came to talk about his own work based 
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on local history. The book presents a cross-section of written records that 
range from (fictionalised?) postcard correspondence to lyrics of adolescent 
angst (“Burping lasses chewing gum, dirty pavements, human scum”). Yet 
they only indicate towards the conversations and interpersonal relations that 
Bas navigated and established with the authors. Deliberately included are 
highly critical letters in which the artist is directly addressed. One of the local 
residents and book contributors, Mary Small, used the opportunity to voice 
her distress at “urban regeneration” consultations: 
 
I still don’t feel heard and all I want is for people from outside the 
neighbourhood to stop judging us. If you don’t live here, you will never 
understand the complexity of the estate. It might not be a perfect 
place, but are there perfect places? […] I want you to start taking 
responsibility for what you write, how you make people feel and what 
you make them believe in. Stop telling us what to think, stop telling us 
how to live, stop telling us what we need. What we lack is not dignity 
but a rightful respect towards us from others. (Small, in Bas, 2013, 
p.81, my emphasis)  
 
The process of “talking through” has been interpreted as intrusive, as a threat 
to the neighbourhood itself. Indeed, negotiation needs to account for 
disagreement (see: 2.1.3. on the importance of dissent), as dissatisfaction, 
resentment, and misunderstandings also arise from Bas’s efforts to achieve 
greater proximity. Small’s reflection shows how the intention of dialogical 
encounters can go awry, if the “intention” presupposes a possibility of 
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mutuality, of openness to engagement. In Bas’s own words: 
 
[There were] no long-term connections to the area, no solid base. I 
was trying to build that for myself. [But] there’s thirty years of bad 
memories and still affects reality now. I didn’t know that when I came 
in. (Bas, 2016, pers. comm., 16 February) 
 
The displacement of an artist in a foreign environment or – more literally – 
the speech acts between Bas and those she meets (residents, shopkeepers, 
commissioners, etc.) cannot be adequately addressed through “dialogue”. 
Words uttered over the finite lifespan of a project may not be able to shed 
light on things that are hard to surface – on the “bad memories” of a place, 
for instance – nor do they convey the difficulties and emotional awkwardness 
of Bas’s immersion process, of navigating how much to share, and of having 
to deal with potential backlash.  
 
While Bas’s residency was a commissioned project that was concerned with 
the exploration of connections and relationships in a particular locality, its 
infrastructural support of partners (which include Arts Council England and 
the Housing Market Renewal Scheme) were rather absent from the 
production process. However, certain texts in the “I Love PX” publication 
articulated the residents’ anger on the changes made in the area: 
 
Currently we are under a North Sheffield regeneration programme 
designed to improve our wellbeing and boost our self-esteem as well 
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as bring cappuccinos and organic cakes to the local cafes. And again I 
can’t help but feel frustrated. Someone in between the lines, in a 
clever way that I am not meant to see, is telling me that we are not 
sophisticated enough, that we should be aiming higher but not too 
high. (Small in Bas, 2013, p.81) 
 
The “nomadic artist”, in this case, ends up critically reflecting upon the 
(exoticised) alterity that her art commissioners had hoped to instrumentalise 
as part of “urban regeneration”, a term that glosses over the sanitisation and 
paternalistic reimagination of a neighbourhood: “I fit into so many boxes for 
people, being the [Polish] foreigner, the other, the middle-class woman” (Bas, 
2016, pers. comm., 16 February). In answering the question “what role can 
artists and art play in a neighbourhood?” posed by YAS, Bas’s afterthoughts 
revolve around what she calls the “protective barriers” that must be erected 
for her own emotional preservation on the one hand, and for institutional 
accountability as well on the other. There must be some evidence of 
established, trusted contact between programme commissioners and local 
partners; after all, the artist’s relationship with a neighbourhood is in many 
ways predetermined by the commissioner’s own situatedness within it. At the 
time, YAS’s key presence in the area was three consecutive one-year art 
residencies. Without any other meaningful representation in the area, the 
responsibility of “building partnerships” (Dodd, 2015, pers. comm., 27 April) 
was effectively outsourced to artists like Bas. It leaves the artist, the 
neighbourhood, and YAS in a precarious relationship with one another. By the 
end of this project, the conversations nurtured with residents and the related 
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attempt of the commissioner to play a part in the neighbourhood have 
engendered some important points of resistance, enacting the limits of 
dialogue and horizontality. 
 
 
Drama for Life: Participatory Performances – Anthony Schrag, 2014 
 
As part of a simultaneous set of nine residencies taking place across the 
continents of Europe and Africa (“Nine Urban Biotopes”, supported by the 
Culture Programme of the European Union), Schrag was selected to work with 
a Johannesburg-based organisation called Drama for Life (DFL) “that sought 
to enact social change via Applied Drama and Drama Therapy” (Schrag, 
2015b, p.47). Over a period of three months, Schrag performed and produced 
almost thirty different actions and events that “explore the place of such 
institutions as tools for social transformation and change, seeking to create 
public events and projects that playfully explore social conflict” (Nine Urban 
Biotopes, 2014). He was originally assigned to work with six MA theatre 
students as well as “community” participants over the course of his stay, but 
he soon began to question the entire framework of the residency, most 
notably: 1. their disagreement on what constitutes a “community” (for DFL, it 
is an “area” within a city; for Schrag, it is a specific group of people that are 
“together” for complex reasons); 2. DFL’s instrumentalisation of his practice 
for uncritical “social betterment”. From this position of disagreement, Schrag 
produced a number of works that elicited conflict as a disruptive form of 
negotiation that functions contrary to the logic of even-tempered, egalitarian 
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dialogue. The starting point of Schrag’s practice, then, is the confrontation of 
irreconciliation. Rather than locating a common ground, he prefers an 
approach that generates “slightly mean” but “productive conflict[s]” that are 
capable of “critiqu[ing] intention by challenging how someone is doing 
something” (Schrag, 2015, pers. comm., 5 March). As such, there is a need to 
focus more closely on one of his many actions during the residency to explore 
the frictive and practical applications of conflict.  
 
For the work Racist (2015), Schrag – a white, foreign artist – sought out the 
reactions of others by wearing a badge that said “RACIST” on it for a week. 
The people who approached him generally wanted to ask about the sign, 
which would lead to discussions about what racism entailed; whether it was 
found in a person or in their actions; and how it was possible that one was 
never racist. He remarks, “I wore the sign that declared me a racist for a 
week and noticed only non-white people approached the topic” (Schrag, 
2015b, p.50). This particular observation is key: why did only “non-white 
people” attempt to challenge Schrag? Taken to mean black South Africans 
primarily, is it because they are not as easily caught off-guard by his 
statement? Or that there is little incrimination? Given that racism pervades 
both explicitly and structurally, how differently do white and black South 
Africans feel about it as a topic of dissent / conversation? Of course, Schrag’s 
sign is meant to incite and demand attention. But importantly, it is a white 
person going public and owning his racism. Current cultural standards of the 
West no longer tolerate jarring displays of racism, which has only made its 
proliferation all the more insidious and frustrating. To see a white stranger 
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call himself a “RACIST” is therefore alarming, not because of disgust – racism 
is old news, after all – but because he has come out of the racist closet. In 
turn, this marks Schrag as a potential ally of a broader counterpublic that at 
least wants to recognise racism. For black South Africans, this agonistic move 
of conflict-seeking could possibly make him a more suitable candidate of 
meaningful conversation, the kind – paradoxically – that dialogue might hope 
to achieve.   
 
But what about the reaction of white South Africans? Surely, his candid 
admission to racism is perceived as offensive to the dominant cultural 
narrative that is already done with Apartheid. Yet this self-congratulatory 
perspective leaves many white South Africans without the wherewithal to 
confront the racism that still affect black South Africans. The unfortunate 
result is partly demonstrated in Schrag’s project: silence from white people, 
perhaps out of guilt or defensive outrage, out of disbelief that they should 
(still) be accused. In the context of this chapter, this inability to deal with 
racism is intimately linked to the egalitarian principles of dialogue. When 
confronted with the aggressively frictive language that also names your 
complicity, everything you know is put into question. Faced with Schrag’s 
“RACIST” sign, the illusion of “equality” pandered by the dominant cultural 
narrative is broken: his own admission of injustice is an inverse reflection of 
your own negligence, dragging your guilt to light. It is the dumbfounded 
discomfort of the white South Africans that is most telling: the 
disengagement, the feeling of disorientation, incrimination, and being on the 
back foot, all of which conspire against their access to dialogue. Where does 
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that leave them now that they no longer have the privilege or the power to 
engage in rational “dialogue”? Funnily, Schrag says, “By arranging a situation, 
I create an excuse to have a dialogue” (Schrag, 2015, pers. comm., 5 March) 
– or, more precisely in the language of this chapter, a frictively generated 
exchange arising out of dissent. As it turns out, Schrag’s racist “situation” is 
both an affirmative conversation starter and an uncomfortable calling out that 
takes away presumed innocence from white voices. By raising the question of 
race in what he calls a “slightly mean” way, Schrag sheds light on the 
impossibility of dialogue, of the vast disparity that still needs to be addressed.  
 
In fully exploring the embodied experience of the relational processes with 
which artists like Bas and Schrag are involved, disagreements, confrontation, 
and silences – not egalitarian dialogue – need to be better highlighted as 
generative sites of new ideas. Reiterating the “props” mentioned at the start 
of this chapter section, Jackson argues in “Social Works” (2011) for a more 
conscious and complicit display of the interdependencies between art and its 
supportive structures – thus “props”. For her, it is less to do with the 
“revealing [of] the reality” and mechanisms that enable art and life, but “to 
find in that exposure evidence of their intimate and ever-shifting co-
imbrication” (Jackson, 2011, p.149). She attempts to undo the tendency to 
dichotomise social efficacy and critical, aesthetic merit by highlighting the 
unresolvable tension that exists between the work of art and the work to 
make the art (ibid., p.92). While her argument takes the form of highly 
choreographed installations, performative actions, as well as collaborative 
theatre projects, the goal here is to forefront the actual conversations – the 
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maintenance conversational work as well as negotiations with dissatisfaction 
that led to the co-authored book in Bas’s I Love PX; the confrontational 
provocation and occasions for meaningful exchange in Schrag’s Racist – as 
vitally demonstrative of the co-dependence / “co-imbrication” of art and the 
heteronomy of life. Frictive speech as refusal and as multi-dimensional ways 
of seizing, reclaiming, and manipulating power must be better accounted for 
in a socially negotiated art. 
 
 
2.2.2. The intimacy of gossip and the play-aggression of 
teasing  
 
So far, this chapter has explored different facets of dialogue that began with 
Freire’s activist interpretation of it – equal participation in an open playing 
field of “co-naming” – which later dissolved into the difficulties of achieving 
this within the heteronomous experiences of life. Against the disembodiment 
of the Habermasian public sphere, Michael Warner reminds us how “the 
possibilities of public or private speech are distorted” (Warner, 2002, p.52) for 
those who do not fit within an invisible body standard of “white, male, 
literate, and propertied” (ibid., p.166). Limited by the impossibility of dialogue 
and the subsequent loss of public speech means at the same time the 
cultivation of alternative speech and social vernacular in counterpublic circles 
to create discursive spaces supported by different political affects. Warner 
borrows from Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s reflections on speech and the 
assumption of intimate knowledge in “what goes without saying; what can be 
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said without breach of decorum; who shares the onus of disclosure; what can 
be known about a person’s real nature through telltale signs, without his or 
her own awareness; who bears the consequences of speech and silence” 
(ibid., p.52).  
 
This section (2.2.2.) now puts forward two particular verbal forms that are 
capable of forging other senses of solidarity and self-reflexivity. It may seem 
tempting to work backwards along a spectrum of speech types to locate 
something between dialogue and conflict, but this imagined gradation 
undermines other ways of speaking by always already pitting them against 
dialogue as the optimum. Rejecting the prejudice implicit in this sliding scale 
opens up a wider, more serious engagement with different communicative 
possibilities that are otherwise underestimated and thus underexamined. 
While Iris Marion Young’s activist approach may be a reaction to the 
deliberative in democracy, it provides important clues to the attitudes one can 
also assume in speech: determination, defiance, irreverence. It questions the 
failure of dialogue by refusing to dialogue, for the conditions that enable it 
are simply not there. Rather than settling for a compensatory alternative, it is 
necessary to move away from the parameters that lock down our thinking 
with dialogue as the locus and instead, draw upon the confidence that exudes 
from Young’s activist interjection: one that embraces its own contingency and 
thrives in experimental dissent. With this conviction in mind, the argument 
now turns to the extended web of communication that exists somewhere 
beside the deliberative and activist, or what this study has been emphasising 
as the frictive. This is perhaps best characterised by its recuperation of 
 143 
intimate, embodied entanglements, which stands in stark contrast to the 
consensual co-naming of dialogue. The frictive garners a different connection 
that would scarcely be considered “generative” or “reflective” at first glance. 
The intention is to analyse how two variants of verbal forms – gossip and 
teasing – typically dismissed by serious researchers need to be recalibrated 
into sites of queer and feminist intimacy and knowledge. In both cases, the 
social and epistemological potential is highlighted in order to examine, 
following Mouffe (2013), its “discursively constructed criticality”. 
 
 
Gossip 
 
In the groundbreaking study “Women’s Ways of Knowing” (1986), Belenky et 
al. propose a series of methods by which women in various conditions of 
social and political subjugation come to know the(ir) world(s). They determine 
five basic methods, each of which are attached to the relative severity / 
absence of sex-based oppression. Noticeably absent is any deeper analysis of 
gossip – appearing only tangentially in the section on “procedural knowledge” 
of the “connected” kind, which is the closest comparative to the sociality that 
is explored here. Focused as their study is on delivering a counterargument to 
the male-dominated approaches on epistemic development, the co-authors 
reactively overlook gossip as a site of serious meaning-making. They do, 
however, define it generously: 
 
Gossip concerns the personal, the particular, and frequently the petty; 
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but it does not follow that it is a trivial activity. […] The explicit 
information gossipers share concerns the behavior of other people; 
but, implicitly, gossipers tell each other about themselves by showing 
how they interpret the information they share. (Belenky et al., 1986, 
p.116) 
 
In other words, gossip has an evaluative function built into its processes of 
information sharing. But in choosing to highlight the element of “trust” and 
“understanding” of gossip, Belenky et al. strip the “petty” of its power, given 
that “[connected knowers’] purpose is not to judge but to understand” (ibid., 
my emphasis). The co-authors therefore refuse the evaluative power of 
dissent and friction that do, in fact, result from gossip. Tellingly, this short 
mention ends up being a small component of a larger epistemological 
framework – connected knowing – in which women arrive at knowledge by 
perceiving life from other points of view (ibid., p.115). As such, the argument 
relies on the abstinence of judgement in favour of “empathy”, “forbearance”, 
“subjectivity”, etc. that the co-authors rework as radical attitudes of system-
breaking (ibid., p.128).  
 
While this chapter’s renegotiation of dialogue can be aligned beside Belenky’s 
et al.’s connected knowing, it does not neglect the critical, evaluative quality 
of “being petty”; doing so would relent to the bad reputation of gossip that 
rules out a more affective analysis. Feminist philosopher Karen Adkins’s 2002 
study on gossip specifically locates it beside “official” routes of knowledge like 
academic research, purposely citing an all-male example from the world of 
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science in the late-1960s to illustrate the use of gossip.  As two rival groups 
of scientists compete in an “international chase for the structure of DNA”, 
they fully engage with “the power of gossip to turn people on or off research 
roads”, as “informal reports on others is in fact a critical way of keeping tabs 
on scientific thinking” (Adkins, 2002, p.224). Adkins’s argument, then, is that 
gossip produces knowledge that is not peripheral to institutional knowledge, 
but rather is at least as crucial as the latter. More relevant yet to this study is 
her argument on the role and perception of gossip in the western historical 
context (Adkins, 2017). In her recent publication, she reclaims gossip within 
the feminist fold not only as one possible mode of knowing, but as a 
challenge of epistemological norms.  
 
She resituates gossip’s critical capacity by, firstly, looking at the historical use 
of the word — “godsibbe”, or “god-sibling”, connoting a person who 
performed intimate as well as public roles for a family. A gossip, then, has 
always been a close cohort. Secondly, she notes the change in the word’s 
usage and meaning some time in the sixteenth century, moving from a noun 
to a verb. Adkins contends that this has to do with the rise of print culture, 
which resulted in a “devalu[ation] of orality” as well as “collective authorship 
in theology, science, and the law” (Adkins, 2017, p.24). She elaborates:  
 
At the very moment when print is attaining dominance as authority, 
challenges to its status are intrusive, and an obstacle to the spread of 
the values of print culture. Gossip, the rhetorical heckler and trickster, 
can hobble pompous public pronouncements. Private whisperings can 
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render public restrictions impotent. It seems like more than 
coincidence to me that the word gossip becomes lexically devalued in 
the century after print culture and literacy become widespread. 
Cordoning off gossip as trivial, probably false, malicious, and the talk of 
(ignorant or spiteful) women minimizes the effect of gossip as a critical 
act. (ibid., p.25, my emphasis) 
 
Taking this claim to task, she follows up with a deliberate intermingling of 
gossip beside her scholarly critique. In her examination of Kierkegaard’s 
argument against gossip and its propensity to bleed into “proper” thought, 
Adkins spends just as much time recounting his public tussles with colleagues 
and “scandal sheets”, while also bringing our attention to the “Good-Natured 
Gossipy Remarks” of personal criticisms against him that he in fact hoarded 
and stashed away (ibid., p.36). She gossips as part of her analysis in order to 
demonstrate what it means to consider the lived experiences of a philosopher 
as part of one’s reflections on their intellectual work. By putting Kierkegaard’s 
actions in frictive contact with his thoughts, Adkins constructs a different, 
delightfully rounded perspective wherein there is no implicit hierarchy of 
importance when it comes to the information shared about as well as beside 
his thoughts; the fact that he was in every way disturbed and interested in 
what people said about him is not incidental but complementary to his work,  
enabling a perspective that is otherwise (literally and physically) hidden away 
from his writing. 
 
In context of socially negotiated art practices, gossip functions in a similarly 
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robust manner that cannot be divorced from the artistic and relational 
processes. To work this through, we can turn to a project by Annette Krauss 
called Hidden Curriculum (2007-2015). Interested in the ways that spaces and 
bodies are disciplined within a school environment, Krauss worked in 
conjunction with a group of 15 to 17-year-old pupils to “investigate forms of 
learning in school” which includes “possibilities to address informal 
knowledge, unrecognized and undesired learning in the context of 
institutionalised normalization processes” (Art Discover, 2013). In thinking 
about where the force of gossip lies, it became apparent that informal 
conversations make use of the same informal spaces that are the gaps and 
blindspots of disobedient behaviour (whispers, scrawled obscenities on desks, 
note-passing, smoking in the bathroom, etc.) in schools. A huge part of the 
project hinged upon Krauss’s ability to earn some measure of trust with the 
pupils, such that they would be willing to let her in on the hidden / private 
aspects of school life. She occupied the ambivalent position of being an adult 
of some authority, but not of the kind that the pupils are normally used to 
with their teachers. This gave her room to manoeuvre, though she admits 
that what is ultimately compiled – how to be “invisible” in school; how to rock 
chairs (which is generally not allowed in lessons) in a group; how to go up 
and down a set of stairs; etc. – does not represent the full extent of their 
undertaking. Some of the information – or “secrets”, as the pupils called them 
– were not divulged in the project’s documentation precisely because of the 
way in which gossip is negotiated. In an interview with fellow artists Hannah 
Jickling and Helen Reed, she notes:  
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Going back to the issue of the students’ secrets, we felt the urge to 
create an agreement and framework for discussing these secrets in 
public without necessarily revealing them. The pupils suggested the so-
called Hidden Curriculum Archive. It is a way to collect the secret 
actions and practices that they use in order to face the requirements 
and institutional structures of school. This archive has two sections: 
one is public, parts of which became the Hidden Curriculum Files, and 
one is strictly confidential – students would always discuss which 
section of the archive these secrets would enter. In this way both parts 
are always under discussion. But also the logistics of the archive, the 
travelling of one workshop series to another brings challenging 
questions: for example, in order to bring the project to other groups of 
students, we agreed that I would only do this if there was not another 
teacher present. My part in this was, and always is, very difficult and 
it’s never really resolved, it’s a paradox. (Krauss, Jickling and Reed, 
2013) 
 
The paradox lies in the delicate balancing act of trust and transgression, in 
having a conspiratorial relationship with the pupils that her co-operating and 
commissioning institutions cannot enter.  
 
Indeed, we come to an unavoidable convergence of secrets and gossip. 
Secrets, once revealed (whether intentionally or not), become the stuff of 
gossip: private information finding itself in the domain of a selective public. As 
slippery and fact-shifting as it is apt to be, gossip cannot be possessed or 
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disciplined, taking on a spatiality that exceeds the speakers; it is prone to 
spreading beyond the control of the gossip participants and potentially cause 
social and reputational harm to those involved, i.e. turn into scandal (Merry in 
Klein, 1997). While the focus of this examination is to look at gossip via a 
feminist take of knowledge production and sharing, its informality permits 
disorderly behaviour and assessment that are hard to control. This 
slipperiness primes gossip for its bad reputation and allows “a pathology of 
space” (Sontag, 1978, p.23) to form around it. In Susan Sontag’s “Illness as 
Metaphor”, she objects to established cultural similes that use cancer to 
describe an uncontainable threat or danger. The pathologisation, she notes, 
prohibits a more direct and healthy acknowledgement of the illness (ibid.). 
Gossip is also similarly pathologised at the social level, destructive and 
invasive as it can be to the status of individuals. It homes into and teases out 
discrepancies, “particularly lapses between claims to reputation and reports 
about actual behavior” (Merry in Klein, 1997, p.53). Gossip therefore has the 
ability to generate, reinforce, and question moral positionings, which gives it 
the power to determine spatiality by tentatively defining and changing the 
borders of (counterpublic) in-groups. Being in the know is one way of 
belonging, but how you value or understand a piece of gossip are markers of 
a more intimate kind of membership. Returning to Ahmed’s “nodal point in 
the [affective] economy” (2004), the knowledge within gossip turns into a 
surface around which bodies gather and, at the same time, becomes a 
potential site for the forming of counterpublics (see: 1.1.2.). Gossip must 
therefore be recognised for its social workings in order to be better 
understood as an epistemology. Anthropologist Sally Engle Merry observes 
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that gossip is “a useful idiom for demonstrating relative intimacy and distance 
[that] flourishes in close-knit, highly connected social networks but atrophies 
in loose-knit, unconnected ones” (Merry in Klein, 1997, p.52). It can ascertain 
or ruin one’s standing within a social cluster. As Adkins argues, gossip is 
evaluative, critical work that offers “a rich vein of unofficial trust and 
reputation being checked, and granted” (Adkins, 2017, p.64). As such, gossip 
is a dissenting type of speech that pulls together at the same time as it repels 
bodies. It enacts group belonging through playful, intimate, and frictive 
speech that simultaneously (re-)iterates a group’s social norms.  
 
Artists like Krauss who are interested in pursuing a more conspiratorial trust 
and closeness rather than eliciting dialogue understand, even if implicitly in 
her examination of secrets, the social and artistic value of the pupils’ gossip; 
it is a queerly feminist action of counterpublic strength and self-reflexive 
criticality, which, whether we recognise it or not, is already crucial to the life 
of socially negotiated art. As it has been argued here, gossip’s associations 
with pointless and idle chatter has historically relegated it to irrelevance. This 
means its reclamation as a site of evaluative knowledge-making is especially 
important for a socially negotiated art that insists on queer and feminist 
embodiments, for it is a relationally generated epistemology that is at the 
same time the taking-stock of relational trust and transgression. To cite artist 
Hannah Black’s feminist portrayal of the gossip: 
 
The gossip, like the witch, was persecuted as if she were an outlaw, 
instead of at the heart of her community. Her superpower is hanging 
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out – giving, sharing, spending and wasting time together; she 
provides material for this activity. She brings news, warnings, and 
information. Worlds appear from her big mouth. (Black, 2017, p.109) 
 
While these key relational components – trust and transgression, secrets and 
gossip – have been artistically exploited in a project like Hidden Curriculum, 
they have yet to assume a clearer, more demonstrative role; put more 
directly, a queerly informed socially negotiated art would own up to its 
dependence on informal learning channels and centre the affective, 
epistemological, and critical values of gossip against patriarchal assumptions 
of more horizontal, dialogical speech forms. Gossip offers a frictive, 
conspiratorial means of constituting the relational material within art practices 
by posing a sideways challenge to the authority of dialogue and enabling a 
self-reflexivity that is insufficiently encouraged in the art form. 
 
 
Teasing 
 
Teasing is yet another frictive act of intimacy that is performed within a group 
and, like gossip, is a means of evaluating membership. Selected here for its 
moral ambiguity, teasing is most often associated with young people as well 
as with parent-child relationships. In practice, teasing involves “intentional 
provocation accompanied by playful off-record markers that together 
comment on something relevant to the target” (Keltner, Capps, Kring, Young, 
and Heerey, 2001, p.234). In a widely-cited empirical study done on teasing, 
 152 
Keltner et al. note the use of “off-record markers” that couch the “playful 
aggression” in the verbal use of tone, idioms, and hints on the one hand and 
non-verbal use of exaggerated facial expressions (e.g. winking) or gestures 
and mimicry on the other (ibid., p.235-236). There are also prosodic uses of 
sighing, pitch, volume, etc. to demonstrate that what is being said, is just 
teasing (ibid.). A noted characteristic of teasing is how its supposed 
playfulness is delivered by what appears to be antagonism. This turns the 
speech and its accompanying gestural cues into a blow of sorts, whereby its 
effect as pain or pleasure is left open to interpretation. It is further suggested 
that the presence of off-record markers is able to mediate the perceived 
hostility of the teasing. Yet they do not guarantee the diffusion of the 
aggression, so blurry are the lines between that and play. In thinking through 
what prompts teasing in the first place, the researchers of the study are 
interested in finding out whether interpersonal conflict prompts teasing or 
vice versa. This question illustrates how the act hovers between attack and 
conciliation, communicating something that is an ambiguous mixture of the 
two. The effect it has on the recipient is incalculable; it can take a sharp, 
sudden turn to bullying territory, wherein the off-record markers are either 
absent or insufficient to soften the blow. Teasing therefore relies on the 
frisson generated from its proximity to aggression.  
 
This tension between play and aggression renders teasing a potentially 
subversive domain of speech and communication that allows it to operate in 
contrast to the rational knowledge sought after in dialogical discourse. As 
Foucault demonstrates in “The History of Sexuality, Volume 1” (1978), 
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discourse’s will to knowledge – which is this volume’s subtitle in its original 
French – tends towards surveillance, which includes what we choose to do 
with our bodies. Of note in his analysis is how power, sexuality, and 
knowledge have intertwined since the nineteenth century to draw explicit 
connections between sex and truth, with the latter oscillating between 
identity and confession, science and medicine. This forces our most intimate 
experiences of pleasure into certain discursive modes: “[B]etween the 
objectification of sex in rational discourses, and the movement by which each 
individual was set to the task of recounting his own sex, there has occurred, 
since the eighteenth century, a whole series of tensions, conflicts, efforts at 
adjustment, and attempts at retranscription […]; around sex, a whole 
network of varying, specific, and coercive transpositions into discourse.” 
(Foucault, 1978, p.35). As such, the turning of sex into discourse refers not 
so much to the former’s repression, but to its insuppressible expansion by the 
very channels that supposedly regulate its health. In the attempt, then, of 
power to discipline the scope of knowledge through selective bodily 
normativity, it simultaneously co-enunciates dissenting sexual desires that 
depend on the taboo of deligitimisation in order to become properly 
contagious (ibid., p.48-49). Foucault calls this “perpetual spirals of power and 
pleasure”, explaining: 
 
The power that lets itself be invaded by the pleasure it is pursuing; and 
opposite it, power asserting itself in the pleasure of showing off, 
scandalizing, or resisting. Capture and seduction, confrontation and 
mutual reinforcement. (ibid., p.45) 
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Following Foucault’s train of thought that recognises the negotiation and 
subversion of power in the discourse of sex, the striptease comes to mind, 
which is the physical performance of seduction, the gradual removal of 
clothing to reveal the dancer’s body as a proxy for sex. The tease, in this 
sense, relates to the tension between play and aggression that is not as 
ostensibly straightforward as the relationship of “consumer and object” or 
“viewer and performer”. Speaking in her study on heterosexual striptease 
dynamics, theatre scholar Katherine Liepe-Levinson observes that “the 
positions of seeing and being seen in live strip shows (and in erotic-sexual 
play) are not discrete, nor are they absolutely connected to the respective 
positions of control and surrender […]. It is possible to theorize, then, that 
positions of ‘desiring,’ ‘wanting to be desired,’ and ‘being desired’ are likewise 
interwoven and inseparable for female and male participants in heterosexual 
contexts” (Liepe-Levinson, 1998, p.33). In other words, the terms of teasing 
play and aggression are negotiated live, in the relational body borders 
between the female performer and male spectator of her analysis; in 
que(e)rying their respective sexual and political frameworks through the 
malleability of the roles. Their participation, importantly, takes place in 
accordance to (un)written rules that delineate the tipping point between the 
two conflicting affects; in the case of the heterosexual striptease, it is the 
earnest reciprocation of (male) sexual desire in the spectator (a sign teasingly 
scolds, “Keep Your Dicks In Your Pants” near the stage [ibid., p.28]).  
 
Returning to the spoken, verbal domain, the boundaries are not as legible, 
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not as clear cut. Indeed, the play-aggression of teasing is a social strategy 
that navigates relational issues of power, camaraderie, and intimacy. With 
regards to power, teasing’s proximity to bullying was already touched upon in 
the earlier part of this analysis. For women and queer people, its ultimate 
embodiment is the “mean girl”, a trope often found in teen film and literary 
genres: smart, arrogant, and villainous, she flatters and humiliates others 
through teasing to maintain her place at / near the top of a given social 
hierarchy.  
 
But teasing also has the capacity to gather and evict bodies at a more 
communal level, which is crucial to counterpublic belonging. Most notably, it 
is found in “snapping” – or “SNAP!ping”, stylised – which is a mode of verbal 
and performed playfighting specific to the queer African-American context. 
The SNAP! written convention is used to highlight the finger snapping sound 
and gesture that usually accompanies the spoken interchange (Riggs, 1991; 
Johnson, 1995). Its influence in pop culture and the subcultures of the 
English-speaking world cannot be underestimated; the attitudes and 
vocabulary adopted wholesale by performers, from pop stars to the 
mainstream explosion of drag queens, can be traced back to SNAP!ping. As 
such, the politics of citation that comes with discussing such a heavily co-
opted cultural phenomenon must be addressed. There is a wide resonance to 
SNAP!ping found in the cultural landscape, particularly in shaping a certain 
self-possessed feminine attitude that is can be readily found in media. With 
the commonplace use of “digital blackface” in social platforms (Jackson, 
2014) as well as more broadly in everyday English language vernacular, the 
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exploration of SNAP!ping is both an acknowledgement of its continuing 
resonance and a self-reflexive confrontation of complicity in the 
misappropriation of African-American culture.  
 
Artist and filmmaker Marlon Riggs, whose work include films, spoken word, 
performance, and writing, that negotiates the space between race, gender, 
and sexuality, is an important starting point. Much of his artistic output 
focuses on the “SNAP! queen” as a persona, which he positions both as 
narrator and subject. Three of his pieces in different media have been 
selected for examination: an experimental documentary Tongues Untied 
(1989); a SNAP! lecture-performance at an academic conference (1992); and 
a personal essay (“Notes of a Signifyin’ SNAP! Queen”, 1991) to examine how 
he reclaims the performative antagonism of SNAP! as a queer African-
American cultural form. 
 
Early on in Tongues Untied (1989), Riggs introduces us to the “Institute of 
Snap!thology” that features a series of SNAP!ping demonstrations. Ironically 
serious and ethnographic in tone, Riggs turns the camera lens knowingly back 
on himself with the use of camp humour; he cinematically SNAP!s back at the 
earnestness of conventional documentary storytelling without diluting the 
tender-combative power of SNAP!ping practices (Feil in Charney, 2005, 
p.485). On screen, for example, we first encounter SNAP!ping via first- and 
second-hand accounts relayed by talking heads. However, rather than adopt 
the even, emotional tone of a narrator, they gossip mischievously with the 
viewer. For example, of a lovers’ quarrel between two gay African-American 
 157 
men on a bus, one SNAP! queen narrator exclaims, “The ride is rough! There 
is no jelly for this!”; of sniding a racist doorman at a club who wanted three 
forms of ID, another says with a contemptuous flair, “Three pieces of ID?! 
(SNAP!s three times in the camera’s face)” (Riggs, 1989). We then see 
different shots of African-American men in SNAP! re-enactments and the 
subcategories of finger-snapping, e.g. “Medusa SNAP!”, “Sling SNAP!”, 
“Classic SNAP!”, etc. (ibid.) A spoken word piece in the style of an 
instructional video scores the visual demonstrations:   
 
This is a basic lesson in SNAP!. Divarettes, listen up to the grand diva 
rap. SNAP!s can be to love and snaps can be strong. To read, to 
punctuate, to cut like a whip. […] Precision, pacing, placement, poise, 
a sophisticated SNAP! is more than just noise. Repeat: precision, poise, 
placement. You must perfect each for the grand SNAP! statement. 
(ibid.) 
 
The men are seen in pairs and then in small groups energetically talking into 
each other’s face and encroaching on their opponents’ space with faux-
threatening SNAP!ping gestures. In both cases, SNAP!ping is used as a way of 
claiming – in no uncertain terms – one’s space and self-possession, which is 
connected to the way the body’s relation to the space around it. This is 
something I have already explored through queer disorientations (see: 1.1.6. 
on bodies tending towards other bodies and objects within their reach) and 
will further investigate with the corporeality of space (see: 3.2.2. on the 
feeling of bodily intrusion in nationalism). 
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Scathingly funny while at the same time potentially reparative when used 
between friends, it is no wonder Riggs claims and reclaims SNAP!ping in his 
work, making it an integral part of his art practice. Even when asked to speak 
at a conference on “Black Popular Culture”, he turns a SNAP! lens back onto 
the event. Much in the same manner as his SNAP!ped ethnographic point of 
view in Tongues Untied, he used the opportunity to speak (properly) as an 
opportunity to SNAP! (inappropriately): 
 
In the last two years I have become a conference queen. Not with 
much deliberate intent, mind you. But my video, Tongues Untied, in a 
way I frankly never envisioned while making it, has catapulted me into 
a society of theory divas and culture queens […] Among you, someone 
no doubt is thinking: Miss Thing can certainly throw down her verbal 
drag schtick, but does she comprehend discursive intertextual analysis, 
can she engage in postfeminist, neo-Marxist, postmodern 
deconstructionist critique? Does she understand the difference 
between text, subtext, and metatext? Does she know she’s part of a 
subaltern universe? Can she, in a word, really read?  
 
Discomforting questions ricochet in the Snap Queen’s mind, and she 
wonders/ponders further whether his/her tongue is at times, in effect, 
not her tongue, if her tongue (to gain validation, an audience) has 
really become their tongues, and if, in fact (yes! to trope sweet Zora), 
it is their tongues that are in his mouth, pressing against, crowding out 
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his own, if he is choking. A different kind of voicelessness. (Riggs, in 
Wallace and Dent, 1992, p.102-3) 
 
In asking Riggs to present, the conference had the intention of representing a 
specifically gay, male African-American voice. What he chose to talk about 
instead, however – what he SNAP!ped about – was the unspoken ground 
rules and privileges of such a cultural setting: its academic norms, language, 
and etiquette. Yet at the same time, he chastises himself for allowing “their 
tongues” to “crowd out his own”. As part of his closing statement, he asks, 
“Do you think you can so closely, critically examine me without studying or 
revealing yourself?” before he “toss[es] his/her tiara to the next diva in the 
wings” (ibid., p.105). SNAP!ping, then, confronts one’s sense of belonging 
and resilience by flirting with the boundaries of teasing play and aggression, 
uncomfortably negotiating the complementary desires to fit in and fight back. 
That these desires are not only privately processed by the performer but 
performed through SNAP!ping demonstrates how it is both a self-reflexively 
and socially negotiated critique. 
 
Besides reclaiming it as an embodied practice, Riggs also brings to bear the 
oppressive atmosphere that generates SNAP!ping. In his 1991 essay for “Art 
Journal”, he revisits the contempt and rejection he felt for much of his life: “I 
withdrew into the shadows of my soul; chained my tongue […]; assumed the 
impassive face and stiff pose of Silent Black Macho” (Riggs, 1991, p.61). Of 
the many “masks” he had to nurture and hide behind in order to make life 
bearable, the last straw was when he was implicitly advised to mask the 
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“blackness” of his voice with a deregionalised one (read: white, midwestern 
American) used in broadcasting. As an aspiring journalist, “I would have to 
further shed my vocal color; this was no metaphor. To rise in his ranks, I 
would have to masquerade in cultural and ideological whiteface” (ibid., p.63). 
The moment Riggs was able to speak his truth was revelatory; for him, 
language became the grounds on which cultural and political subjectivities 
would be properly articulated. He therefore calls for a “coalition” of 
differences that nonetheless “create[s] a cultural language, a notion of 
identity”:  
 
Thus far we have chosen, for the most part, an easy multiculturalism, 
a polite, deferential appreciation and respect for political and cultural 
pluralism, without developing a rigorous discourse that analyzes how 
multiple subjectivities intersect, compete, and collide. (Riggs, 1991, 
p.64) 
 
Yet this coalition’s language and identity developments are deferred, as Riggs 
believes they will be found above all in twenty-first century development of 
“media arts” (ibid.). Part of this delay is rooted in the hopefulness of 1990s 
identity politics as group identities were being renegotiated (ibid.) and 
empowered by their increased visibility. This momentum might explain his 
optimistic vision of differentiated struggles brought together by a common 
language and identity. 
 
The potential he foresaw in the arts converges with the art world’s interest 
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with relational, socially engaged, and participatory art, which as he says allow 
for “multiple subjectivities [to] intersect, compete, and collide”. As we have 
seen in the course of this chapter, the horizontality sought after by dialogue 
involves muting and bracketing, both of which work against the complexities 
of embodiment (see: the breakdown of the art projects in 2.2.1.). The 
assertion, then, is that in order to heed questions of different subjectivities, 
one must do so by looking at the social practices of different subjectivities, 
i.e. practices of dissent. The play-aggression of SNAP!ping embodied in Riggs’ 
works is, in this perspective, already the language he was hoping for; it is one 
amongst many other languages that are marked, unapologetically, by 
difference. Riggs’ SNAP! diva talking heads and his “conference queen” 
SNAP!-lecture are both instances of self-care and resistance, played out 
socially in the affective resonance of the audience. It is a kind of performance 
that falls under camp and hovers between irony and seriousness; it is a 
tender kind of caricature. As Sontag famously says at the end of her “Notes 
on Camp” essay, “Camp is generous. It wants to enjoy. It only seems like 
malice, cynicism. (Or, if it is cynicism, it’s not a ruthless but a sweet 
cynicism.)” (Sontag in Cleto, 1999, p.65). Therefore, instead of a social 
engagement that prioritises a bringing-together with the purpose of leveling 
out discrepancies, a focus on differences as frictive points, necessarily 
unresolved, would alter what forms of communicating we deem productive or 
not and therefore allow them to be investigated in greater seriousness, beside 
one another. Doing so, it is hoped, would multiply the behavioural possibilities 
of social relations.  
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Of course, this particular refraction of dialogue into SNAP!ping is not to 
suggest that Riggs’s work be considered a socially negotiated art practice, nor 
is it to argue for SNAP!ping as a model for socially negotiated art. Rather, this 
analysis attests to how the play-aggression of teasing takes shape at specific 
cultural, affective, and embodied intersections, the nuances of which follow 
very specific rules. While teasing as a form of mockery is a well-rehearsed 
strategy used by many artists, e.g. the intentionally nonsensical work of the 
Dadaists to the over-identifying performances of Andrea Fraser (see: 1.1.6. 
for Léger’s analysis), the point here is to present reparative forms of frictive 
communication that are socially negotiated in the exclusivity of counterpublic 
margins. The teasing explored here therefore cannot be compared to the 
play-aggression of Dadaists that keep them at a remove them from post-war 
capitalist encroachment, nor can it be to Andrea Fraser’s deliberately 
alienating performances of institutional critique. The terms of teasing in the 
context of this study concern embodied articulation of borders, the process of 
which generates a situated understanding of game play. In the end, the 
dissent and friction of play-aggression is at the same time an attunement to 
the so-called “off-record markers” and critical proximity – not distance, which 
looks at how we are already navigating our queer disorientations in daily life 
(see: 1.1.6. on dislocated subjects) – within a given environment.  
 
This is most relevant for artists who have their own counterpublic affiliations 
that they want to address, question, or deepen. If a project concerns social 
groups or contexts close to the artist, and she is already embedded within the 
specificities of speech and conduct, she is in the robust position to negotiate 
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the riskier potentials of teasing’s play-aggression. Beyond that, artists who 
are commissioned to take on projects as outsiders (see: 2.2.1. for the 
nomadic art practices of Ania Bas and Anthony Schrag) would find it harder to 
do so as their experiences struggle to find their place in relation to local ones. 
In this case, attunement to teasing would be a complicated matter; instead of 
drawing from behavioural codes already familiar to the artist, she has to 
navigate new ones to establish equally new relations. The significance of 
teasing as play-aggression would then translate into a reading exercise, one 
that tunes into the resonance between bodies: why and how is it used, what 
is the outcome? Can she negotiate some kind of place in this performative 
bonding or must she, as the outsider-artist, step back? As with gossip, teasing 
functions at the cusp of exclusion and inclusion that does not openly invite 
membership or impart insider knowledge. A socially negotiated art must be 
better at critiquing how practices root themselves within situations, with 
particular attention paid to the ways we make and maintain relations. This 
includes above all the informal channels of gossip and teasing, which are 
negotiated exchanges that can prohibit intimacy as much as they encourage 
it. To use and examine them as means of circulating knowledge and 
counterpublic exclusivity would be far more enriching than reiterating the 
need for inclusivity or dialogue. 
 
 
2.3. Incongruences, plural: towards polyvocality  
 
In this chapter’s gradual working towards dissenting discourses, what (if 
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anything) can still be recuperated from dialogue? As a representation of 
something more universal, it is not without value. In a new foreword written a 
decade after “Gender Trouble” was published, Judith Butler revises her 
previous criticism towards universality, saying that it does have “important 
strategic use precisely as a non-substantial and open-ended category”. This 
enables it to promote “a future oriented labor of cultural translation” (Butler, 
1999, p.xviii). In a similar spirit, this chapter critiques the summoning of 
dialogue, but only insofar as its disintegration into a myriad of day-to-day 
speech possibilities would enable a greater frictive understanding towards 
what is already there: we do speak with one another, just not in that perfectly 
pitched, egalitarian way. The issue, instead, lies in the thoughtful usage and 
serious examination of these rarely condoned frictive modes – like the 
aforementioned gossip or teasing – and refusing the insidious descriptors that 
encircle informal discursive practices. 
 
By reframing dialogue as an idealised speech type based on presumptions of 
equal participation, the potential of informal speech types is highlighted in 
contrast, turning them into sites of knowledge, solidarity, and social 
negotiations. This is an effort to reconfigure some of the optimistic rhetoric 
that continues to define art practices in the social realm. What falls between 
the cracks in thinking about these practices as art or socio-political instrument 
is the work itself, which involves an embodied criticality of relations and new 
modes of communication, indigenous as they are to the needs of the projects. 
To talk about what these practices do as a kind of “dialogue” does little to 
unearth the complications that mire conversations in situ, while also 
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presuming an educationally constructive experience. Crucially, the drive for 
dialogue ignores the how quarrels, and indeed gossip and teasing are already 
sites for reflection (Moersch, 2011). 
 
In critical psychologist Lisa Blackman’s 2001 text on voice-hearing, she 
questions the “curative process” in psychiatry that equates auditory 
hallucinations to insanity (Blackman, 2001). Her argument problematises the 
ways that voice-hearers are encouraged to reject all the voices that do not fall 
in line with “the voice of reason” (p.203) – a critique that strikes a chord with 
this study. That unified voice is aligned with the one imagined for dialogue, 
located as it is within the realms of reason away from the untamed rest. Yet, 
as we have seen in 2.2., impassioned and candid speech perform activist 
functions (Young, 2001) of frictive meaning-making. The rationality 
persistently called for in dialogue is thus complicit with the erasure of 
alternative, dissenting meanings; as discussed in this chapter, gossip and 
teasing are two discursive practices examined that generate bonds as well as 
knowledge in subjugated groups (see: 2.2.1., 2.2.2.). In a similar vein, 
Blackman sees the pathologisation of voice-hearing and psychiatry’s 
corrective processes of removal as “a problem of government and regulation” 
(Blackman, 2001, p.152). She argues that 
 
[t]he socially and historically produced meaning of the voice-hearing 
experience, embedded within the contemporary ‘psy’ disciplines, is 
intimately bound up with the discursive production and maintenance of 
a very specific image of human life and morality. (ibid., p. 187) 
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The assertion here is that, as with activist, dissenting discursive practices, the 
multiple voices are seen as “a random, uninvited and uncontrollable assault 
[…] on a person’s psychological functioning” (ibid.). This convergence makes 
it is possible to draw a direct connection between the psychiatric, institutional 
mandate to have a unified voice with the educational mandate to dialogue in 
the same even-tempered voice: both prioritise reason, thus stabilising 
governance. This is predicated on what Blackman calls a “pre-discursive” 
ability to “self-regulate and operate with a sense of responsibility and guilt” 
(ibid.), echoing the refrain of the naturally rational human being. 
 
By drawing attention to voice-hearing, the intention is to underscore how 
polyvocality is capable of producing ongoing agonistic commentaries. And as 
such, the conflicting cacophony of voices behaves much like the disagreeing 
perspectives that bump and collide in the messy relational material of an art 
project: without exploring the friction of discursive practices, there would be 
no relationships to speak of between artists, participants, commissioners, 
collaborators, etc. Dialogue, sought after for its ostensible neutrality and 
horizontality, is desired for the unity it implies when, in fact, it takes away the 
possibility of situation-specific speech. Techniques mentioned in Blackman’s 
study to treat voice-hearers include “distraction, denial, negation, and 
diversion” (Blackman, 2001, p.187), all of which seek to shut down rather 
than acknowledge the voices. As such, Blackman’s approach towards voice-
hearing veers towards a reparative polyvocality, one in which the meaning of 
selfhood is multiple, shifting, negotiated. This also directly impacts the 
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(irresolvable) struggle for congruence between consciousness and 
embodiment – which, as we understand through gender performativity 
(Butler, 1990; see: 1.1.1.), are mutually co-constitutive. Indeed, voice-
hearing is not always pathologised, as “the ‘psy’ disciplines” distinguish 
between “pseudo” (random or situation-specific) and “real” (completely 
consuming) auditory hallucinations. While the voices and visions may vary 
wildly, it is ultimately an issue of control that determines pathologisation: 
 
Control is taken to be a measure of social and work functioning, where 
the focus is upon specifying how well a person is seen to be 
functioning within the external milieu. […] Control is therefore not 
measured in relation to vividness, but with a person’s relation to the 
eternal world. It is a measure of behaviour and conduct, and not a 
measure of the quality of a person’s own internal reverie. (Blackman, 
2001, p.23)  
 
In this light, the voices are seen as a sign of bodily as well as mental 
disintegration (ibid., pp.198-199).  Translated to the larger social realm, 
discursive practices of dissent are then similarly pathologised as 
disintegration. For Blackman, working with voices entails their (re-)integration 
into a person’s life not so much by individual therapy but by group dynamics. 
In other words, the voices would need to be socially negotiated: 
 
[T]he experience of hearing voices can even become a marker of 
sensitivity, or even oppression. It is not just about changing ‘beliefs’, 
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but radically transforming the ways in which voices are problematised 
and acted upon, often occurring within a particular dynamic of group 
processes. (ibid., p.202) 
 
The use of the frictive in this chapter is to highlight dissenting voices not in 
oppositional contrast to dialogue, but in a productive refraction that brings 
other spoken discursive practices to bear. Polyvocality is embodied and 
situated in the many; it is therefore always performed in relation with others. 
Returning to Butler, she reminds us in “Excitable Speech” (1997) that while 
speech can be “a force that both presages and inaugurates a subsequent 
force” (Butler, 1997, p.9) by saying what is about to happen, it fails to 
acknowledge speaking itself as a performative act of the body. Utterance is 
meaning finding its way out through physicality, which often ends up as a 
surprise; we do or say what was never intended in the first place.  
 
In a way, the uncoupling of speaking from consciousness turns it into an act 
over which a subject does not have full control, which reiterates some of the 
important subjective dispositions looked into in chapter one: dispossession 
(see: 1.1.3.), which stresses a social orientation of the self that allows a “you” 
to emerge from the body as well as its surroundings; and material-discursivity 
(see: 1.1.4.), which posits a performative agency of matter and doing. 
Different voices and speech types therefore occur as much as they are, 
relying on bodily performance as much as intention. As such, it is embodied 
criticality that we return to time and again in this research; by insisting that 
dialogue, and social negotiation for that matter, be more than the brutal 
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equalising between subjective positions, this study seeks to carefully nurture 
a frictive approach that accounts for situated elements – bodies, stimuli, 
affect, social powers, etc. – at play. By refracting dialogue’s pedagogically 
constructive obligations and the horizontality that it strives for, this chapter 
argues that dissenting multiplicity and intimate forms of frictive 
communication both need to be centred in critically embodied, situated 
practices of a socially negotiated art. Following Ahmed (2006), an abundance 
of other possibilities – of other “worlds” – can emerge if we can queerly 
disorient ourselves from the dialogical horizon and attend to the intimacy of 
speech. 
 
  
 170 
3. The difficulties of love: political attachments and the 
felt dimensions of socially negotiated art 
 
 
The previous chapter ended on an analysis of frictive communication that 
refracts the pedagogical call for dialogue. Speech practices affectively makes 
the social as they are remade by it, strengthening and breaking connections 
within the relational material. Indeed, this chapter turns to the way these 
connections feel, and to the affective dimensions that motivate art workers to 
work outside of gallery contexts. For many of us, the desire often feels like a 
faraway promise that has a gravitational pull, that can link bodies together if 
only we tried harder. But does this desire result, in fact, from feelings and 
workings related to love? If not, then how do we describe and analyse the 
connections some art workers hope to generate (and ideally sustain) as part 
of a socially and politically charged art process? What can actually be said 
about the affective conditions that foster, limit, and prescribe these 
encounters? 
 
The significance of love stems from the methodological interest in being 
“beside” (Sedgwick, 2003) as well as from a need for a better articulation of 
the “felt” dimension in socially negotiated art practices. In conceiving the 
multiplicity of encounters and experiences through a multilateral embodiment 
of “rivaling, leaning, twisting, mimicking, withdrawing” (ibid., p.8; see: 1.2), 
one inevitably turns to how these actions feel. As this study questions social 
engagement and shifts the emphasis onto social negotiation as part of an 
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artistic process, the affective intentions we as art workers and researchers 
bring into projects must also be examined. Specifically, its proximity to love 
and its affiliates need to be better critiqued as this strand of art so often 
intersects with care and activism. To do so, this chapter limits its investigation 
to the desires, affects, and experiences most closely associated with these art 
practices. It does not venture into psychoanalytic territory by delving into 
latent or unconscious motivations; nor does it seek to propose or refine any 
typology of love.  
 
Yet it is useful to look briefly at the classical Greek delineation of philia, which 
provides a useful affective premise to the loving feelings that this chapter 
explores. Of the different and overlapping kinds of love noted in ancient 
Greek, philia is the one most concerned with the possibility of acting for 
others on the basis of affection. Classics scholar David Konstan notes that the 
heart of this lies in the tension between reciprocity and altruism, whereby the 
former hinges on duty and the latter on affection, generosity. In his attempt 
to collapse the obligation and the desire to do something for others, he 
argues that “in classical antiquity, love was deemed to play a larger role in 
the way people accounted for motivation in a number of domains, including 
friendship, loyalty, gratitude, grief, and civic harmony” (ibid., p.31). This 
chapter similarly brings together needs and desires to reiterate the good 
intentions and loving feelings that make up the affective textures of so many 
socially negotiated art practices. But it also attends to more chaotic feelings 
that fall outside of philia, closer to what Audre Lorde calls “the erotic”, or “our 
deepest feelings” that help us “give up, of necessity, being satisfied with 
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suffering and self-negation, and with the numbness which so often seems like 
their only alternative in our society” (Lorde, 1984, p.58). 
 
The idea is to critique these loving textures through theoretical reflection 
(2.1.), scenes (2.2.), and labour (2.3.), so as to: 1. take seriously the bonding 
power that brings bodies together in an overarching concept that is referred 
to here as love; and 2. give an analysis of its different aspects in three parts 
that puts it into theoretical and political perspectives. Together, they provide 
an embodied reading of the complex, often contradictory, incongruent 
feelings and motivations (or lack thereof) that spur the processes of socially 
negotiated art. The first section of this chapter begins with three theoretical 
perspectives that concern love specifically, starting again with Paulo Freire’s 
reflections that weave in and out of personal narrative and pedagogy (3.1.1.). 
This is followed by a comparative reading of love’s politicality in Michael Hardt 
and Lauren Berlant respectively (3.1.2.). Then, in light of this study’s interest 
in embodiment, the second section of this chapter examines scenes of social 
love, which interrogate how bodies magnetise towards one another affectively 
and politically: firstly, as temporary assemblies of protest congregating in the 
streets (3.2.1.); and secondly, as defensive, nationalist selves to keep foreign 
others at bay (3.2.2.). To end, the third and final section of this chapter 
focuses on care as an embodied demonstration of love, specifically in 
affective labour (3.3.1). Silvia Federici’s description of the “extradomestic” is 
both borrowed and extended as a critical approach, which is used to look into 
care within three different frameworks of socially negotiated art (3.3.2.). The 
three parts of this chapter ultimately investigate possible facets love without 
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regarding it as a whole.   
 
 
3.1. Three theoretical perspectives on love  
 
Reading Freire was an important emotional step in coming to terms with this 
study’s concern of the relational material in socially negotiated art practices. 
Paulo Freire’s “Pedagogy of the Oppressed” was one of the first books that 
helped incite different, firmly political questions of intersubjectivity, given its 
fiery proclamation to be accountable to one another. The conviction with 
which he advocated for dialogue within radical education resonated with me 
at a time of professional fatigue. With this book as a starting point, dialogue 
and love have become two key loci from which a socially negotiated art might 
be reconceived. However, the most significant outcome was how this 
endeavour has turned into an examination of egalitarian presumptions that 
underlie dialogue, love, and praxis in the Freirean sense. Yet the fact remains 
that his work has enriched the grounds of this study, opening it up to queer 
and feminist approaches that are attuned to the affective and material 
textures of embodiment.  
 
This chapter begins by reconnecting with Freire’s writing, with his thoughts on 
love, loss, and faith that had moved the research direction in the first place. 
His later reflections in “Pedagogy of the Heart” (1997) and “Pedagogy of 
Hope” (2004) form the basis of the examination. Using his anecdotes as a 
starting point, this analysis turns to love and hope in his work while critiquing 
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them in context of his life and work. The following subsection (2.1.2.) then 
attempts to unsettle those love and love-like feelings through the differing 
conceptual lenses of Michael Hardt and Lauren Berlant: while Hardt 
counterproposes a love for the stranger – i.e. for the other (Hardt, 2011a) – 
to the biblical imperative to “love thy neighbour”, Berlant prefers to tackle the 
moral ambivalence of attachment that is in itself what is unsettling. I use their 
(Berlant’s) description of “intimate publics” (Berlant, 2011) to explore the 
movement as well as the impasses of affect and argue how these moments of 
co-feeling are part of understanding complicity through dispossession. 
 
 
3.1.1. Paulo Freire’s mobilisation of love and hope 
 
The importance of love is peppered throughout Freire’s writing. It underpins 
his pedagogy and influences the way in which he envisions the emancipatory 
project as a whole. Yet despite repeatedly referring to love, there is no 
dedicated investigation on the topic; instead, he recounts anecdotes in order 
to support his claims. For instance, while he insists that we collectively risk 
“acts of love” as part of an emancipatory praxis (Freire, 1970, p.50), he does 
not offer an argument to clarify what he means by such a politicised love, 
only that it is “the very nature of human beings” to love (Freire, 1997, p.44). 
As his pedagogy’s key affective concept, it nonetheless requires considerable 
interpretive labour on the reader’s part. But as with his understanding of 
“human” or “humanisation”, there are broad presumptions in his use of love 
that are not supported theoretically; what it means is explained in terms of 
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practice, a “vocation” of becoming that is equated to making change in the 
world. We can deduce from his writing as a whole that “humanisation” is 
reactively opposed to the “dehumanisation” that he witnessed in the rural 
regions of Brazil and Chile early in his life. Away from the critical philosophical 
developments with regards to human nature in the twentieth century, he 
stresses instead the primacy of the body in his pedagogy. In a similar fashion, 
his understanding of love is based on its affective generosity that is not so 
much rooted in a focused theoretical engagement than it is on his own 
embodied experiences, which is not a dissimilar position to that of the 
research here. However, his take on love is more a source for hope and 
mobilisation than it is a problem of its own. 
 
In her analysis of Freire’s work, education scholar Antonia Darder 
acknowledges how love is an ethical dimension underscoring education as 
political practice, since “we must dare to do all things with feeling, dreams, 
wishes, fear, doubts, and passion” (Darder, 2017, p.49). Freire’s liberatory 
education is “a labor born of love, but deeply anchored in an unceasing 
commitment to know through both theory and practice” (ibid., p.55, my 
emphasis). Her argument is in line with situating love as a motivational force 
in Freire’s pedagogy, enabling the work he envisions. In his own words: 
 
[Pedagogy of Hope] is written in rage and love, without which there is 
no hope. It is meant as a defense of tolerance—not to be confused 
with connivance—and radicalness. (Freire, 2004, p.4) 
 
 176 
In “Pedagogy of Hope”, emotional forces take centre stage – a “fabric”, he 
calls it, that contains “the cultural marks, memories, feelings, and sentiments, 
doubts, dreams […] and longings, of my world, my sky” (ibid.). They unfold 
through autobiographical narratives, which he provides in lieu of theoretical 
analysis. While this has drawn criticism from education scholars, there are 
nonetheless those who defend the poetic, first-person tendencies that 
pervade so much of his writing. Antonia Darder argues that “his revolutionary 
hope was firmly grounded upon the materiality of the body” (Darder, 2017, 
p.78); indeed, she calls his pedagogy “a humanizing ethos of the body” that 
“support[s] reflection, dialogue and solidarity” (ibid., p.82, my emphasis). The 
primacy of the body is something that resonates with this study, to a degree. 
For instance, his recourse to autobiography can be seen as an embodied 
interpretation of “reflection” as he takes his body as a starting point. As such, 
hope, rage, and love can only ever be examined as lived. However, the 
intention here is to be more specific about how and where these feelings 
work within his pedagogy beyond as well as beside the affective implications 
of his anecdotes. This includes both an interrogation of his first-person 
narratives as well as some contextualisation that resituates his perspective in 
theory and in practice. 
 
We can begin with his childhood, which is a time and place that he repeatedly 
goes to for reflection even as a man. In great detail, he depicts a backyard 
with its “mango trees, cashew trees with branches kneeling down to the 
shaded ground” and the “varied colors, smells, and fruits” (Freire, 1997, 
p.38). Recalling these things while exiled in Geneva, he is struck by how such 
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textures affectively produce him: 
 
I was realized as the I who made things, the thinking I and the 
speaking I. […] In that afternoon, it was as if I had discovered that the 
longing I was feeling for my homeland, had begun to be prepared by 
the lived relationship I had with my backyard. (ibid., original 
emphases) 
 
As Freire says here, the “I” is explicitly a maker, thinker, and speaker, but the 
possibility of reflection hinges on his having felt something on “the lived 
relationship”. The felt dimension, as crucial as it is for Freire’s thinking, 
appears as correlative, directly reflective. This lineage between making, 
thinking, and feeling carries with it some presumptions of what an excavation 
of textures is supposed to bring about: they generate facts about one’s 
feelings, which can be used to correct the feeling (of sentimental longing, for 
instance) wilfully, where necessary. The congruence accorded to this process 
of excavation not only depletes a disruptive element of surprise that is a 
crucial and irresolvable part of life, but also enforces a rationalisation of 
feelings that produce capably revolutionary emotions like rage and love. At 
the same time, we “carry with us the memory of many fabrics, a self soaked 
in our history” (Freire, 2004, p.23). Is Freire therefore saying that we need to 
forgo the many emotional valences in order to feed a raging, loving hope for 
collective worldmaking? It is in the least suggested, since certain feelings like 
nostalgia (which “nullifies tomorrow”, ibid., p.45) and fear apparently 
contribute towards a hopeless, “immobilist fatalism”.  
 178 
 
In this light, retrieving textures of our past is always already aligned with 
mobilisation, which we see in the way Freire writes about his life. 
Concentrating on details that demonstrate the impact of his personal history 
on his present day political determination, he fastidiously analyses how 
certain events have made their mark on him. He recounts, for instance, how 
emotionally debilitated he would feel whenever it rained heavily. Many years 
later, on a visit home, he seems to come upon a realisation: 
 
I stopped in front of the house in which I had lived—the house in 
which my father died in the late afternoon of October 21, 1934. […] 
That rainy afternoon, with the sky dark as lead over the bright green 
land, the ground soaked, I discovered the fabric of my depression. I 
became conscious of various relationships between the signs and the 
central core, the deeper core, hidden within me. I unveiled the 
problem, by clearly and lucidly grasping its “why.” I dug up the 
archeology of my pain. (Freire, 2004, p.22)  
 
His “fabrics” do not stay as such; sticking to his analogy, they are meant to 
be unraveled into its singular, legible threads. Each one explains a “why” of 
his sadness, which solders a narrative onto an emotion. The underlying 
assumption is that “problem” (rain) and “emotion” (sadness) are interlinked, 
as if situations are incapable of triggering more incongruous and multiple 
connections that defy direct, one-to-one correlations. It is argued here that 
his “archaeology” uses storytelling to straighten out the queerest of our 
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feelings, to package cumbersome fabrics into more manageable explainers. 
Freire describes how his intuitions give rise to new pieces of information over 
time, as “tapestries and fabrics [become] meaning”. Thus, 
 
to connect recollections, recognize facts, deeds, and gestures, to fuse 
pieces of knowledge, solder moments, re-cognize in order to cognize, 
to know, better. (ibid., p.11, original emphasis) 
 
This approach assumes an obvious connection to be made between an event 
and a feeling, which does not always work themselves out with such clarity. 
Memories and their readings are never reliable, much less the affective 
intensities that surround them (see: 1.1.6. on embodying disorientations). 
Given Freire’s activist legacy that is deeply connected to the reading and 
writing of the word/world, it is little wonder that he would strive for the 
legible clarity of cognition (echoed in the above “to cognize, to know, 
better”). As fellow critical pedagogue Henry Giroux notes, Freire believed in 
“the crucial necessity of not only reading the world critically but also 
intervening in the larger social order as part of the responsibility of an 
informed citizenry” (Giroux in Lake and Kress, 2013, p.xii). The affective 
textures then break down into legible threads, wherein the “deeper core” 
(ibid., p.22) of each person lies. The argument is that, for Freire, stories are 
sources of “rage and love” that need to be unlearned from inconvenient 
feelings, ones that are bad for, as Giroux puts it, “informed citizenry”. Thus, 
rage and love are a Freirean conscientisation at an emotional level, making us 
aware of the feelings that best correlate with worldmaking. This means that 
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we must properly read our feelings – not merely sense them – and rewrite 
them into stories that we tell ourselves in our collective political struggle. As 
such, love fuels hope, and in turn, transformation. The more we excavate, the 
more emotional power we can reap for change.  
 
At this point, it is useful to theoretically underpin Freire’s hope. Throughout 
his work, it is positioned as an ontological need, which finds earlier resonance 
in Ernst Bloch’s famous and complex analysis of hope. Bloch similarly frames 
hope as a necessary part of life. But whereas Freire emphasises a subjective 
mediation of affect that ensures hope, Bloch sees it in the making of utopian 
desires that point towards a more promising future. Hopes for “a better life” 
can be located in longings not obviously aligned with a radical rage or love, 
but obliquely so with “cultural artifacts” through which we daydream (e.g. 
fairytales, art, and even advertising) (Bloch, 1986). Bloch’s “preconscious” 
does not require raising, nor does it hoard the forgotten, but instead 
embodies a “Not-Yet-Conscious” and a “dawning”. He differentiates this 
notion of the preconscious from that of Freud’s: his contains “no repressed 
material, but rather something coming up, is to be clarified” (ibid., p.116). Far 
from the nightmarish unveiling of past trauma is this notion of a dreaming-
ahead, whereby utopia can be sensed with an “anticipatory consciousness” 
(ibid., p.157). He therefore advocates for a kind of analysis that attunes to 
the latent affective currency of cultural artifacts ranging from art and opera to 
advertising and fairytales. These are utopian “daydreams” that emerge from 
capitalist constraints of life, with varying degrees of emancipatory potential. 
Freire’s hope is less about imagining the contours of a Blochian concrete 
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utopia as it is to about ensuring that the past – what Bloch calls a “No-
Longer-Conscious” – is not left irreconciled. To be clear, Bloch also pays 
attention to the culturally-generated potential that lingers historically in the 
“undischargedness” of the No-Longer-Conscious (ibid., p.141). But what is 
notable in Freire is how the past is restored through thoughtful consideration: 
by looking at how his emotions that have hampered him, they are reinscribed 
with the hope he feels is necessary to keep moving.  
 
Arguably then, hope in the Freirean sense is the harnessing of affective 
intensities into emotional stability – rage and love – from which one feeds to 
get things done. Thus construed, it is indeed an “ontological need” that can 
be positioned alongside his Catholic faith. Although he is hesitant to mention 
it in his work, faith is a significant contributor to his activist understanding of 
hope, rage, and love. In fact, education scholar William M. Reynolds notes 
that Freire was “instrumental in creating […] the zeitgeist of the 1960s and 
1970s in Latin America. Part of that zeitgeist was that portions of the Latin 
American Catholic Church’s clergy developed liberation theology” (Reynolds in 
Lake and Kress, 2013, p.136). On faith, Freire accords it 
 
fundamental importance […] in my struggle for overcoming an 
oppressive reality and for building a less ugly society, one that is less 
evil and more humane. [B]eing in faith means moving, engaging in 
different forms of action coherent with that faith. (Freire, 1997, p.104) 
 
Yet, he admits that he refrains himself from speaking about his faith out of 
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discomfort, “[a]t least, I do not feel as comfortable as I do when speaking 
about my political choice, my utopia, and my pedagogical dreams” (ibid., 
p.104). This partly reveals how his writing on hope as a bodily, affective 
experience is coded by his faith; the struggle against oppression can only take 
place with hope, the latter of which we nourish with love. Similarly, Reynolds 
argues that “the struggle filled with hope [is] the lasting legacy in Freire’s 
work with liberation theology” (Reynolds in Lake and Kress, 2013, p.141). 
Where the two overlap most tellingly is what liberation theologists calls “a 
‘preferential option for the poor’” (ibid., p.131) and their “stressing the 
importance of the sins of the system over the importance of individual sin” 
(ibid.). As such, Reynolds contends that Freire’s critical pedagogy is 
“consistent with [such a] Marxian and Christian utopianism”, which is 
characterised by its “hope with deep commitment”. In Freire’s mind, this is 
pitted against “hopelessness and despair, both the consequence and the 
cause of inaction and immobilism” (ibid., p.141).  
 
Hope and faith play key roles in his work, because he is dedicated to the 
possibility of emancipation; his is a pedagogy spurred by rage and love. 
Indeed, his closest readers – Henry Giroux and bell hooks, for instance – 
always insist that his writing not be discussed in isolation from its affective 
context. But they do so in different ways: where Giroux focuses on situating 
Freire’s work within a postcolonial struggle, hooks finds personal resonance in 
his “recognition of the subject position of those most disenfranchised” (hooks, 
1994, p.53). Here, the aim is to better reconnect Freire’s hope, rage, and love 
within his life and work, which is also to take seriously both the embodied 
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understanding that pervades his writing and the notion of praxis to mean 
action and practice as well as reflection and theory. Education scholar and 
close colleague Peter McLaren states that Freire’s work must be understood 
as part of a “postcolonial praxis”; his pedagogy is specifically geared towards 
“decentering and disorienting forms of authority that domesticate the Other 
[…]. His goal has been to question the tacit assumptions – the unexamined 
faith in continuity and desire for familiarity – that make up the history of the 
oppressed” (McLaren, 1992, pp.23-24). This postcoloniality is stressed in 
Giroux’s repositioning of Freire’s work as “a dislocating discourse” that makes 
visible “how Western knowledge is encased in historical and institutional 
structures that both privilege and exclude particular readings, particular 
voices, certain aesthetics, forms of authority, specific representations, and 
modes of sociality” (Giroux, 1992, p.23).  
 
While he is critical of Freire’s binary oppositions most evident in his earlier 
work, Giroux also reminds us of the conditions in which Freire’s politically and 
culturally minded pedagogy was first conceived. As such, “there is a […] 
profound sense of rupture, transgression, and hope, intellectually and 
politically, in his work” (ibid., p.21, my emphasis) that makes it as problematic 
as it is envigorating. What Giroux’s analysis foregrounds is how Freire’s 
writing is born of “the heat of life-and-death struggle” of anti-imperialism 
(ibid., p.19) that called for a more daring interweaving between cultures, 
disciplines, and languages. In other words, the “restlessness” of his work is 
part of an intense, affective swell. Even as his work continues to draw 
different analyses and criticisms, it is above all the emotional force and 
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urgency with which he writes that resonates with many of his readers. 
Returning to hooks’s short reflection of his influence on her, she talks about 
how his writing gave her the means to resist the racist culture of the United 
States; to come to terms with herself as a subject; and to recognise 
disenfranchisement. She admits that she experiences difficulty with 
addressing the sexism of his work because of everything else that it enables, 
especially in “Pedagogy of the Oppressed”: “I felt myself included […] in a 
way that I never felt myself—in my experience as a rural black person—
included” (hooks, 1994, p.51). Her reflections focuses above all on how his 
work moves her, particularly in the generosity it evokes and his honest display 
of non-defensive vulnerability (ibid., pp.54-55). 
 
Thus, loving affects seep into Freire’s own pedagogical theorisation as well as 
into the worlds of those who read him. His understanding of love seems at 
first glance somewhat static, a source of strength and hope, and feeding a 
mobilising impulse for change. As this chapter unfolds, the certainty of love at 
the subjective level is disturbed, resembling instead an endless struggle for 
closure. This is arguably what a Freirean notion of hopeful love also feels like: 
it is always incomplete. From this perspective, a more fruitful way of tracking 
down what he means by love is to look more obliquely, more queerly at his 
work. In his argument for “becoming unsettled”, for instance, one comes 
close to the mobilisation that he so desires. Against the resignation that is so 
often found in the religious belief of the disenfranchised groups he worked 
with, Freire advocates “becoming unsettled”, which aligns with “a God on the 
side of those with whom justice, truth, and love should be” (Freire, 1997, 
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p.103). In the process of unsettling, he argues, submission can be 
counteracted with momentum for change. But moreover, within the context 
of this study, it holds out the possibility for examining disconcerting feelings 
that exist beside the certainty of hope, love, or rage; that wrestle with the 
fabrics of life in other ways. 
 
 
 
3.1.2. Loving the stranger and intimate publics 
 
As the love-core is dispersed, so too is the preoccupation for identifying the 
precise forces that drive political work. In attempting to feel out the contours 
of the possible motivations in socially negotiated art, love evokes a similar 
aspiration to that of dialogue in the previous chapter: of an improbable 
equality and magnamity, though this time around, we are entering the 
mercurial, erratic realm of affective intensities. In emphasising the 
changeability of what we feel and the subjective experiences of how we feel 
what we feel, this chapter tunes into the modulations – pluralised – of what is 
meant by “love”. If it is to be better understood, articulated, or referenced in 
discourse, we must face up to its broad and disconcerting universality. Two 
differing views that tap into the variegated capacities of love while staying in 
conversation with one another are those of Hardt and Berlant. In the last 
decade, they have talked in person as well as through essays about the 
political, gravitational potentials of love. Using their conversations as 
comparative entry points into a love exploration, we find different ways of 
capturing and dislodging its effusiveness: this is a characteristic that is the 
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most intellectually confusing, worrying, and captivating with regards to love. 
The intention here is to understand the desirous, magnetising draw by turning 
first of all to these conceptual approaches as a navigational guide. The 
remainder of the chapter follows through that strong affective compulsion, 
maintaining the “effusive” stamina right alongside the making of new 
theoretical insights and, of course, an embodied criticality (see: 1.1.).  
 
Hardt’s shorter, more recent texts on love lay out a tentative plan of 
identifying and politicising it. But an earlier attempt can be found in his co-
authored book with Antonio Negri “Commonwealth” (2009), which seeks to 
“redefin[e] love in such a way as to demonstrate its utility” (Negri and Hardt, 
2009, p.179, my emphasis). Distinctive to the way they approach love is the 
allusion to opposing poles that are evident as follows: belonging to the 
common of singularities on one end of the spectrum and to mystical 
unifications of romance or race on the other; a love that produces new 
subjectivities versus a love that propagates and conforms to preconceived 
interests. The comparatives offer ways of contrasting different kinds of love 
that somehow defy categorical fixities, since “it can be and is constantly being 
transformed” (ibid., 190). In fact, Hardt and Negri are setting up the reader 
to judge love in terms of its ability to construct the common. But not only 
does this encourage a reductive reading of love as a “utilitarian” means to an 
end, it also proposes a morally evaluative matrix:  
 
The first question to ask when confronting evil, then, is, What specific 
love went bad here? What instance of the common has been 
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corrupted? (ibid., p.190, original emphasis) 
 
As Lauren Berlant (2011) similarly points out, it ends up being a matter of 
separating bad from good love which cannot take into account those 
moments in which you wrongly assess the motive of your (or someone else’s) 
love. In fact, a prominent aspect of love is precisely that it cannot be morally 
depended upon; Hardt and Negri acknowledge as much when they say that it 
is “deeply ambivalent and susceptible to corruption” (Hardt and Negri, 2009, 
p.182). This is explored in the latter part of this section (2.1.2.) by way of 
Berlant’s intimate publics and cruel optimism. For now, the task lies in 
examining the selectivity in what Hardt later calls a “political” love.  
 
Returning to “Commonwealth”, the co-authors refute the mandate to “love 
thy neighbour” – which is often “corrupted” to mean “love those who are the 
same as you” – and instead, to suggest the opposite, to “love the stranger” 
and their difference and otherness (ibid., p.183). Hardt also elaborates on the 
theme of unification and difference in his later thoughts on love (2011a, 
2011b, 2012). The perils of homogeneity are found in our most intimate 
needs that differently translate into e.g. the completion of oneself by another 
person, or in the preservation of a sovereign, nationalist state that is 
uncontaminated by others. In other words, both kinds of love are motivated 
by the idea of sameness; love is wielded here for the purpose of unification. 
To substantiate his later argument, he notes that Arendt disqualifies love from 
the political arena due to its “fundamental and ineluctable effect as 
unification” (Hardt, 2011b, p.678). Unwilling to give up entirely on love, Hardt 
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proposes a different paradigm that is built upon a communism that, citing 
Marx, conceives of love relations that opposes property relations and finally 
“become[s] human” when it can function as a fully-fledged social organ in 
communist emancipation (ibid., p.680): 
 
Communism can thus be conceived as the creation of a new love, 
which operates […] by increasing our power to create and maintain 
relations with each other and the world. Under the rule of property, in 
which property structures and maintains social order and bonds, Marx 
claims that the power of the love and the other senses cannot be 
developed. And correspondingly to achieve a society beyond the rule of 
property those human powers would have to be transformed and 
expanded. (ibid., p.681) 
 
Love would then inaugurate a new era of the senses that befits an equally 
new political era. To clarify what Hardt is proposing: love, whose 
unpredictable volatility he acknowledges, can in fact be defined and assigned 
functions (“to demonstrate its utility”, as quoted earlier). This excludes ways 
of loving as inappropriate, such as the love of (becoming) the same, which is 
a sentiment that structures the most extreme, self-preserving political 
movements. For Hardt, then, these groups ought to be disqualified altogether 
from the discussion of politics (ibid., p.678). Loving thy neighbour cannot be 
political whereas loving thy stranger and difference is a political act.  
 
But the knowledge to love thy stranger does not necessarily correlate with 
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achieving that in practice. It cannot be simply assumed that a conceptual 
understanding of a “wrong” love will steer it back to the “right” one, for how 
often do we hear about “toxic” situations that people find impossible to get 
out of? In this examination of how to love politically – or correctly, in 
accordance to Hardt’s “wrong” to “right” spectrum – the process appears to 
function top-down, from head to body, mind to matter: declare your 
ambitions before you go forth and love uncorrupted. The naming or taming of 
love does not adequately tackle the affective effusiveness that is capable of 
generating momentum across his categories of neighbours and strangers. The 
listing of criteria, of describing love’s orientation or how it ought to behave, is 
a deadening move that neglects how feelings of love behave amorally. This is 
partly articulated in “A Properly Political Concept of Love” (2011), in which 
Berlant responds to Hardt. Critiquing Hardt’s framework of love, they wonder 
(Berlant’s pronouns are they / them) whether there can be “other kinds of 
infrastructure for proximity” that does not promote “spending and hoarding. 
[Love] could be released into the world when no longer copying property, so 
that we, through our senses, would belong to the world, rather than it 
belonging to us” (Berlant, 2011b, p.684). In likening Hardt’s love typology to 
property, they broach the larger question of ownership and (the possibility of) 
reining in love until it is the right kind: the kind that is not dissimilar to 
Freire’s hopeful love and works for the greater political good. Beyond that, 
Berlant also argues against the enforcing of rules: 
 
Any social theory worthy of its ambition requires a space for enigmatic, 
chaotic, incoherent, and structurally contradictory attachments; it 
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needs a way to assess the attachment needs that put people in relation 
without promising to deliver “a life” that feels cushioned. There is no 
cure for ambivalence. (ibid., p.685) 
 
Instead of providing a clear alternative of a love that could work – or even 
perform politically and enable something more than basic survival – Berlant 
turns instead to attachments that lead us to certain objects in expense of 
others that are oriented the right way politically. They examine this amoral 
impulse further in “Cruel Optimism” (2011), which questions “how people 
maintain their binding to modes of life that threaten their well-being” 
(Berlant, 2011a, p.16). To be clear, the focus of their text is not at all on the 
specific intensities of a love-situation, but rather on whatever affective forces 
that draw and bring us “in proximity with” an “object/scene of desire”, the 
latter of which is at the same time “an obstacle to fulfilling the very wants 
that bring people to it” (ibid., p.227). In fact, Hardt’s love for alterity might be 
cast as a case of cruel optimism; he wants rid of the sentimentality that props 
up an imagined unity just to have it re-emerge as a sentimentality of 
embraced difference. Unlike Hardt, Berlant does not locate any specific 
emotion or space in which political optimism is found. Rather, their approach 
negotiates the fraught attempts of flourishing and the attachments we form in 
the simultaneous navigation of life and political potential. This puts aside 
questions of moral allegiances and examines instead love’s multiple 
allegiances (whether correct, corrupt, or something beside these) by turning 
them into forces of longing.  
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Turning to the peculiarities of optimism, Berlant contends that it may likely 
resemble “dread, anxiety, hunger, curiosity” (ibid., p.2) seeing how 
anticipation seldom feels like joy alone (if at all). These “binding modes of 
life” are enabled by what they frame as “clusters of promises” (ibid.) that 
captivate. While there are innumerable reasons that see us returning time and 
again to these promises, the overriding one is the desire for something better. 
They position this as a form of political hope, as motivations and interest for 
the larger lived context. In a documented live conversation with Hardt, 
Berlant describes the social as “the problem of the inconvenience of other 
humans” (Berlant in Davis and Sarlin, 2011), which encapsulates what it 
might feel like to live alongside others, alongside strangers as well as 
neighbours. When the political is construed as a frictive field, where are the 
possibilities and how do we assure ourselves? From this, then, Berlant 
extracts an “intimate public” that produces “immediacy and solidarity by 
establishing in the public sphere an affective register of belonging” (Berlant, 
2011a, p.225). Specific to these publics is an attunement to each other’s 
struggles (which puts them in contact with Warner’s counterpublics in the 
context of this study). Notably in Berlant, however, is the emphatic reiteration 
of the amorality of affect, which then leaves the political consequences of its 
forces to speculation. In “The Female Complaint” (2008), they talk about 
these intimate publics as “a world of strangers who would be emotionally 
literate in each other’s experience of power, intimacy, desire and discontent” 
(Berlant, 2008, p.4). Loosely and conditionally tied together, they work via 
various forms of narration (also noted in Warner’s argument on 
counterpublics as circulation of texts, see: 1.1.3.) that “feel as though it 
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expresses what is common” (Berlant, 2008, p.4) and offer “[a] sense of 
capacious emotional continuity” (ibid., p.5). Although they originally use this 
formulation to talk about the emergence of women’s culture in the United 
States, the focus on affective resonance as the parameters of membership 
makes it possible to imagine a vague but importantly real sense of belonging 
without having to depend on physical presence. In other words, you are part 
of it as soon as it moves you. Improbably expensive clothes and reductive 
advice columns found in women’s magazines are stories to remind you of a 
social belonging. “This means that people participate in it who may share 
nothing of the particular worlds being represented in a given magazine, book, 
film, or soap opera venue” (ibid., p.ix). Indeed, Berlant reminds us that 
strangers – which can include Hardt’s sense of difference and otherness – are 
able to generate solidarity from making-believe: 
 
A public is intimate when it foregrounds affective and emotional 
attachments located in fantasies of the common, the everyday, and a 
sense of ordinariness, a space where challenging and banal conditions 
of life take place in proximity to the attentions of power but also 
squarely in the radar of a recognition that can be provided by other 
humans. (ibid., p.8) 
 
The net is therefore cast somewhat differently from Warner’s counterpublics. 
Rather than seeking a social form by inclining towards a narration however 
faint, an intimate public is formed of affective attachments that make day-to-
day survival possible. This allows for a hugely expanded perspective on what 
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constitutes a public, especially if it coincides with socially negotiated art 
practices in foregrounding the aesthetic and political relevance of feelings. 
Indeed, politics appears most of all as indirect communication, in the clipped 
headings of news feeds and overheard in the street, which recalls the 
spreading spatiality of gossip explored earlier (see: 2.2.2.). Berlant reminds us 
that 
 
[a]midst all of the chaos, crisis, and injustice in front of us, the desire 
for alternative filters that produce the sense – if not the scene – of a 
more livable and intimate sociality is another name for the desire for 
the political. (ibid.) 
 
This reframes sentimentality and political indifference as politically motivated, 
precisely because they are related to the desire for “a more livable and 
intimate sociality”. In fact, the two – livability and intimacy – permeate our 
every experience in the most uneven of ways, making Hardt’s hope of a well-
defined and correct political love impossible to guarantee. Rather than dictate 
a properly political love that works towards a new communist sensorium 
further afield, how might we draw out what is already here? What of the 
(fantastic) relations that we practice everyday to make life livable right now? 
A “political love”, if there is one, must heed where we all are as sentient 
bodies, what we already feel, and with whom or with what we are complicit. 
These indicate how we strive in the direction of survival and flourishing.  
 
While closing in on these desires at work, Berlant introduces the notion of 
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being-stuck that acts as a counterweight to the effusiveness of being-moved 
towards an attachment. For them, this constitutes an “impasse”, which is the 
moments in which crisis is lived through quite ordinarily, not merely defined 
by the high intensity of milestones or disasters (Berlant, 2011a, p.10). A few 
times, they supplement what this means with the image of staying mobile and 
afloat in water, which reinforces the sense of desperation and suspense in 
surviving. They note: 
 
The impasse is a space of time lived without a narrative genre. 
Adaptation to it usually involves a gesture or undramatic action that 
points to and revises an unresolved situation. (ibid., p.199) 
 
Using two films by Laurent Cantet to examine the sense of being caught adrift 
in the present as impasse, Berlant contends that there is a precarity beyond 
the economic; it is one that has seeped deep into the affective structure of 
the global precariat, or the “planetary petty bourgeoisie” (Berlant, 2011a, 
p.191-192), a description she borrows from Agamben. They zoom into 
specific scenes and bodily gestures of the two films that hearken to 
compulsive behaviours of holding on, to locate precisely where these affective 
impressions make their mark: the “hazing [between management and 
production] as the price of upward mobility” (ibid., p.206); the momentary 
“bodily paralysis” and “stunned ineloquence” of feeling the slipping away of 
stability and retirement (ibid., p.211); and “the open secret of the zombie 
managerial enthusiasm” that one must uphold in order to keep a job (ibid., 
p.221). While trying to articulate the affective tension that exists between 
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propulsion and impasse, the contradictions of attachment can be found in the 
tension between and around the two, in the halting stop-start between 
movement and stillness. If new learning is to be reaped from delving into the 
affective intensities that make up an intimate public, we must attune most of 
all to feelings of unpredictability and discomfort, to everything that comes 
with being beside one another in dissenting, frictive contact. The fact that 
attachments so often appear politically detrimental suggests that we do not 
only move towards and away in our fraught attempts to control them, but 
that we also stop (or stall, trip, and freeze) for reasons that do not feel 
immediately obvious. 
 
My emphasis on Berlant’s impasse is an attempt to further develop the 
significance of intimate publics for the purpose of understanding them in the 
context of a muted political ongoingness. As noted, intimacy is conceived here 
as feeling our way to a public belonging, one in which our struggle is 
affectively sensed and understood. This, of course, includes the desire to 
change and improve, to progress and resolve the problems that the now 
comprises. While propulsion of this kind is necessary for any transformative 
project, there is an equal if not more forceful motivation to also feel rooted in 
the now, to already flourish in some way – to not merely survive. The power 
of their argument with regards to the impasse lies in its consideration of 
current capitalism and how neoliberal privatisation extends to our emotions, 
whereby “the body is a container for the subject’s affects while [the] face 
aspires to remain all surface” (Berlant, 2011a, p.222). Not only are bodies 
weighed down by their affective subjectivities, they must also find the 
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motivation to produce, even through the deadness of it all, an appearance of 
ease and composure. This is the ambivalence: counterpublic making then 
appears to take place within the context of intimate publics. The latter feels 
through struggles and holds on to fragments of respite and joy in ways that 
do not always translate into revolutionary uprising; moving and mobilising is 
no easy feat, but nor is surviving. 
 
What do practices of socially negotiated art look or feel like with regards to 
cruelly optimistic attachments and impasses? On the one hand, there are 
practices done in the name of love and political radicality that aspires in the 
direction of Freire’s hope and Hardt’s embrace of difference. However, this 
motivation to work towards somewhere better than the present is not, as 
Berlant demonstrates, always consistent or reliable. What they point out with 
cruel optimism is how bodies keep going back to objects despite leaving you 
feeling empty in the long run, which turn trajectories of desire into impasses 
that disappoint rather than ways-out that fulfil. This broken loop resonates 
hugely with many artists who are stuck running on a treadmill of grant writing 
and project proposing with minimal reward, of feeling that the work always 
comes up short to expectations. In an entanglement of sincere desire to work 
with others and financial need, of a precarious career and the ubiquitous 
remit of social impact, lies an impasse that most definitely feels like Berlant’s 
“treading water”. The exhaustion that comes from being at the intersection of 
hope and disappointment co-existing at the risk of cancelling one another out 
to numbness is often discussed informally between art workers, but there is 
yet an attempt to weave this emotionally privatised aspect of the work more 
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seriously within its theory as well as practice. It must be stressed that a 
socially negotiated art that accounts for intimate publics is concerned not only 
with congealing outward-facing, counterpublic solidarity, but acknowledges 
above all the idiosyncratic and just as social ways that bodies desire and, 
relatedly, are let down. What cruel optimism allows, then, is for socially 
negotiated art to refract its supposed “labour of love” into more intimate 
projections of disappointment both with other bodies as well as self-
reflexively; getting stuck at impasses might engender queer forms of “lateral 
agency” (Berlant, 2007) that warrant closer, more reparative modes of 
analysis and negotiation. 
 
 
3.2. The affective nodal points underpinning a socially 
negotiated art 
 
The previous chapter section (3.1.) has been dedicated to laying out three 
particular theoretical perspectives that underpin this study’s thinking and 
refractions of love. Their functions are more overarching than precise, setting 
the affective context within which the rest of the chapter unfolds. To conclude 
that section with Berlant’s thinking on intimacy, livability, and impasses is a 
way of underscoring its influence in this second part of the chapter. The 
ambivalence of feeling means is something that is increasingly stressed as the 
refractions unfold; loving is not straightforward, and loving politically does not 
always look or feel like it is supposed to. In 3.2., two specific loving affects 
are described through embodied experiences. It focuses on the swell of social 
 198 
movements (3.2.1.) the corporeality of space in nationalism (3.2.2.) as 
affective sites that draw bodies together. Before embarking on these 
analyses, there are some important pivots that are worth emphasising as 
points of orientation for the reading of these two scenes: paranoid and 
reparative (Sedgwick, 2003), disorientation and the sociality of feelings 
(Ahmed), and the “what’s doing?” of knowledge (Massumi, 2011). They serve 
as reminders for a self-reflexive embodiment, which is used in figuring out the 
affective textures of the relational material in socially negotiated art. 
 
Firstly, then, is Sedgwick’s “topography” of research (2003). She 
problematises the academic convention of deepening knowledge that lies 
“behind” what we perceive – as if it were waiting to be uncovered. This has 
already been included in the discussion of this study’s research methodology 
(see: 1.2.2.), which looks to Sedgwick’s less predatory proposal of 
approaching knowledge by travelling “beside”. The prepositional change has 
been an important turning point in this study, which has led to its focus on 
relationality, on lived and living experience, as well as tacit understanding. 
This is achieved by asking how socially negotiated art is embodied: how do 
we critically, politically, and aesthetically attune ourselves to our corporeality? 
If this is a move that re-centres the making and inventing of sociality, then it 
must in some way also embrace what Sedgwick calls reparative as 
differentiated from a paranoid approach (Sedgwick, 2003), which digs below 
the surface for knowledge. The search for depth, she argues, leads to a 
“hermeneutics of suspicion” that asks, “Is a particular piece of knowledge true 
and how can we know?” But what we can also ask is what roles a specific 
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knowledge plays and what kind of influences it produces, thus opening up a 
reparative means of negotiating its limits and significance with life. As 
Sedgwick asks, “[h]ow, in short, is knowledge performative, and how best 
does one move among its causes and effects?” (ibid., p.124)  
 
This brings us to Ahmed’s spatially aware disorientation (“Queer 
Phenomenology”, 2006) that considers how the body (comes to) know 
through living. By figuring out our own, unrepeatable perspective, attention is 
placed on how spaces beside other bodies are lived and defined. What / who 
becomes near or distant, possible or impossible? In prioritising the clash of 
incommensurable “zero points” (ibid.), bodies and objects have to make the 
ground / position they perch on as they orient towards one another; our 
boundaries – our porous skin and reiterated limits that make sense only to 
ourselves – are a queer matter of feeling-as-figuring-out. Ahmed calls this a 
“surfacing of bodies” through a mixture of perception, evaluation, and feeling, 
all of which make distinct impressions that are not consciously registered 
(Ahmed, 2004, p.25). In “The Cultural Politics of Emotion” (2004), she notes 
how surfaces are made particularly clear in affective economies of pain, 
whose circulation mark and marginalise some bodies while gliding over 
others. Empathetic attempts are sometimes made to lessen that divide, but 
are often premised upon feeling on behalf of others. Such a desire to become 
through the pain violates the intensity of someone who is already with the 
pain, and therefore “sustains the very difference that it may seek to 
overcome” (ibid.). What this suggests in terms of affective relationality, 
especially the kind that is sought after in community-based art settings, is the 
 200 
navigation of our co-separation: a practice “based not on the possibility that 
we might be reconciled, but on learning to live with the impossibility of 
reconciliation, or learning that we live with and beside each other, and yet we 
are not as one” (ibid., p.39). Alongside queer dispossession and recognition of 
complicity (see: 1.1.3.), co-separation is an important reminder not only of 
the ambivalence but the contradiction of wanting to understand and feel for 
others. 
 
The primary challenge in this chapter, then, is to process the complexity of 
such affective experiences both beside and through cognitive modalities. 
Unlike Massumi’s autonomy of affect (2002), the point is not to foreground 
affect as a means of asserting it dominance over what he calls “cognitivism”; 
it only serves to flip the two around and instate a paranoid approach of bodily 
knowing. Ruth Leys (2011) critiques his overinvestment in “anti-
intentionalism” most evident in the latter’s citing of the half-second delay 
experiments. He uses them as biological evidence for substantiating a “never-
to-be-conscious autonomic remainder” that is “disconnected from meaningful 
sequencing” (Massumi, 2002, p.25) based on the fact that human beings can 
only detect stimuli on our skin if they last for more than half a second. Leys 
questions how often the focus on affect only serves to rehash the same 
binaries, particularly of mind and body, that many cultural theorists refute. 
Much like how gossip and teasing in chapter two (see: 2.2.2.) are 
repositioned as speech forms that function beside so-called “formal” 
epistemologies, the exploration of affect in this chapter, therefore, takes 
precedence insofar as it insists on the value of the embodied and the in-
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between. In fact, unpredictability is precisely what makes affect a crucially 
queer and feminist theoretical “move”, rather literally: to treat bodies as 
knowing and feelings as social, etc. is always going to incite more questions 
than statements, given how their specificities are under perpetual renewal. 
There are resonances of this in Massumi’s “activist philosophy” (2011), which 
asks,  
 
‘what’s doing?’ while cognitivist approaches ask what the subject can 
know of the world, as if the subject does not come to itself already in 
the midst but rather looked upon the world at a reflective remove that 
it is philosophy’s job to overcome. (ibid., p.6) 
 
Rather than disproving cognitivism, this study chooses to focus on spatiality, 
movement (and possibly its impediments), and sociality as theoretical 
possibilities to bring a different clarity to where one is at a given point. And 
Massumi’s observation that “what [a knower] knows is its own beginning, 
retroactively” (ibid.) acknowledges his and others’ zero points of orientation, 
all of which see us caught up with living and doing while trying to take stock / 
take charge at the same time. This is ultimately the crux of this chapter: to 
negotiate feelings beside thought, to locate how and where the former can 
function as a reparative strategy to queerly challenge the paranoid revelation 
of truths. The questions, then: how can this dimension of felt-knowing be 
understood? To what extent can the sensuous and the intense be articulated 
as an embodied criticality expressed through words, through theory? These 
questions – along with caveats of reparative reading and co-feeling without 
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reconciliating – help in theoretically refracting the following two scenes of 
socially oriented love: revolution (3.2.1.) and nationalism (3.2.2.). 
 
 
3.2.1. The swell and movement of revolution as choreography 
 
In an article on the affect space of protest for Online Open, cultural theorist 
Eric Kluitenberg talks about the eruption of public protests and assemblies in 
terms of the “choreographic” — a concept that he takes from digital media 
scholar Paulo Gerbaudo to further his argument on “movement of the 
squares” as a confluence of “technology, affect, and hybrid urban space” 
(Kluitenberg, 2015). Kluitenberg thinks of these gatherings as a kind of 
“affect space” that is created in order to be seen, heard; it is a culmination of 
what has already taken place virtually, specifically through the effervescent 
connections made in social media. The search for acknowledgement results 
from what Kluitenberg calls “a very basic form of making presence — of 
marking the fact (if only to oneself) of existence” (ibid.). In my reading, 
Gerbaudo and Kluitenberg both regard the use of social media as an 
important platform for the making of these counterpublics. The key difference 
lies in how affect is aligned within the gathering: while Gerbaudo regards it as 
a minimisation of social complexity for the sake of temporary solidarity, 
Kluitenberg describes physical protests as brimming over with difference and 
contradictions. For both writers, social media are tools of affective stirring; 
the concentration of people in the streets embody a climatic manifestation of 
the discontent drummed up online. For Gerbaudo, this “emotional 
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coalescence” and solidarity is achieved through a “choreography of assembly” 
(Gerbaudo, 2012, p.12), which would appear to be calling for a greater focus 
in our bodily relations. However, Gerbaudo’s choreographic premise is 
developed as a preparatory framework “to indicate that the process of the 
symbolic construction of public space […] has not been entirely ‘spontaneous’ 
or ‘leaderless’ – as many pundits, journalists, activists and academics alike 
have suggested” (ibid., p.13). This emphasis on the organisation of social 
movement as labour is also found more recently in “Assembly” (Hardt and 
Negri, 2017), who go even further than Gerbaudo by calling for greater 
specificity to “nonsovereign forms of organization and institution” (p.14). 
According to the co-authors, leadership is conventionally about strategy or 
how to “see far” while movements are associated with tactics or “the 
arrangement of forces” (ibid., p.15) concerned with the solving of immediate 
issues. They argue for the inversion of these roles such that movements 
imagine what the long-term holds, whereas leadership applies tactical 
judgments to serve the movement’s vision. Gerbaudo’s choreography can 
thus be aligned with Hardt and Negri’s tactical leadership, given his focus on 
the logistical structuring of movement as proof against its spontaneous 
eruption or leaderlessness. But what he stresses is the emotional over the 
factual aspect of movement-making, referencing social media in particular as 
a platform for mobilisation. By stoking a passionate sense of outrage in 
readers and media users, the choreography of assembly rests in the tactical 
elicitation of emotions that enable the imagining of a “popular reunion” 
despite greater differences (ibid.). 
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He emphasises the mediation of forces that allow an identity to congeal 
around common enemies as the precursory task and scene-setting for action. 
But it is also worth extending this thinking of choreography as movement-
organising to include embodied moments of physical contact and proximity: 
movement and stillness, distance and closeness entangled with the 
environment, surrounded by sounds, smells, textures, etc. How do bodies 
move beside one another in this space? This is an important question to 
consider with regards to socially negotiated art practices when so many of 
them position themselves adjacent to / within political movements. At the 
point in which the latter coalesce into physical forms like protests and 
occupations, they live out, even if only temporarily, some of the most 
significant imaginings of these art practices. As Yates McKee observes about 
the Occupy Movement in “Strike Art” (2015), it is as much an art process as it 
is a revolutionary event. He notes that many of the initial instigators / 
organisers were artists and examines Occupy Wall Street in 2011 as a living, 
unfolding art practice: it is theatre, a spectacle, an enabling imaginary, and a 
pedagogical laboratory (McKee, 2015). Such an intersection of art and life far 
exceeds the way it is described, as if these were two overlapping circles of a 
Venn diagram. McKee chooses instead to set the scene of Occupy Wall Street 
in great detail: amongst other things, he describes the “people’s microphone” 
stage, the zones carved out for sign-making, the “people’s library”, and the 
biopolitical relevance of cardboard as a functional / symbolic material of 
Occupy’s precarity. Together, they constitute “a communal life-support zone 
resistant to both the market and state-sanctioned versions of public 
assembly” (ibid., p.102, my emphasis). The question I would like to further 
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here concerns how these different bodies and practices might be analysed as 
a moving structure, which takes us back to choreography as a conceptual 
framework. 
 
In “The Choreographic” (2014), performance artist and scholar Jenn Joy 
examines choreography as  
 
orientation in relationship to space, to language, to composition, to 
articulation, and to ethics. To engage choreographically is to position 
oneself in relation to another, to participate in a scene of address that 
anticipates and requires a particular mode of attention. (ibid., p.1)  
 
She develops her argument within the paradoxes of bodily knowing and 
heeds a “saturated temporality” of attentive immediacy. Often, this 
immediacy is used to describe one of the more obvious qualities of dance and 
movement. But she hopes to challenge this by proposing a “saturated” 
temporality, wherein she asks what bodies are capable of saying in order to 
imbue movement with reflection. Her study on the choreographic then 
focuses on two key arguments: 1. dance produces a dense and embodied 
discourse; 2. dance is saturated with – and not lacking in – time, which 
enables different analytical possibilities that elude a more conventional (and 
less mutable) grasp of time. She argues bodies-in-address carry other 
temporalities that unsettle the presumed linear progression of time, 
something that is similarly explored in disorientation and queer time (see: 
1.1.6. on living out-of-time and place). In fact, Joy’s saturation of temporality 
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runs the same course as what Lloyd Pratt calls “radical present tense-ness” in 
his examination of Eudora Welty’s writing – or “[p]ut simply: the future is not” 
(Pratt in McCallum and Tuhkanen, 2011, p.188). Pratt selects exquisite 
moments in which the expectant rhythms of reproductive anticipation are 
distorted, contrasting the ubiquity of clocks in her descriptions of childhood 
memories with “alternative chronometers” (ibid., p.193) that include rocking 
chairs as the scene of storytelling, silent reading as a father lays dying, 
knitting while keeping watch, and writing as the unfolding truth of the 
present. The ruling order of clock time is challenged by different embodied 
tempos, which is a task that Joy similarly seeks to meet through a dance 
orientation. She describes what takes place in the now-ness of address as 
“precarious rapture”, which “breathe[s] in history as present tense” (Joy, 
2014, p.25). It involves the clash / contact of our innermost with the 
outermost, an experience that Joy locates in the bodily act of walking: 
 
[M]y choreographic attention to landscape seeks not to tether the 
works to the sand or cement – the grounds – but to activate a mobile 
utopic thinking that participates in the uncertain writing of walking, 
making, witnessing, thinking, cruising around and around again. (ibid., 
p.31) 
 
Bringing this back to the scene of street assembly, the protester walks with 
others in contrast to these solitary endeavours, taking the form of a body-in-
plurality. By its sheer size and presence, the walking mass speaks solidarity, 
exemplifying Joy’s materiality of bodily speech. The “precarious rapture” 
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therefore circulates at a number of levels: amongst other moving bodies in 
procession as they all head in the same physical direction; and amongst other 
“bodies” brought to bear by the act of walking – those of borders, buildings, 
streets, atmospheres in the urban background. The “uncertain writing and 
making” of protest walking is deliberately catered to a counterpublic making, 
which must take into account how our skin-bound bodies and the landscape 
around us are co-generating aesthetic shifts that demand something new 
from our relationships. Vis-à-vis the landscape as co-negotiator and support 
system, this reinforces Jackson’s argument of art’s reliance on “props”, i.e. on 
the supportive infrastructure that holds it up (2012; see: 2.2.). More recently, 
Judith Butler’s “Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly” (2015) also 
emphasises how the surrounding avails itself:  
 
We see some ways that bodies in their plurality lay claim to the public, 
find and produce the public through seizing and reconfiguring the 
matter of material environments; at the same time, those material 
environments are part of the action, and they themselves act when 
they become the support for action. (Butler, 2015, p.71) 
 
In the body’s “taint of flesh and emotion, moving alongside the affective 
traces of the landscape itself” (Joy, 2014, p.37), there is actually a 
reimagining and remaking of the world taking place in the midst of a 
counterpublic swell. By turning the functions of structures on their head, the 
collection of bodies – organic and otherwise – propose tangible alternatives to 
the ways they are recognised. In living out new choreographies and 
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(dis)orientations in other organisations of space, bodies, and existing 
materials, other modes of placemaking – to deliberately reclaim it from the 
language of urban renewal – are negotiated and put to work. This is what Joy 
suggests when she talks about a choreographic discursivity. To resituate this 
more experientially, writer and activist Rebecca Solnit recalls the affective 
response of San Francisco’s city infrastructure to the 1991 Gulf War protests: 
 
[P]eople began to gather spontaneously […] to plaster the city with 
posters that seemed to make the very walls break their silence with 
calls for specific actions and caustic commentaries on the meaning of 
the war. Many of the demonstrations here, as elsewhere, instinctively 
headed for the traffic arteries – bridges, highways – or for the power 
points – the federal building, the stock exchange – and shut them 
down. […] The city was being remade as a place whose center did not 
belong to business or to cars, but to pedestrians moving down the 
street in this most bodily form of free speech. (Solnit, 2002, p.227, my 
emphasis)  
 
As Solnit notes, bodies walking along in directional unison is already a “form 
of free speech”, recalling directly Joy’s claim of the discursive body, one that 
does so at a different temporality. In co-walking, new (un)livable provocations 
are called into existence. The city material becomes a conspirator, a dance 
partner even, who feels our movements and (re)actions, the brush of our 
skin. Walking as protest choreography enliven relations and reparative 
opportunities that ideas about them alone cannot. The argument, then, is that 
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“choreography of assembly” can go much further than the preparatory 
mediation of emotions and movement-building. It also embodies a different, 
saturated temporality that reconfigures the borders (and with them, the 
meanings) of flesh and buildings, bodies and atmospheres in a moment of 
“precarious rapture”. Moreover, there is potential here to disrupt some of the 
attachments that have us emotionally invested in life conditions that are 
actually bad for us (see: 3.1.2. on cruel optimism), because the counterpublic 
movement temporarily reconstitutes the shape and form of intimacy and 
flourishing. 
 
Yet protesting bodies are often disproportionately restrained and violated as 
policing forces submit to paranoid ideas of state choreography. Protest and 
assembly are both endangered from the moment it comes to life; precarious 
rapture indeed. By homing into the volatility and potential violence of protest 
– its discontent, policing, and rage, namely – choreography’s “utopic mobility” 
is made affectively contingent: just as it plays a part in the euphoria of 
counterpublic forces, so too does it work in conjunction with oppression. 
Choreography reveals itself to be morally ambivalent, pliable in accordance to 
the material and affective forces at hand. It therefore continues a theme of 
“felt” complexities that have already been differently stressed throughout this 
study (see: complicity and dispossession in 1.1.3., frictive communication in 
2.2., intimate publics in 3.2.1.). Indeed, dance scholars Gay Morris and Jens 
Richard Giersdorf define choreography as 
 
a structuring system for any kind of movement with inherent political 
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potentiality [that] can include soldiers participating in a mock battle 
[and] arranging hostage videos in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian 
Territories to demonstrate to audiences through comportment and 
movement the vulnerability of prisoners and the might of the captors. 
(Morris and Giersdorf, 2016, p.6-7) 
 
Morris and Giersdorf note how choreography – the writing of movement – 
first appeared in the eighteenth century to instill a particular kind of social 
order, arranging bodies in ways that both perform and reflect their obedience 
to power (ibid., p.8). Intending to draw out the ramifications of choreography 
in the twenty-first century, Morris and Giersdorf describe a permanent state 
of war and control, producing a dispersed military complex that is made up of 
increasingly coincident state and private entities.  
 
What would it mean, then, to retrieve choreography’s politically radical and 
antagonistic potential in light of this landscape? The contingency of 
choreography, as mentioned earlier, suggests that a countering stance is not 
impossible, but unsustainable, given how systems are relationally negotiated 
in-between, with and beside whatever bodies they are in contact with. What 
we can focus on, Morris and Giersdorf argue, is the dilemma of 
choreography’s political applicability, of structuring and disciplining through 
movement:  
 
Has choreography also changed in character and objective? Or is there 
perhaps a need to adjust our understanding of choreography to also 
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incorporate a temporally, spatially, and conceptually metamorphous 
disorganization that might include disorder not simply as an obstacle 
leading toward an end result or enlightening a process but as an 
ontological state? (ibid., p.12, my emphasis) 
 
This analysis on embodied revolutionary movement expands upon Gerbaudo’s 
provocative “choreography of assembly” in order to examine how politically 
oriented affect is structured. As such, choreography is taken from the 
logistical work of movement organising to the protest ground itself, where 
crowds gather and remake urban spaces. But crucially, this move towards a 
generative third space of politics and dance / movement also demonstrates 
the inseparable agency of our surroundings as prop and material (Jackson, 
2011; Butler, 2015). What we are confronted with, then, is the inter/intra-
action (see: 1.1.4. on phenomena and material discursivity) between bodies 
that include flesh, buildings, and environment, putting into embodied practice 
some of this study’s key ideas for a socially negotiated art. Thinking about 
movement structures makes physically explicit both the methodological 
“beside” and the co-enunciation of meaning, played out in the reconfiguration 
of bodies as they protest (including streets, buildings, and other surrounding 
“props”). The in-between space of socially negotiated art has been teased out 
and queerly reframed into a space thick with affective, corporeal, and 
material forces. Over the course of this study, “beside” as a methodology is 
gradually reconfiguring engagement into embodiment that self-reflexively 
(re)negotiates the social rather than enters it. By acknowledging the systems 
that structure how we move, we can emphasise how bodies and their 
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inter/intrarelations are generated, enabled, thwarted. More importantly, the 
conventions of choreography highlights the performance aspect of socially 
negotiated art through “training, technique, rehearsal, performance, and 
reception” (Morris and Giersdorf, 2016, p.7) which just might be able to 
scramble old orders (see: 1.1.3. on the “scrambling” of norms). For a short 
time, these affect spaces of protest are at the same time forms of socially 
negotiated art that directly enacts what it means to live alongside others in 
new and unexpected ways.  
 
 
3.2.2. Nationalism and the corporeality of space 
 
One of the conceptual entry points to this chapter’s refractions on love has 
been the mandate to “love thy neighbour”, which Hardt and Negri 
problematise as the love of the same and from there, ask that you “love thy 
stranger” (see: 3.1.2.). The idea of loving the same is explored here through 
nationalism, a political and cultural sentiment that is increasingly normalised 
in the western hemisphere. The argument hinges on two key points: body 
borders and the corporeality of space, both of which shed light on the 
insidious ways in which nationalism works in the current political climate. The 
turn to the right is intimately connected to socially negotiated art contexts, 
driven as commissioners (claim they) are by the most pressing social issues. 
Art institutions in western spaces must, more than ever, learn to navigate 
their complicity with xenophobic affective economies, even – or especially – if 
their curatorial intentions betray a certain political consciousness. Also, as 
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Gregory Sholette elucidates, away from these “white cubicles of the art 
industry” (Sholette, 2011, p.20) is the “dark matter” of “surplus artistic 
producers” (ibid., p.87). They include “an explosion of professionally trained 
young artists, many from subaltern backgrounds” (ibid.) who contribute their 
labour to the primary art world even as their own practices work to decentre 
it. The two are thus interrelated, with the primary art world dependent on a 
large body of failing artists to invest their time and careers into auxiliary roles 
within the system. In this sense, an examination of nationalism provides an 
extremely current context with which to rethink borders and territories 
through corporeality, providing crucial insight into the ways bodies assert 
themselves and mark out power – quite physically – in their surroundings. 
 
Following Hardt’s “love they neighbour”, nationalism can be seen as a self-
protective, paranoid love that fears invasion. In this thinking, the body longs 
to be impenetrable to outsiders (read: those who do us harm) as a means of 
self-containment. As such, two key ideas are put under examination: 1. how 
love for the same provides a conceptual framework to insidiously stoke a 
nostalgically nationalist and racist imagination, and 2. how self and 
subjectivity is embodied spatially, beside and beyond the flesh we move 
within. This is done by turning firstly to visual impressions that generate a 
sense of self through ideas of home, vigilance, and racial unity. Together, 
these create what Michael Billig describes as the “banal flagging of 
nationhood” (Billig, 1995, p.10) that sustains an illusion of national selfhood. 
Following that are two contrasting notions of expanded corporeality, one in 
which a territorial imperialism is underscored and another that transforms 
 214 
bodies literally into material borders.  
 
 
The self-preservation of nationalism  
 
In one of the earlier studies written on nationalism, Benedict Anderson 
describes the nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as 
both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson, 2006, p.6). Rather than 
think through nationalism as an ideology, he approaches it as an element of 
culture, “as if it belonged with ‘kinship’ and ‘religion’ rather than ‘liberalism’ or 
‘fascism’” (ibid.). In this spirit, he acknowledges the affective attachments 
that are enabled through nationalism, though his analysis is less interested in 
exploring the workings of this desire than it is in cultural artefacts such as 
language, which helps foment an “anonymous, faceless” tribe (ibid., p.154). 
“Through that language, encountered at mother's knee and parted with only 
at the grave, pasts are restored, fellowships are imagined, and futures 
dreamed” (ibid.). If nationalism desires an exclusivity of belonging that is 
defined by sovereignty (see: 1.1.3. on the making of a state and self), then 
we can recall what Hardt and Negri caution with regards to a love for the 
same. They follow this imperative in terms of the biblical “love thy neighbour” 
which, as they argue, rules out any contact with alterity. But what if your 
neighbour in real life – the one who literally lives next door to you – is no 
longer “the same” as you anymore and speaks a foreign language?  
 
For those who find this change in the neighbourhood landscape unacceptable, 
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nationalism provides a nostalgic albeit fictional means (see: 1.1.3. on 
practices that uphold a fiction of sovereignty) of holding onto “the same”. In 
other words, you have to extend into the imagined realm of the nation in 
order to retrieve the supposed lost neighbour. Another note of ambivalence is 
found here as desire forms itself around the nation, for there are undeniable 
echoes of lonely bodies, counterpublics, and intimacy which have been 
explored previously (see: 1.1.2.). But this is far from a struggle for peripheral 
or queerly articulated co-recognition that is argued in those ideas; rather, its 
very intimacy is the common outrage of a lost identity that nostalgically takes 
shape as nationalism. As Michael Billig argues, the nation is already 
celebrated routinely in a kind of banal nationalism (Billig, 1995). Our 
“background space” is turned into “homeland space” in the performative, 
daily flagging of the nation (ibid., p.43), who also happens to be our mother 
and father (land). In line with Hannah Arendt’s view on “banality” far from 
being harmless, Billig repudiates nationalism as “something 'surplus'; rather, it 
is endemic in the world of nation-states” (ibid., p.10). Nationalism exists, he 
argues, precisely in the absent-minded celebrations of the flag that are then 
forgotten. For him, the flags hanging limply on government buildings are 
representative of the memory slip that he wants to revive (ibid., p.69). And 
following this reminder, we can locate signs of it everywhere: in the UK, it is 
found emblazoned on packaging (“Grown by British Farmers”), on the 
inescapable “Keep Calm and Carry On” items, on the money we use. This is a 
present absence that normalises the idea of the nation while endowing it with 
the latent power to affectively mobilise its citizens in critical moments. 
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But the present absence is only selectively experienced. There are times when 
its memory fails to slip causes uncomfortable, frictive contact; when the flag 
rubs (the wrong way), so to speak. The occasions in which this happens 
indicate the affective borders of nationalism’s banality. The questions we then 
need to ask: when does it happen? And to whom? Outside of special 
occasions like the Olympics when the national flag is paraded and cannot 
recede, how is the weight of the flag felt on an everyday basis? We can turn 
to Ahmed’s affective economies once more, whose circulation and interruption 
correspond here with the forgetting and alerting of nation respectively. As 
discussed in chapter one, this specifically concerns how feelings are socially 
transmitted and transmuted – or as Ahmed puts it, how they adhere to and 
slide around subjects (Ahmed, 2004). The impressions they leave depend 
upon where and how they move between subjects-as-nodal-points; the flag 
may glide over certain bodies, but irritate or stubbornly stick onto others. In 
practical terms, the Union Jack hanging in a neighbour’s window might not 
appear notable. But at the same time, it might cause worry to an immigrant 
like me, because the flag is a living, breathing reminder that the nation 
cannot be taken for granted. Othered lonely bodies – immigrant and racialized 
ones – therefore experience the collateral damage of such flagging, for it is 
the denial of national intimacy that leaves a mark on their bodies. In other 
words, they are marked because they are not unmarked by the flag, since 
their bodies are not part of the affective economy that are capable of 
circulating nationalism absent-mindedly. And since they do not have the 
privilege of receding into the background, they fail to constitute the 
nationalist homeland space that Michael Billig talks about. Their bodies, like 
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the Muslim woman’s veil Ahmed discusses in her text, “block the economy of 
the national ideal” and 
 
represent[s] a betrayal not only of the nation, but of freedom and 
culture itself, as the freedom to move and acquire value. (Ahmed, 
2004, p.133) 
 
From the position of the “felt” flagging, the absent-mindedness is by dint of a 
collective belonging that fixates on what – and therefore who – it is not as a 
means of self-recognition. Regarding the veiled Muslim woman in the banal 
nationalism of the UK, the following is assumed: that the UK is not a religious 
state and does not mandate modest dressing from women. In so doing, there 
is a need to emphasise the underside to Billig’s banal nationalism argument, 
because the banality of flagging in the everyday coheres an identity by 
ascertaining who and what it is not, which depends on the production of the 
other. What feels like absent-mindedness in one body can feel like a pang of 
fear in another. There is indeed a banality to nationalism, as long as the body 
is aligned with the flag. At the same time, there is something far from banal 
when the body fails to adhere and is seen as an interruption or a circulatory 
blockage to national continuity.  
 
 
Towards a negotiated corporeality of space 
 
Thus, bodies of otherness are physical borders that interrupt the flow of banal 
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nationalism. They come into view as sites of contention, aggression, and 
violence by enacting the possibility of otherness. Yet they also embody other 
possibilities, which means the body-as-border demonstrates a split between 
reality and the “instincts which detach the ego from reality” (Bhabha, 1994, 
p.188; see: 1.1.1. on third space) – or, between an other that must be 
negated and an uncertain body that opens up new relationalities. With 
regards to the experience of this body border, critical race scholar Barnor 
Hesse (1997) and feminist theorist Elizabeth Grosz (2001) gesture towards 
the body’s propensity to merge with the space around it. The aim is to situate 
the body within its proprietary zeal to claim space as its own while challenging 
that by emphasising its entanglement with the world. As such, the analysis 
tackles these two corporealities of space. 
 
Just as Billig scales down the affective intensity of nationalism to the banal, so 
too does Barnor Hesse seek to question the scope of “nation” through a 
localised perspective of belonging — or “white governmentality” (Hesse, 
1995). His position relates to and departs from banal nationalism within the 
context of this analysis, given how Hesse regards governmentality in terms 
that are reminiscent of choreography; he describes it as the disciplinary 
structuring of behaviours both at an individual as well as social level (Hesse, 
1995, p.98). Locating British cities as pressure points for racialised 
antagonisms, he constructs his analysis in spatialised terms such as 
“shrinkage” and “occupation”, “territoriality” and “contamination”: 
 
For the ‘white’ body of neighbourhood nationalism the ‘zone outside 
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the body, occupying its surrounding space, is incorporated into the 
body’ itself (Grosz 1994:79). It is ‘reterritorialised’ (see Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994). In this way any intrusion (e.g. immigration, 
multiculturalism) into this ‘bodily space is considered as much a 
violation as a penetration of the body itself’ (Grosz 1994:79). It is 
probably for this reason more than any other that the discourse of 
racial harassment in the city justifies itself, without qualification, in the 
defence of the nation against the ‘threat’ of being over-run or the ‘fear 
of being swamped’ and in paranoiac anticipation of those events 
violates the integrity, relations and context of the ‘other’s’ body. (ibid., 
p.97) 
 
Having continuously and deliberately repressed its imperial history, the 
nationalist British body has been led to believe its own colonisation: it is 
already (too) open and (too) multicultural. Governmentality comes to 
articulate itself around this narrative, with the white British body feeling like a 
line has been crossed. This means we cannot simply take racist animosity at 
face value, but must literally and physically stretch the body around our 
understanding of boundaries and nation to help us recognise more innocuous 
forms of racism and nationalism. To illustrate how the white British body feels 
under threat in its “natural setting as an endangered species” (Hesse, 1995, 
p.97), Hesse highlights various forms of conduct that are “invoked randomly 
and opportunistically” (ibid., p.88). Aside from the bodily, confrontational 
modes most typically associated with racist behaviour are the more systemic, 
repetitive ways in which Black and Asian lives are illegitimised by excessive 
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disbelief, suspicion, and negligence that is encouraged by white 
governmentality. The presence of racialised bodies materialise a feeling of 
“intrusion and proximity” (ibid., p.88) within white British spaces because of 
an investment in such a corporeality. Citing Grosz, Hesse takes into account 
how the white body thinks of its surroundings as “penetrated” to demonstrate 
the bodily extent of white governmentality. This echoes the queer rape scene 
in The Bachar Tapes (2000) by The Atlas Group discussed in 1.1.3., in which 
the white perpetrator jumps back as soon as the victim responds sexually. 
The rapist can only indulge in his racist, bottom fantasy as long as there is no 
reciprocal desire, no actual penetration. Once the Lebanese man begins to 
actively participate, the white governmentality kicks back in and borders are 
erected again. Indeed, Grosz explicitly calls for greater attunement of the 
body’s inextricability with its surroundings, speaking in particular about urban 
space: 
 
 [T]he city can be seen as a (collective) body-prosthesis or boundary 
that enframes, protects, and houses while at the same time taking its 
own forms and functions from the (imaginary) bodies it constitutes. 
Simultaneously, cities are loci that produce, regulate, and structure 
bodies. […] [T]he corporeality of cities and the materiality of bodies—
the relations of exchange and production, habit, conformity, 
breakdown, and upheaval—have yet to be adequately thought as 
corporeal. The corporeality, or materiality, of the city is of the same 
order of complexity as that of bodies. (Grosz, 2001, pp.49-50, my 
emphasis) 
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While the city and the body are not interchangeable, Grosz insists on a 
“corporeality of the city” that encourages a more sensitive and sensory 
elaboration of city spaces, for one does not exist independently from the 
other. Here, she talks about the city as a “body-prosthesis”, noting the extent 
to which the city and the body are co-enunciative. We are reminded of 
Barad’s entanglements (see: 1.1.4.) that are not about interrelation as such, 
but a queerer, discontinuous continuity between object and apparatus that 
enfolds the two (Barad, 2003, 2007). That Grosz notes a similar complexity 
between them, however, does not imply an over-correlation wherein the city 
is a literal stand-in for the body, with visual or functional equivalents. In fact, 
sovereign notions of racism and nationalism are facilitated precisely through 
such unproblematic alignment (where the body bears signs of “belonging”). 
Hesse has already argued how the linking of bodily heritage to space is 
already used as justification for racially motivated actions against Blacks and 
Asians (Hesse, 1995, p.88).  
 
In order to further the corporeality of space that Grosz advocates, this 
analysis heeds her idea of a “body-prosthesis” as a feminist wager that 
situates the body in a non-normative relationship with its environment, thus 
stressing the body’s porosity to renegotiations. The “body-prosthesis” refers 
to bodily tendencies to expand inventively, which keeps it open to different 
possibilities and meaning-making. She argues that this drive to transform 
“matter” into “things” is 
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in a sense, the first prosthesis, the first instrumental use of intelligence 
to meld the world into things, through a certain primitive technicity, to 
fit the needs of the living. The inorganic becomes the mirror for the 
possible action of the living, the armature and architecture necessary 
for the survival and evolution of the living. (Grosz, 2001, p.177) 
 
This opening up of the body embraces the strange to make the new, which is 
something that nationalist desire blindsides in their calling for stronger 
borders. Driven by the inheritance of lineage, bodily sovereignty – understood 
as a matter of contained and entitled selfhood – comes at the cost of 
vulnerability and the inflicting of pain on others. To think about the 
corporeality of space is both to underscore this study’s research site and to 
undo assumptions of the body as merely bounded and human. In positioning 
nationalism as a defensive refraction of loving feelings, this analysis asks how 
belonging and exclusion happens through the body and extends into space. 
At the same time, it asserts that a more entangled approach to understanding 
the corporeality of space is necessary to make out the body borders that 
delineate us from them, neighbour from stranger. This means re-construing 
space as an indispensable part of bodies to pose more self-reflexive questions 
of engagement and intrusion, transgression and limits within socially 
negotiated art practices: what kind of space does a project hope to make and 
what does it actually demand?  
 
Beyond such practical application, a corporeality of space is a way for artists 
to think about where they are within the larger art system and in relation to 
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those they work with or for. Representing the art world to the outside and the 
outside to the art world, artists working in the social realm must reflect on 
how they are (uncomfortably, frictively) embedded in both. With its borders 
and prostheses, a corporeality of space tests out inside and outside, 
belonging and alienation. Doing so not only helps to articulate the relational 
complexities that the artist is asked to navigate, but gives her the means to 
address the “banality” of art production’s background privilege: who is let in, 
kept out? How do those body borders come about? This inevitably leads one 
to question how art organisations are compartmentalised and self-preserving 
while wanting to be public-facing, which is plainly evidenced by the 
subordination of education work to curatorial work in many larger institutions. 
Socially negotiated practices thus function as the body border of an art 
organisation, allowing the latter to explore its artistic autonomy as the former 
performs the maintenance work of face-to-face relations. This division is not 
only infrastructural but gendered, and has been notably critiqued in the art of 
Mierle Laderman Ukeles. Her sanitation and kinship performances – cleaning 
floors and vitrines in a museum, shaking the hands of street cleaners, 
shoveling show, etc. – make plain the institutional reliance on maintenance 
work (see also: 3.3. for a discussion on socially negotiated art as reproductive 
“extradomestic” labour) and the continued denial of certain bodies into art 
spaces. To return to Jackson’s observation, Ukeles’ art “move[s] from a 
discrete notion of an art work to a process-based notion of the work it takes 
to make art” (Jackson, 2011, p.92). A corporeality of space as argued here 
understands bodily extension as a kind of work, a (co-)dependent making 
that takes place through bodies. It is a feminist contortion of the body’s 
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tendency to territorialise and demarcate a safe, uninfiltrated space for itself; 
in the end, a body needs other bodies within its surroundings – the prosthesis 
and the prop – to function.   
 
 
 
3.3. The role of care in labour and art 
 
The previous chapter section refract two scenes of socially oriented love to 
think through the affective, magnetising draw that are variously situated in 
the emotional, social, and political. They present contrasting possibilities, with 
bodies calling on love – or affects connected to the attachment of love – in 
very different ways. As noted at the start of 3.2., the scenes are built on 
reparative reading (Sedgwick, 2003), which signals a move away from the 
need to reconcile (Ahmed, 2004) by focusing on what the body knows 
(Massumi, 2011). In the process, revolution is made choreographic and 
nationalism is recalibrated as part of the body’s spatiality. The upshot of the 
refractions are chiefly the following: 1. the structuring of movement and 2. 
the corporeality of space, which engender living possibilities of disobedient 
organising and embodied limits / transgressions respectively. Both are critical 
aspects in understanding the potential that is embodied in the relational 
material of socially negotiated art.  
 
This third and final chapter section is arguably another scene of love, which 
comes in the form of care. However, given the breadth of the topic – 
particularly relevant with regards to discussions of affective labour in the 
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current neoliberal climate – it warrants a section of its own. This begins with 
some historical and contemporary thinking about care in the form of domestic 
work and labour, with specific reference to reproductive care and its feminist 
legacy. Extending Silvia Federici’s description of paid labour that women take 
on as a point of departure, the “extradomestic” is adopted in the latter part of 
this chapter section to critique the notion of care within socially negotiated 
art. There are three ways in which the extradomestic leads us to different 
roles and problems of care in socially negotiated art practices, specifically: 1. 
care and its relation with meniality; 2. the legacy of care in community art; 
and 3. the problematic conflation of care and service.  
 
 
3.3.1. Situating domesticity and affect in labour 
 
Having spent the first two sections of the chapter exploring the theoretical 
positioning of love (3.1.) and examining different, social scenes of affective 
culmination (3.2.), the final section (3.3.) turns to the most intimate, 
personally necessary processes of love that concerns care, specifically the 
kind related to bodily renewal. In Elizabeth Freeman’s examination of queer 
kinship practices, she talks about the importance of having 
 
a set of representational and practical strategies for accommodating all 
the possible ways one human being’s body can be vulnerable and 
hence dependent upon that of another, and for mobilizing all the 
possible resources one body has for taking care of another. (Freeman, 
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2007, p.298) 
 
She argues that queer kinship is less about lineage than performing a body-
to-body legacy that endures through “renewal” (ibid.). This is a restorative 
process that involves concern, play, and other forms of social life – i.e. caring 
work, which is something that has always played a critical role in feminist 
studies. This chapter section attends more closely to the chores, the 
nurturing, and the maintenance of life to refract the constitutive affects and 
efforts of reproductive labour, or “the foundations of the factory system” 
(Federici, 2012, p.7). Even as women in the industrialised world took on 
“extradomestic” positions within the waged workforce, it was only due to the 
fact that much of the reproductive labour was siphoned to immigrant women 
from the global south (ibid., p.108). Such a passing of the domestic buck has 
served to tighten the work and gender entanglement through its “global 
apartheid” (ibid.), making historical and current forms of racism a pressing 
issue for feminism. 
 
Yet, as Kathi Weeks notes, the discussion of reproductive labour is mostly 
concerned with its position relative to productive labour (2007); it portrays a 
the home world that either parallels or opposes the work world, both of which 
simplifies the household as “a site of social reproduction” by leaving 
unexamined any questions that delve into the actual composition of 
reproductive labour itself (Weeks, 2007, p.235). Asserting the place and 
significance of reproductive labour should also (perhaps more importantly) 
address the following: how do we come to differentiate “life” from “work”, 
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and the gendered implications that are attached to these categories? 
Regarding such a “paradoxical intensification and erosion of gender itself” in 
late capitalism, Weeks sees the need for “more complicated mappings of the 
gender divisions of material and immaterial labor” (ibid., p.239). Crucial to 
this shift is the recognition that “who one becomes at work and in life are 
mutually constitutive” (ibid., p.246). However, would this not obscure the 
explicit feminist declaration of care, of its complex significance as work / in 
support of work? Weeks substantiates: “[W]hat counts as work and life are 
not pre-given; they are, rather, matters of political determination and 
important for feminist struggles” (ibid., p.247). The emphasis, then, is not in 
distinguishing reproductive from productive labour but on how we make this 
distinction in the first place.  
 
Her argument that life and work be placed in frictive contact with one another 
is a reminder of the different yet inextricable kinds of becoming each of the 
two makes possible. It opens up the social field to more complex, or what 
Weeks aptly calls “more capacious” (ibid., p.246) interpretation. At the same 
time, it withdraws from the home as a focal point, putting aside a place that 
feminism has always held close. Not to mention the unfinished, situated 
knowledges located within it that can enrich – both literally and 
metaphorically – a critical project of affective life or work. As such, the 
“extradomestic” that appears in Federici’s writing feels readaptable here: it 
suggests a kind of embodied reflection that concerns the home while being 
removed from it. This would be an addendum to what Weeks calls “life within 
and against work” by deliberately foregrounding the home, giving it the space 
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to thrive (and writhe) in its own terms. Or perhaps, to critique “life” from the 
pivot of home, turning it into a problem-site. Far from “re-valuing the private 
world of the family and defending its traditional values” (Weeks, 2007, 
p.246), the extradomestic is an opening gambit for the feminist 
reconfiguration of life and work; the “home” can offer practical and 
metaphorical tools that befit a point in time when affective labour (Hardt, 
1999) presides: what does it mean to “feel at home”? Or to “be at home” with 
something? As a concept, the extradomestic zooms into the housekeeping of 
customer satisfaction and the type of care that is dispensed to keep you 
satisfied – akin to the minimal livability or flourishing of the impasse (see: 
3.1.2.) in which there is a curbing of disruptive affects in favour of a smooth, 
even surface. Much like affective labour, the “soul at work” (Berardi, 2009) is 
another framework that helps us grapple with a live and work entanglement 
in which our subjectivity is an employment pre-requisite. In his argument, the 
soul “animates” the body and is harnessed for “Semiocapitalism” in a new 
form of alienation (ibid., p.21). Focused as Berardi is on the evolution from 
disaffected labour (body) to desirous enterprise (soul), he correspondingly 
atrophies the former: “The immaterial factory asks instead to place our very 
souls at its disposal: intelligence, sensibility, creativity and language. The 
useless body lies flabbily at the borders of the game field: to take care of it 
and entertain it, we put it through the commercial circuits of fitness and sex” 
(ibid., p.192). In a climate of “high-tech” labour that has replaced 
“mechanical” labour of the industrialised world, immaterality has become a 
contemporary form of alienation. For Berardi, the post-Fordist present is 
“marked by the submission of the soul, in which animated, creative, linguistic, 
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emotional corporeality is subsumed and incorporated by the production of 
value” (ibid., p.109). After all, following Spinoza, “[w]hat the body can do, 
that is its soul” (ibid., p.21). In identifying the neoliberal context as one that 
is defined by the soul, the body is now anaemic and out of touch, put to 
pasture. Yet there is still the maintenance needed, even if minimal, for the 
body to keep going in order for a soul to work at all: outside of “commercial 
circuits of fitness and sex” that Berardi mentions, there are also the more 
basic acts of bodily renewal (see: 3.2.3.) like eating, resting, cleaning, etc. 
More than just sustenance for the soul, these should also play a critical part in 
examinations of affective labour. 
 
Beyond the co-constitutive subjectivities of life and work in service of 
neoliberalism, the extradomestic is in the position to stimulate a feminist self-
reflexivity with regards to the “home”, e.g. how do we delineate our activities 
of bodily renewal? Where do we restore ourselves and with whom? Do we 
delegate any of the activities to keep our “soul at work”? In its original 
context, the extradomestic was actually used by Federici to refer to the labour 
done by women outside of the home. The irony is that immigrant women, 
primarily of Mexican and Filipina descent, have been introduced as live-in 
domestic helpers to replace them. Of course, this gendered and racialised 
relegation of domestic work has many historical precedents, most of all during 
the slave trade. As Saidiya Hartman notes in her essay on black women’s 
labour, “[t]he domestic space, as much as the field, defined their experience 
of enslavement and the particular vulnerabilities of the captive body; and it 
continued to define the very narrow horizon and limited opportunities 
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available to black women in the first decades of the twentieth century” 
(Hartman, 2017, p.87). Currently, there is an enormous, booming industry 
that has developed around immigrant workers. This reiterates the queerly 
ambivalent significance of the extradomestic both as care and entrapment for 
women of colour especially, and also underscores the intimate means by 
which domesticity houses and exploits. It might, then, also queerly critique 
Irigaray’s oft-cited analysis of the woman’s body as commodity. She argues 
that “all the social regimes of ‘History’ are based upon the exploitation of one 
‘class’ of producers, namely, women. Whose reproductive use value 
(reproductive of children and of the labor force) and whose constitution as 
exchange value underwrite the symbolic order as such, without any 
compensation in kind going to them for that ‘work’” (Irigaray, 1985, p.173). 
While it is an incisive formulation, she does not account for the exchange and 
commodification of African women sold – with a monetary value – in 
transatlantic slavery. If the domestic trope was at one time instrumental to 
exposing the hidden labour of women, the extradomestic challenges it by 
globalising the home space – maybe even the world-at-home – and queering 
how we look at it. The extradomestic is a tangible place in which our 
repressed histories and the present-day precarious workers live as well as 
work, making it a wide-reaching feminist problematic. In fact, the daily lives 
of the precariat practically latches onto the home; no longer just a place for 
personal and bodily renewal, it is functionally an in-between location 
alternating between office, waiting room, and commodity (see: the temporary 
renting out of homes or rooms within homes via Airbnb). And yet, the home 
remains an aspiration for many of us; it is the embodiment of flexibility and 
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financial autonomy, both of which promote a sense of control through 
consumption. The extradomestic therefore reasserts the material prowess of 
the home over the contradictions of life and work. So how might the 
extradomestic help us grapple with our social relations? In what ways can it 
rethink the complexity of the personal and the political? In the following 
analysis, socially negotiated art is centred as the site and practice of caring 
labour, with the extradomestic as a framework for thinking through and 
reflecting upon what the art does, how it is positioned, what the expectations 
are, and what the (care) work of the artist entails. 
 
 
3.3.2. The extradomestic as a critical framework of care in 
socially negotiated art 
 
To start with, this section provides a brief clarification of what the 
extradomestic describes in this specific intersection of socially negotiated art 
and care, the latter of which is often intimately tied into the practices of the 
former. As mentioned earlier, it is an adaptation of Federici’s term that 
differentiates the kinds labour performed by women in and beyond the 
household. Rather than react to this by severing our attachment to the house 
and home, the intention is to retether it onto both work and life as an 
inconvenient kind of encroachment, a reminder of its influence. The 
extradomestic is a feminist articulation of life, exerting a palpable influence on 
the ways that care and bodily renewal necessarily make themselves known in 
our relationships. To do so, the extradomestic recalls the affective and 
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corporeal spatiality of the home, a place that both holds history and promises 
future challenges. Its capacity to retain intimate knowledges that tell stories 
about gender, racial enslavement, and precarious labour relies on the 
permeability and borderness of the “home”: its walls structure certain 
choreographic possibilities but its doors, windows, and gates invite permanent 
transition. The “extra” of extradomestic draws from this contradiction of 
holding and changing by reiterating the equally contradictory personal and 
general associations we have with the home. It is a place of work and 
renewal, of joy and drudgery, care and entrapment, growth and decline. All 
this takes place “behind closed doors” that can be flung open at any time, as 
if the containment itself engenders experiments in subjectivities.  
 
The aim here is to consider the extradomestic alongside the relations in 
socially negotiated art by situating – embodying – the latter as a form of 
caring labour. In line with the affective associations that the home brings, we 
observe how practitioners of socially negotiated art typically take on 
“residencies” in locations that are temporary “homes”. But when art settles 
into local familiarity as an oblique response, it tends to incite as much as it 
illuminates. In the wake of architectural collective Assemble winning the 
Turner Prize for “offer[ing] alternative models to how societies can work” 
(Tate Press Release, 2015), how might the extradomestic offer a situated 
critique of care in socially negotiated art? There are three particular 
dimensions that need to be looked at more closely: the position and 
responsibility of the artist within a chain of care; the legacy of care inherited 
from community art; and the reconfiguration of care as artistic service in a 
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project based on exchange. 
 
 
Meniality as a critique of caring labour 
 
To start with, some insight on care as it plays out in socially negotiated art is 
necessary. The following is a reflection made at the end of a project led by 
artist and game designer Hannah Nicklin. She wrote this with regards to 
Teviot Tales (2015-2016), a community-focused art project she co-produced. 
It was one of four nationwide projects overseen by the Social Housing Arts 
Network (SHAN), taking place over a span of 18 months between 2014-2016: 
 
Do I believe community storytelling projects are worth money from a 
housing association who is embroiled, with most other housing 
associations in London, in a housing crisis the result of which is what I 
do believe to be the social cleansing of the capital? My answer is 
different on different days. I think some days that taking that money 
and running workshops that attempt to give people means with which 
to believe in their own articulacy, to practice computer skills, or to 
practice their English, and in trying to tell their stories (with their 
express consent) including their stories about gentrification, the way 
their area is changing, what they find hard, how things are made hard 
for them… sometimes I think that’s an answer. I know that they 
enjoyed the workshops I did. Every person who attended one of my 
workshops on a scale of 1 (very poor) to 5 (excellent) rated them 5 or 
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4. I know they enjoyed it. But on a scale of harms, was my 
commission, and the tacit means by which it implicated me in the 
operations of a housing association, was that greater? Other days I 
think that the 60 or so people I worked with on an estate of 2,010 
were better off without me and the storygame I made with what they 
told me. (Nicklin, 2016)  
 
As part of her work, Nicklin has had to navigate the disparate desires of 
SHAN, Poplar HARCA, co-operating organisations, and collaborators, which is 
a difficult balancing act. The duty to keep everyone informed falls most of all 
on her; she is the frontline embodiment of the commissioners’ values, 
interests, and reputation, while at the same time a delegate for the estate’s 
residents. In other words, Nicklin’s core role is a relational one; more than 
anything, she is responsible for performing affective labour and expectation 
management as social “engagement”. 
 
A typical examination of such a project would focus on the process of the 
artwork itself, i.e. the “storygame” she mentions at the end of the reflections. 
It would take into consideration what the production of the art involved and 
declare the project more or less ethical and/or successful with regards to the 
people it represents, as well as to the demands of SHAN and Poplar HARCA. 
But this study deliberately pulls away from such assessments of socially 
“engaged” projects to see how they navigate embodied, living relations. This 
study has stressed in different ways the importance of nurturing a self-
reflexive sensibility, which makes up a crucial part of the art practice’s 
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relational material. For this reason, Nicklin’s text leads to a question of 
positionality, specifically with regards to a care chain. Similar to Federici, Arlie 
Russell Hochschild uses the term a “global care chain” (2001) to critique the 
international division of care work. The crux of this chain is that the product 
of care work – bodily renewal, affection, love – is just as unequally distributed 
internationally. In an updated preface to her 2012 edition of “The Managed 
Heart”, she links the division of caring labour to the “economic trends of our 
time”: “the profit seeking drive for efficiency, the downsizing of public 
services, the growing gap between rich and poor, and globalization” (ibid., 
p.xi-xii), which has driven care into new forms of extradomesticity. Hochschild 
illustrates this with the “emotion-deaf arrangements” of privatised hospitals in 
the United States, wherein “menial” tasks such as “positioning a post-surgical 
patient on a chair, feeding an elderly patient, or helping him to the bathroom 
[are] assigned to untrained, lower-paid workers” (ibid., p.xii). The “menial” 
qualifier used in this analysis deliberately emphasises its low status within the 
care chain while hearkening to its indispensability. In Hochschild’s example, 
this work is about the moving, feeding, and washing of another body. 
Moreover, meniality suggests a servility that comes with the job. This is, 
indeed, a critical point within the care chain that comes into direct contact 
with sickness, disability, and non-normative needs, all of which rely on 
healthy, well-adjusted, and normatively able bodies. Related to the bare work 
performed by and with bodies, menial labour can be queerly inflected into an 
extradomestic issue that looks into the “dirty work” of care with greater 
criticality. 
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We arrive at a few significant indicators of meniality: low-pay, low-prestige; 
bare, servile tasks that are physically demanding and/or require face-to-face 
contact. Doing so is not to put the labour of a social art practitioner in direct 
comparison with that of a care worker, nor is it to confirm the lowly 
assignation of “menial” labour within a care chain. Instead, this is motivated 
by the desire to ask self-reflexive questions of art’s role in projects like those 
led by Nicklin, e.g. is she being asked to take on the bare task of caring 
because there is no other form of support available? And where does that 
leave her amidst SHAN, Poplar Housing & Regeneration Community 
Association (or Poplar HARCA), individual collaborators, etc., particularly with 
regards to control and power structures that “give people means with which 
to believe” (Nicklin, 2016)? Meniality is a line of inquiry that situates the artist 
in a care chain of official and unofficial services or responsibilities. It allows us 
to address the artist’s task, both in terms of the project specifically as well as 
the reputation and legacies she must embody more generally. Using the 
extradomestic as a framework, it is possible to think about art practices as 
caring – or not (enough) – and concurrently, critique whether the project and 
art processes in fact constitute menial caring labour. 
 
 
The transition of cultural democracy to care in British community art  
 
If we are to look at how socially negotiated art is pegged with explicit forms 
of care and how that might coincide with forms of power and control, we 
must inevitably turn to community art and its eventual inextricability with 
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social care. Specifically in the UK, it is a strand of art that began with 
politically progressive intentions when, under the Labour government in the 
1960s, there was a massive increase in funds allocated to the Arts Council of 
Great Britain: a jump of 45% in 1966-7 and a further 26% in 1967-8 (Hope, 
2010, p.16). The unprecedented opportunity resulted in an influx of project 
proposals from independent artists and groups who did not fit into any of the 
predetermined categories at the Arts Council. Of note was the large number 
of projects that prioritised group work with “communities”. To meet with the 
demand, a new department had to be established: originally called the New 
Activities Committee, it was renamed the Community Arts Committee in 1974, 
two years after the Association of Community Artists (ACA) was formed in 
1972. The initial goal of the Association of Community Artists was to prove 
their work as art and thus their right to receive funding support from the Arts 
Council. They did so by situating their practice within “cultural democracy”, 
emphasising its capacity for individual and social empowerment. As a concept, 
cultural democracy emerged in direct response to the democratisation of 
culture of the 1970s promoted by Sir Roy Shaw, then-Secretary General of 
the Arts Council of Great Britain. He envisioned “a programme of education in 
the arts, along with intelligent popularisation, in order that the idea that 
ballet, theatre, painting and opera are pursuits solely for the middle classes 
might be overcome” (Kelly, 1984, p.99). In contrast, cultural democracy  
 
is an idea which revolves around the notion of plurality, and around 
equality of access to the means of cultural production and distribution. 
It assumes that cultural production happens within the context of 
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wider social discourses, and that where the cultural production arises 
out of, and feeds back into, these wider discourses, it will produce not 
only pleasure but knowledge. (ibid., my emphasis) 
 
The focus on the equality of cultural production was in tune with the 
experimental attitudes of the late 1960s when a community movement was 
spreading across cities in the UK (Matarasso, 2013). However, the explicit 
political focus of community art would be neutralised by the involvement of 
the Arts Council. For them, community art was another category that existed 
alongside visual and performing arts. As the main funder of community art, 
the Arts Council were in the position to re-frame the potentially disruptive 
timbre of “empowerment” within a safer rhetoric of “urban regeneration” that 
encouraged a homogenised, non-threatening inclusivity. With property-led 
gentrification plans on the horizon, this proved to be timely; in one move, the 
government stunted the growth of a countercultural movement while 
hijacking its egalitarian, democratic aspirations for its own use. Though there 
was concerted resistance to the depoliticisation of their work, the artists were 
divided in their dedication to a socialist concept of cultural democracy which 
led to the disintegration of the movement (Hope, 2010, p.25). Stripped of its 
politics by the late 1980s, community art became synonymous with anodyne 
group activities often used to reiterate unproblematic ideas of social harmony 
and togetherness (Matarasso, 2013). In the 1990s, community art would be 
reconstituted as “participatory arts”, which was an attempt at the time to 
leave politics behind and redirect the practitioners’ focus onto forms of 
creative engagement (ibid.). As critiqued by Bishop, this has enabled 
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community / participatory art to be instrumentalised for social amelioration 
(see: 1.1.4.), which, in her view, produces mediocre art under a pretence of 
care. There are, indeed, plenty of instances in which art has been used 
menially, to address the angry mess left by public cuts and commercial 
externalities; it is the menial caring labour within larger a care chain that 
continually validates neoliberal control. 
 
The argument of art’s complicity and/or its limitations within these contexts is 
well rehearsed. These projects have nonetheless flourished, with the 
continuing participation of artists. Knowing that they represent the interests 
of commissioners, there are nonetheless artists who enter a project with the 
vague hope that their practice will be socially constructive in some way – 
echoing Bishop’s “social amelioration”. The hope is itself understandable and 
not particularly remarkable, except for the fact that community / 
participatory2 artists are also enduring the extradomesticity of a neoliberal 
care chain that they are accused of being complicit with; facing the impasse 
of precarious work and absent state support herself, she is in a fight for 
limited resources. Of greater interest is therefore the practical, situated 
negotiations she must perform and with whom, what (emotional) affect they 
may have on her. For example, Nicklin’s reflection of Teviot Tales lays out the 
tension she felt as an artist commissioned by SHAN and Poplar HARCA on one 
side and as a gatherer of stories from estate residents on the other (Nicklin, 
2016). Her acknowledgement of “artwashing” on behalf of Poplar HARCA’s 
                                                             
2 By referring to the practitioners as community or participatory artists is not to single them out from 
other forms of socially negotiated art. I am continuing the use of the community / participatory 
qualifiers here to narrow down and specify the context within which the artists find themselves. 
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gentrification process is matched with the recognition that most public money 
is “tainted” and that “socially engaged art”3 used for the improvement of 
“productive citizens [is] coercive and to be reviled” (ibid.). On whether her 
project “made the world better”, she expresses ambivalence: “I don’t know if 
it was successful” (ibid.). She has told me that she has since left the publicly 
funded arts sector, mainly due to the lack of money “to truly allow a project 
to flex and be responsive” (Nicklin, 2017, pers. comm., 25 August). But 
looking at the amount of work she did as part of the project – “liaising” with 
everyone, “promoting” the project, “speaking” with people around the area, 
“installing” an exhibition, “among other stuff I might have forgotten” (ibid.) – 
it would be important to cite the immense physical and emotional resource 
the artist needs to keep both herself and the project afloat. Unless the critical 
reflection of the artwork’s relations is a constitutive part of the project, there 
is in practice little to keep it from being used solely as a service of menial 
care.  
 
 
From service to exchange and grasping structures of relations  
 
Between 2007-2012, Serpentine Galleries co-led a longitudinal project called 
Skills Exchange (2007-2012) alongside five different older people care home 
facilities that pointedly sought to “[move] from a paradigm of service to one 
of embedded exchange” (Rooke, 2012, p.4) in order to “alter roles and well-
rehearsed relations through processes of creative exchange” (ibid., p.11). 
                                                             
3 The usage of “socially engaged art” is cited from Nicklin and put in quotes also to contrast with the 
study’s focus on the material relations of socially negotiated art. 
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They commissioned five “studies” involving artists, researchers, carers, and 
care home residents: 
 
Dominant formulations of ‘care’ often place the elderly in the role of 
the ‘serviced’ or ‘cared for’, as those ‘without’, or ‘after’ the peak 
moments of their lives. […] It is important to note that this kind of 
work repositions older people (and their carers) as participants in a 
process, as co-producers, rather than recipients of art that is being 
delivered or provided. (ibid., p.41) 
 
The attempt to even out the distinction between what everyone does extends 
to the role of “co-researchers” (ibid., p.15), which involves proposing 
collaborative processes of questioning as well as making. Titled “Modalities of 
Exchange”, the 76-page project report covers three main areas: it offers an 
in-depth analysis of the art and social care context; provides practical surveys 
of the five studies; and looks at categories of exchanges within the different 
study contexts.  
 
The surveys give the best idea of the relational textures of the project. On 
artist Marcus Coates enacting a “vicarious wish” for Alex H, an older man 
being cared for at St John’s hospice, the director of clinical services asks, “It’s 
nice for Marcus to go off to the Amazon or whatever, but what does the 
patient get out of this?” (Rooke, 2012, p.36). The film documentation of the 
artwork offers glimpses into Coate’s trip, but it is interrupted by important 
conversations he and Alex had about the (im)possibility of living vicariously, 
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the purpose of the project, and about dying. In other words, “[t]he exposure 
of the negotiations of power between Marcus and Alex […] became the 
subject of research” (ibid.). This echoes the overriding methodology of Skills 
Exchanges, wherein the “research questions, outcomes and methods [are] 
shaped by those who are the basis for the study and who are most likely to 
be effected by its findings” (ibid., p.14). As cited, the project aims to 
reconfigure the assumptions that the larger society holds about (the needs of) 
older people. In doing so, it must also question the habitual approaches found 
in community / participatory art, firstly by unpacking (rather than delivering) 
care as a function, and secondly by embracing time, uncertainty, and critical 
reflection, all of which allows the project to unfold in some way. The focus, in 
the words of the report, is to “[make] use of aesthetic, relationship-building 
and communicative capacities to provoke political impacts that groups have 
defined as relevant and important” (ibid., p.23). Backed by Goldsmiths, 
University of London as well as the Serpentine Gallery, artists and 
collaborators are given the space to co-author new objectives rather than be 
tied down to a pre-discussed brief. In other words, Skills Exchanges breaks 
away from a service-model, socially ameliorative community art project by 
striving to become a properly infrastructured, socially negotiated art project.  
 
Indeed, art projects like these that focus specifically on articulating the 
complexities of relations are far and few between. The availability of funding 
and resources is a major factor as Nicklin notes from her experience, though 
perhaps what these “resources” are needs clarifying: there is the money that 
pays for the participation of bigger name artists; the institutional reputation 
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that enables exposure and discursive resonance in overlapping fields of art 
and care; the willingness, particularly from the (reputable) backing 
institutions, to shift, adapt, and seek extra funding where needed. It is a very 
privileged sub-strand of socially negotiated art, one in which a mutually 
beneficial set of affiliations calls for a supple and responsive relationality. 
What this abundance of resource has allowed is a yielding and self-reflexive 
structure of processes, conversations, and artmaking. Once again hearkening 
Shannon Jackson, it is crucial to account for the “interdependencies between 
art and its ‘props’” (see: 2.2.1.), which means engaging with the 
infrastructure that set the parameters for the art in a similarly critical, 
embodied way.  
 
How might this be done? In Social Art Map (2015), a small research project 
that investigates five different commissioning infrastructures of different 
socially negotiated art projects, artist Sophie Hope echoes a similar 
sentiment: “The conditions in which art is made are often hidden, so as to 
foreground the artwork itself. […] However, I feel an urge to keep poking my 
head behind the curtain, to check the scaffolding, to see who, what, why and 
how it is being propped up. This is how all things should be treated, in my 
view, not just publicly funded projects” (Druiff and Hope, 2015). A co-
produced project between Hope and Peckham Platform’s director Emily Druiff, 
the map is available as a free and accessible PDF on their website that 
anyone can use as a “starting point and resource for people interested in 
social art practice” (Peckham Platform, 2017). What it provides is an 
infrastructural overview in two ways: it provides brief and comparative details 
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about everyone’s interests and work development in three parallel timelines of 
the commissioner, the artist, and the collaborator; it illustrates the dynamics 
between the three parties with a simple diagram that suggests relational 
responsibilities. In four out of five diagrams, one finds the bulk of the 
relational responsibilities directly leading to and pointing away from the artist, 
which speaks to the complex negotiations she must perform. Another notable 
recurrence is the arrangement of commissioners on one side of the artist and 
collaborators on the other, clarifying that much of the negotiating concerns 
the mediation and translation between them. The affective tonalities refract 
from the generalised “care” to include “dedication, commitment, generosity, 
persistence, enthusiasm and patience” (ibid.), reminding us more precisely of 
the emotional commitment that often accompanies socially negotiated art 
practices.  
 
As a tool, the Social Art Map is an analysis that differs both from Nicklin’s 
candid first-person reflection done in a blog entry on Teviot Tales as well as 
the qualitative research on Skills Exchange. It offers a pared-down look at the 
infrastructural building blocks of the art practice as filtered through the three 
points of contact: commissioner, artist, and collaborator. Of course, there can 
be many more points of contact to which extra timelines can be added, thus 
elucidating how “props” in fact support the three parties involved. But the 
primary motivation for Druiff and Hope is to show the ways these key bodies 
converge at the point of the art project and to attend more closely to 
systemic accountability, i.e. how does a specific configuration of relations vis-
à-vis labour and responsibility make it (im)possible for a given art project to 
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“care”? Similarly, the affective, social modes of doing and practice around 
which this study is organised seek to destabilise notions of self and sovereign 
in bodies of systems as well, i.e. it takes to task the channelling of affect into 
sanitised service labour. 
 
Socially negotiated art encompasses a vast range of practices, from artist-run 
initiatives to art fair commissions; from participatory work aligned with Bishop 
or Léger to community art projects at the art world periphery. The latter’s 
instrumentalisation as social care or “artwashing” has indeed pushed many of 
its practices towards artistic and political irrelevance, but as a sub-strand of 
socially negotiated art, it is also the most widespread. In attempting to get a 
handle on socially negotiated art’s working relation to care, it has been 
necessary to look at community art in practice and as a legacy in order to: 1. 
highlight how current systems of labour delegation so easily strip away 
affective entanglements in favour of menial service, and 2. re-include 
community art both historically and in its current guise as part of the 
discussion on socially negotiated art. 
 
 
3.4. The breakdown of love to affective attachment 
 
Exploring love in various modes of bonding, intimacy, and bodily renewal is a 
way of facing up to the messy, complicit affective position in which socially 
negotiated art often finds itself. In this chapter, the key motivation has been 
to examine the breakdown of love into a more complex set of affective forces, 
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scenes of socially oriented loving, and care in its concern for bodily renewal. 
It opens with an attempt to re-read Freire’s understanding of a politically 
mobilising love that is at the same time linked to hope and the latter’s 
connection to a liberation theology. The political potential of love that he 
longs for is then refracted through Hardt’s explicit attempt to properly define 
a love in politics as well as Berlant’s cruel optimism, a morally ambivalent 
understanding of attachments that foregrounds impasses as sites of survival 
and sometimes flourishing (though they never quite deliver). The 
understanding reaped from this first part of the chapter, especially in reading 
beside with Berlant, is an important affective crux for any socially negotiated 
art practitioner who deals with incessant doubt and tedium that accompany 
their work: while impasses often fail on their promises, they nonetheless keep 
us going – which means rehabilitating disappointment to a certain extent and 
understanding it as entangled with love. 
 
With this, the first part of this chapter (3.1.) sets the tone for a more 
ambivalent sense of love. In the second part (3.2.), two scenes of socially 
negotiated love are prefaced by three conceptual markers on reparative 
reading (Sedgwick, 2003), irreconcilability (Ahmed, 2004), and embodied 
doing as knowing (Massumi, 2011). These three points of orientation have 
been indispensable in thinking about the relevance of revolutionary 
choreography and refracting nationalist spatiality, both of which help to 
articulate the feelings, experiences, and desires of socially negotiated art. In 
looking at protests and their embodied movements, choreography is used to 
argue that they disobediently restructure bodies and spaces; in these 
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moments, there is a haptic understanding, what dance scholar Jenn Joy calls 
a “mobile utopic thinking” (Joy, 2015, p.31), that makes present an 
alternative way of living with(in) the world.  
 
Finally, the third part of the chapter (3.3.) delves into the extradomestic to 
inspect caring – the “labour of love” – from the world-at-home. The 
extradomestic provides an alternative framework with which to assess the 
parameters of care within socially negotiated art. By illustrating the 
inextricability of the care chain from the instrumentalisation of these art 
practices, three points of interest are highlighted: meniality as the bare work 
of care; the depoliticisation of community art in the UK and its subsequent 
coupling with care work; and how the notion of (skills) exchange might 
question the role of care as service in socially negotiated art projects.  
 
As such, this is a chapter consisting of affective theories, scenes, and 
practices that involve love in some way. What this study’s focus on 
embodiment has made apparent is, above all, the inextricability of affect from 
doing, from thinking, from being and becoming. The intention is that some 
new textures and ideas are generated between the three rather different 
approaches. Only by immersing within these affective resonances can one 
speak of an embodied criticality or a relational material in socially negotiated 
art. This in-between space where so much gets lost, misunderstood, picked 
up and reinterpreted is ultimately what makes socially negotiated art a 
difficult endeavour, and its relations so prone to instrumentalisation. It is this 
study’s hope, then, that this chapter has stayed true to affective ambivalence, 
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to make space for loving disorientations that contain glimmers of utopic 
thinking.   
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4. Praxis as embodied self-reflexivity: situatedness in the 
practice and research of socially negotiated art  
 
 
This chapter explores practice as a mode of doing and feeling. For this part of 
the study, I revisit interviews with artists living and working in Hong Kong 
whose practices are differently oriented towards social negotiation. Engaging 
chiefly with the notion of action that underscores Freire’s notion of praxis 
(which I also explore in the first part of this chapter), the focus is on modes 
of doing that are narrated, observed, felt, and lived. The artists featured here 
do not self-define as practitioners of “socially engaged art”, preferring instead 
to discuss their work in their own terms. They variously describe their work as 
responding to politics and society (Woofer Ten; C&G Artpartment); re-
imagining how to live (Luke Ching Chin-Wai); and the city as laboratory 
(Sampson Wong Yu-Hin). They were differently navigating an environment 
that was brimming with political discontent. Having undertaken the fieldwork 
in the summer of 2014, the political tension was palpable; four weeks prior, 
800,000 Hong Kongers voted in an unofficial referendum for universal 
suffrage. Preparations were being made for a classroom strike across local 
universities that escalated into a revolutionary swell by the end of August 
2014, leading to the Umbrella Revolution. On paper, the three-month long 
occupation was about the right to elect the Chief Executive as well as 
lawmakers of the Legislative Council; in reality, it resonated profoundly as a 
collective desire to break away from the political oppression that it suffers as 
a “Special Administration Region” of China and as a former British colony.  
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The interviews read very differently in the aftermath of the largest and 
longest demonstration Hong Kong has ever seen. As such, the purpose of this 
chapter is to make the space for restoring the significance of the fieldwork in 
relation to the rest of the study’s emphasis on the relational material. The aim 
is to focus on the practices of the artists as well as the researcher in their 
own words. The fieldwork was originally conducted for a former research 
question that concerned the “transformative potentials of socially engaged 
art”. The interviews were meant to shed light on the kinds of impact, if at all, 
of art. What was soon clear upon arriving in Hong Kong, however, was the 
immense difficulties that would arise from the way the research question was 
framed and how, in turn, that would alter the course of the study; the 
“transformative potentials” are never guaranteed, only negotiated in the 
doing of the research and artistic practices. 
 
There are two main parts to the chapter: the shorter first part (4.1.) concerns 
Freire’s pedagogical philosophy of praxis, which is the third of three 
components that are borrowed from the radical educator (dialogue, love, and 
praxis). The longer second part of this chapter (4.2.) revisits the fieldwork 
process done in Hong Kong at the beginning of the research process. This 
part of the chapter shifts to a more personal and autoethnographic voice in 
order to fit in with the analysis pursued here, which is to directly address the 
embodied experiences and contexts that led to the orientation of the previous 
three chapters. The primary focus here is twofold: to see artistic praxis at 
work in greater subjective proximity; and to reconnect this study’s position on 
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socially negotiated art with the living / lived experiences that were its 
impetus. 
 
 
4.1. Freirean praxis as humanisation 
 
This chapter begins once again with an acknowledgement of Paulo Freire, 
whose writing enunciated the starting point of this study. In dialogue, love, 
and praxis, there are desires related to the social that overlap with socially 
negotiated art practices. The aim has been to examine these three points as 
embodiments of communication and feelings – i.e. as the material of this 
strand of art. To look at praxis – specifically here the practices that 
accompany it – in the final chapter is to make sense of the many refracted 
perspectives from the preceding chapters within a “saturated temporality” 
(see: 3.2.1. on the choreography of assembly) that attunes to the queer time 
of material experience.  
 
Freire’s praxis is influenced by Marx’s thinking that is explored below, but a 
full historical and philosophical analysis of Marxist praxis exceeds what can be 
achieved here4. Instead, the focus is on the way praxis is perceived and 
woven into Freire’s critical pedagogy and on situating acts within the context 
of embodied experience. Amongst the unpublished essays, poetry, and notes 
                                                             
4 Notable analyses of Marxist praxis include Kostas Axelos’s “Alienation, Praxis and Techne in the 
Thought of Karl Marx” (1976), which includes a problematisation of praxis in a fully reconciled world 
that no longer needs philosophy (chapter fourteen); Andrew Feenberg’s “The Philosophy of Praxis: 
Marx, Lukács, and the Frankfurt School” (2014), with a historical overview that shows how the concept 
has been developed by key Marxist theorists.   
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collected in the posthumous publication “Daring to Dream” (2007) is a short 
text – likely written before “Pedagogy of the Oppressed” (1970) – titled “On 
the Cognitional Act”. It outlines some of his thoughts on education and its 
capacity to structure the realms of what is possible, or the “what-to-do […] 
within the domain of culture and history” (Freire, 2007, p.16). In these 
scattered notes, he talks about “men and women” as “beings of 
transformation, of re-creation, and of reinvention” (ibid., p.17). This belief in 
having a hand in changing reality would be articulated in different ways as his 
work progresses, but most notable is the centrality of praxis as a dialectics of 
action and reflection (Freire, 1970).  
 
It is a concept that Freire extracts from Marx, to whom he is greatly indebted 
philosophically. Articulated in Marx’s earlier writings, especially in “Theses of 
Feuerbach”, is his desire for philosophy to find an “exit” (Ausgang) that then 
enjoins it actively to processes of “emancipation, liberation” (Balibar, 2007, 
p.17). In what Balibar sees as an “explosive” move that attempts to depart 
from the contradiction between traditional materialism (of sensuousness and 
life) and idealism (of abstraction and contemplation), Marx proposes in their 
stead “the category of practical activity” (ibid., p.25), wherein the subject 
exists through practice. While Balibar argues that this does not “genuinely 
remove him from the history of idealism” (ibid., p.27), it is more important for 
the purpose of understanding Marx’s influence on Freire to note how the 
subject’s venturing into practice reconfigures her role: she is capable of 
exerting her will to make change in the world. In “Theses”, Marx sees this as 
a revolutionary practice that exceeds philosophy (the point is not to 
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“interpret” but “change” the world). To do so requires that we understand 
“the ensemble of social relations”, of which the “human essence” is 
constituted (Marx cited in Balibar, 2007, p.16). Balibar sees in praxis a 
“transindividual ontology”, wherein it “never opposes the individual’s self-
realization to the interests of the community, and indeed does not even 
separate these, but always seeks to accomplish the one by accomplishing the 
other” (Balibar, 2007, p.32, original emphases). What is stressed here is 
Freire’s commitment to a similarly conceived praxis, specifically with regards 
to the dialogical, subject-to-subject relation that cuts through his pedagogy. 
As such, praxis through a Freirean lens is characterised by a pedagogical 
intersubjectivity that nonetheless relies on the very “ensemble of social 
relations” that is described in the sixth thesis of Feuerbach. This means that 
the conscientisation articulated between action and reflection is crucially a co-
produced one, not an individual creation.  
 
As the modus operandi of “men and women” (which Freire appears to use in 
contrast to what is considered a politically conscious “human”), Freire’s praxis 
seeks humanisation as a solution to the dehumanising effects of oppression: 
 
One of the gravest obstacles to the achievement of liberation is that 
oppressive reality absorbs those within it and thereby acts to submerge 
human beings consciousness. Functionally, oppression is 
domesticating. To no longer be prey to its force, one must emerge 
from it and turn upon it. This can be done only by means of praxis: 
reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it. (Freire, 
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1970, p.51) 
 
Binaries such as reflection and action show up consistently throughout his 
writing, along with human and animal, culture and nature, intellectualism and 
activism, amongst others. In doing so, he provides the oppositions for a 
dialectical thinking on the one hand while implicitly indicating, on the other, 
the potential evolution that proceeds from one end of the spectrum to the 
other. “Human beings are because they are in a situation. And they will be 
more the more they not only critically reflect upon their existence but critically 
act upon it” (Freire, 1970, p.109, original emphasis): specifically within the 
context of his argument, they will be more human. On numerous occasions in 
“Pedagogy of the Oppressed”, Freire puts forward the “correct method” (ibid., 
p.67, p.111) to liberation and conscientisation respectively. This means that 
any kind of consciousness that does not “unveil reality” – an expression he 
reiterates throughout – is (still) oppressed. Therefore, conscientisation comes 
with the impetus that asks you to pay it forward, to unveil to others the 
reality you are to remake together. To refuse that responsibility condemns the 
uninitiated to “magic consciousness” (Freire, 2012, p.83) and thus the wrong 
end of the spectrum wherein one “simply apprehends facts and attributes to 
them a superior power by which it is controlled and to which it must therefore 
submit. Magic consciousness is characterized by fatalism, which leads men to 
fold their arms, resigned to the impossibility of resisting the power of facts” 
(ibid.). 
 
In many of Freire’s texts and documented conversations, he appeals to a 
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praxis that is spurred by love (see: 3.1.1. on the role of love in his pedagogy) 
and applied towards what he sees as the most significant goal of all: 
humanisation. This idea is generated in proximity to the “dehumanising” 
conditions that he witnessed in northeast Brazil working as part of the 
country’s Social Service of Industry. The impressions left behind by these 
early experiences heightened the urgency for change, which in Freirean terms 
means aiming for consciousness and nurturing a belief of one’s vocation to be 
and become human. “Life becomes existence and life support becomes world 
when the conscience about the world, which also implies the conscience of 
the self, emerges and establishes a dialectical relationship with the world” 
(Freire, 1997, p.34). That is, we can begin to make meaning once our 
conscience “emerges” from a magic state and exercises its “ontological 
vocation” to act upon the world. Only then can we attain agency and leave 
behind our primitive, illiterate ways to properly engage with what is around 
us. He elaborates: 
 
I am not a being in the life support but a being in the world, with the 
world, and with others; I am a being who makes things, knows and 
ignores, speaks, fears and takes risks, dreams and loves, becomes 
angry and is enchanted. I am a being who rejects the condition of 
being a mere object. I am a being who does not bow before the 
indisputable power accumulated by technology because, in knowing 
that it is a human production, I do not accept that it is, in and of itself, 
bad. I am a being who rejects a view of technology as a demon's deed 
designed to throw out God's work. (Freire, 1997, p.35, my emphasis) 
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For Freire, humanisation takes place through a kind of praxis that strikes “[a] 
harmony between theory and practice”, thereby producing a “virtuous and 
hermeneutic circle of thought and action” (Irwin, 2012, p.73). Enabling this 
praxis is the dialogical method that, as critiqued throughout chapter two, does 
not actually unsettle certain predetermined power relations such as radical 
educator and learner, given the assumed epistemological superiority of the 
former with regards to consciousness-raising. This means that Freire’s 
dialectical “harmony” of praxis is restricted by a dialogical imagination that 
predetermines who knows what and, crucially, whether that knowledge is 
applied towards transformative worldmaking. As discussed in chapter two, 
there are difficulties of coming to the point of dialogue in the first place (see: 
2.1.1. on the challenges of difference) as well as the need to disrupt dialogue 
as an optimum speech mode via more frictive forms that communicate and 
evaluate through unofficial channels (see: 2.2.2. on in-group gossip or the 
play-aggression of teasing). And – extending to the evolutionary binary of 
“magic consciousness” and “conscientisation” that Freire provides – there is 
scope to reconfigure the thinking around “magic” and “consciousness”, nature 
and culture to position them beside one another: what if the transforming of 
reality is made more capacious by noting the intertwining of the two, where 
magic and consciousness, nature and culture co-exist in friction, to queerly 
and defiantly challenge categories of humanness, consciousness, and 
worldmaking? 
 
Some related questions have been posed within posthumanist frameworks, 
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whereby the centre of gravity shifts from morality and consciousness 
(intentional, humanistic) to the in-between (relational, systemic). Perhaps it is 
more precisely the “between” without any qualifiers, if we take seriously 
Barad’s intra-activity of phenomena and the inseparability of matter as a 
starting point (see: 1.1.4. on an examination of material discursivity). The 
emphasis on entanglements resituates the “human” within a broader systemic 
whole, one that takes concepts like animals and environments into critical 
consideration. Donna Haraway also calls this “a motley crowd of differentially 
situated species, including landscapes, animals, plants, microorganisms, 
people, and technologies” (Haraway, 2008, p.41), a description that highlights 
the becoming-worldly and becoming-responsive more than the becoming-
human with the agency to change reality. The arguments of such a 
deconstructive approach notwithstanding, it is important to contextualise 
Freire in his own theoretical development: his earliest literary activism, which 
set the tone for his pedagogy, was urgently concerned with the material 
effects of historical and colonial oppression, specifically those of indigenous 
rural dwellers in Brazil and later in Chile. Praxis, then, is an attempt to make 
life possible in the midst of “immobilising”, “dehumanising” conditions through 
“reflection and action” (Freire, 1970. p.51). 
 
So far, praxis has only still been considered from his pedagogical reflections. 
But as he repeatedly notes, actions are also central to his praxis, something 
that resonates closely with the embodied focus of this study. In “Education 
for Critical Consciousness” (2000), he describes what takes place within a 
“culture circle”, the format of choice in the rural literacy education work he 
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was involved with. A series of illustrations demonstrate ten different 
“situations” discussed during culture circles. Each of them is accompanied by 
generalised anecdotes that suggest what past learners have said and how 
they reacted. Ordered in accordance to their supposed literacy progress, the 
first situation starts with a simple question: “Who made the well? Why did he 
do it? How did he do it? When?” (Freire in Freire and Macedo, 2000, p.95) 
From these questions, participants are primed to make judgments of 
necessity, labour, and innovation, amongst other things that is oriented 
towards humanisation. As the situations progress, we find by the fourth one a 
discussion about categorisation. Presented with an image of a man aiming 
with a bow and arrow, one learner remarks: “Culture in this picture is the 
bow, it is the arrow, it is the feathers the Indian wears. […] The feathers are 
nature, while they are on the bird. After man kills the bird, takes the feathers, 
and transforms them with work, they are not nature any longer. They are 
culture” (Freire in Freire and Macedo, 2000, p.99). What this shows is a grasp 
of differentiation as framed by Freire’s progress from nature and culture. In 
the concluding tenth situation, the accompanying image is striking: it is 
recognisably a classroom with participants sitting in a group turning their 
attention to the front of the room where the educator stands pointing to a 
picture of a bouquet. This is a pedagogical end goal, “the democratization of 
culture” (ibid. p.106) which is not at all dissimilar to the “cultural democracy” 
of community art in the UK of the 1970s (see: 3.3.2. on its politically 
motivated beginnings). Praxis enables wor(l)d literacy, and literacy enables a 
cultural democracy in the agency of wor(l)dmaking. It allows – to use Freire’s 
terms – men and women to become humans, which means “reflect[ing] about 
 259 
their own capacity for reflection, about the world, about their position in the 
world, about their work, about their power to transform the world, about the 
encounter of consciousness – about literacy itself, which thereby ceases to be 
something external and becomes a part of them, comes as a creation from 
within them” (ibid., p.106).  
 
Fluent in a praxis that is defined by its ability to “transform the world”, 
learners are not only able question their conditions but challenge them in 
ways that are legible to the world. Living through what Freire calls “magic 
consciousness”, what is at stake is in fact an affective overhaul from fatalism 
to motivation for change. Ultimately, Freire attempts to harness a dialectical 
praxis, but in attending to its “harmony” (Irwin, 2012, p.73), he neglects to 
wade through its more troubling waters (e.g. how do social relations, 
branching out to include “magic”, non-human forms as well, produce the 
category of the human in the first place?). Instead, he is keen to focus on a 
progressive narrative that allows learners to take part in worldmaking through 
praxis. Defining it as “a creation from within [men and women]” (Freire in 
Freire and Macedo, 2000, p.106), praxis is a goal-oriented instrument. Against 
its grain are modes of feeling and doing that are devoid of any creative 
impulse, that in his assessment are “loveless, arrogant, hopeless, mistrustful, 
acritical” and therefore “anti-dialogical” (ibid., p.84), closing off praxis to 
emotionally wrought relations.  
 
Yet his later writings betray the desire to grapple more with the 
communicative discomfort he has experienced as part of his pedagogical 
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praxis. The following reflection comes from a visit to a Chilean “agrarian 
reform project”. He asks to sit in with the culture circle taking place, and after 
some initial pleasantries, the group was overcome by “a disconcerting silence” 
that was finally broken by one participant’s observation. “’You’re the one who 
should have been talking, sir. You know things, sir. We don’t’” (Freire, 2004, 
p.36).  
 
And it was at the price of having to hear statements like that that I 
learned that, for the progressive educator, there is no other route than 
to seize the educands’ “moment” and begin with their “here” and 
“now” – but as a stepping-stone to getting beyond, critically, their 
naïveté. It will do no harm to repeat that a respect for the peasants 
[…] does not mean that the educator must accommodate to their level 
of reading of the world. What would have been meaningless would 
have been for me to “fill” the silence of the group of peasants with my 
words, thus reinforcing the ideology that they had just enunciated. 
(ibid.) 
 
He “seizes the moment” by playing an impromptu game that pits him against 
the participants: you win a point if you know something that the other side 
does not know. Clearly, his motive is to get to an even score between the two 
(and they do: ten to ten). The game stems from his assessment of the 
participants, namely that their “naïveté” ought not to be “accommodated” but 
be seen as an opportunity to (co-)learn. He warns of “filling” the situation 
with (the educator’s) words, reiterating the dangers of an oppressive 
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education of rote memorisation. The message here, instead, is to help the 
learners figure out that they bear knowledge just as much as he does. 
Indeed, Freire intends for this process to reciprocate, allowing the educator to 
find out new things from the learners as well.  
 
While Freire does not “fill” the silence, he nonetheless saw the need to deal 
with the discomfort it caused him by contriving a way out. On the significance 
of silence in pedagogical practice, education scholar Huey-Li Li argues that it 
can be an act of refusal (Li, 2004). She notes how “silencing [of] silences [is] 
the primary liberatory pedagogical practice” linked with “the politics of due 
recognition”. The idea behind that is to “transform passive victims into active 
agents” (Li, 2004, p.78), whereby speech functions as the reclamation of 
oppressed voices. But at a different level, it also serves to appease allies 
belonging to more dominant groups – like Freire, in this instance – who are 
intent on silencing silence. Li reminds us that speech is not the same as being 
listened to, much like silence is not automatically the absence of speech. In 
other words, we need to become more literate in silence: 
 
A truly liberating pedagogy must be based on a conjoint effort to listen 
to the silences and to reclaim the silenced voices. This approach is not 
based on a sequential logic; i.e., listening to silences first and 
reclaiming the silenced voices later. Rather, it calls our attention to 
interconnections between speech and silence (ibid., p.79). 
 
It must be noted that Freire does condone listening through dialogue, but in 
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his conviction for consciousness-raising and worldmaking, he predefines a 
playing field wherein participation is already in accordance to a humanising 
praxis. As Li also cautions, “[s]ilenced people’s reclaiming of their voices often 
relies upon their mastery of the dominant groups’ languages” (ibid., p.80). In 
fact, the learners should reserve the prerogative to not participate in any 
game or playing field just to prove their consciousness, socially produced as 
they ostensibly are (but remain nonetheless directive and couched in Freire’s 
notion of pedagogical praxis). Instead, the learners should be able to speak, 
write, and exert themselves in terms that are much closer to their own.  
 
As such, the rest of this chapter turns to the exploration of other playing 
fields via a socially negotiated art, wherein artists indeed discuss their 
practices in terms “closer to their own”. Their disparate forms co-constitute 
what John Roberts calls an “art-political praxis”, which “facilitates a multitude 
of creative contributions in order to divest a given situation of its fixed 
identity, or to model a different world” (Roberts, 2015, p.218). The crux of 
this art-political praxis, therefore, lies in its ability to open up other 
possibilities – or other playing fields – that exceed the capacities of the 
present. Above all, he stresses its emergence from capitalist value structures, 
within which a suspensive avant-garde finds itself. The friction that is 
foregrounded in the relational material of socially negotiated art also concerns 
the emergent, though what has been attempted in this study is an articulation 
of how it is embodied and how it feels. This means accounting for the 
failures, disorientations, and impasses while, at the same time, attending to 
the acts that keep these practices possible despite such “crisis ordinariness” 
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(Berlant, 2011).  
 
 
4.2. Socially negotiated practices of space, occupation, and 
embodiment  
 
This part of the chapter looks back at the fieldwork that was done in Hong 
Kong in the summer of 2014. This is subdivided into three parts: the turn to 
autoethnography, the context, and the interview extracts and analyses. The 
first (4.2.1.) examines the need to take on an autoethnographic voice for a 
more situated analyses of the interviews; the second (4.2.2.) sets the scene 
by providing some political and affective context within which the interviews 
took place; and the third (4.2.3.) consists of the four interview extracts, each 
accompanied by an analysis that reflects upon the study’s orientation and 
concepts on the relational material so far.  
 
To make the fieldwork an integral part of a chapter on praxis is to recentre 
the work and encounters between bodies that comprise acts of change. This 
involves revisiting the situation, the impressions, and the interviews of the 
research trip to acknowledge the influence they exerted on the study’s shift to 
the relational. Given the theoretical orientation of the study – one that is 
aligned with embodied criticality – it is important to return to the lived and 
affective experiences that underlie the research. If praxis is an attempt to live 
out new possibilities, then this part of the chapter is an attempt to get closer 
to the point of action. The intention, then, is to describe and confront some of 
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the most difficult obstacles that provide the context for this study’s heavy 
emphasis on relations as a kind of material; and to incorporate a living, 
visceral dimension of space and temporality that is crucial to an embodied 
refraction of praxis.  
 
  
4.2.1. First-person turn and affective ruptures 
 
Before delving into the four interviews, it is necessary to note the turn to a 
more first-person narrative for the remainder of this chapter section. In 
examining the Freirean reflection-action of praxis, the focus in this chapter 
rests primarily on the “action”, which is taken here to be the lived experience 
of art and its research. The most telling of the process was the fieldwork done 
in Hong Kong, which resulted in a drastic perspectival shift for the study. The 
impetus was embedded in the material moments of being there, of the 
pressure that mounted from the yawning gap between what felt like 
professional and personal distinctions. The study came to be about this as the 
research sought ways to critically confront this discomfort by tying into 
embodiment and eventually affect. 
 
Therefore, a fuller engagement with this study can be enabled by including 
this gap as part of the research. Doing so would involve autoethnographic 
reflections, which Norman K. Denzin (2003) situates in the moment of 
performative contact with the world: “The critical, performance ethnographer 
is committed to producing and performing texts that are grounded in and 
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coconstructed [sic] in the politically and personally problematic worlds of 
everyday life” (Denzin, 2003, p.270). Thus referring to autoethnography as 
“performance [auto]ethnography”, (original parentheses) it is part of what he 
refers to as “insurgent cultural politics” (ibid., p.259). In fact, he builds this 
explicitly upon Freire’s thinking, stating “[a]s praxis, performance 
ethnography is a way of acting on the world in order to change it” (ibid., 
p.262). Indeed, much of Freire’s writing is autoethnographic, with a mixture 
of “talking books”, confessions, and pedagogical analysis. This particular 
dimension of his work coincides with the intention here to foreground the 
living, affective textures that have influenced the course of the research. 
Here, autoethnography helps “to produce aesthetic and evocative thick 
descriptions of personal and interpersonal experience” (Ellis, Adams and 
Bochner, 2011, p.277). As means of implicating themselves within “relational 
ethics”, Ellis et al also argue that autoethnographers tend to consider 
“’relational concerns’ a crucial dimension of inquiry” (ibid., p281); this leads to 
a need “to show their work” (ibid.).  
 
The “work”, then, involves tackling the gap that was made evident at the very 
start of the fieldwork. Citing Hartman, Cvetkovich reminds us that “the 
rupture is the story” (Hartman cited in Cvetkovich, 2012, p.127) – the feeling 
of a break is what should be examined. Additionally, Cvetkovich’s book on 
depression as a “public feeling” hearkens to “forms of testimony that can 
mediate between the personal and the social” (Cvetkovich, 2012, p.15), which 
in her case ends up being a combination of memoirs (part one) and a long-
form speculative essay (part two). This chapter section attempts neither to 
 266 
make material sense of history through autobiographical reflection (Freire) 
nor to broaden the affective scope of politics (Cvetkovich). The aim, rather, is 
to employ an autoethnographic approach as a means of intimacy, one that 
brings the broader argument for embodiment closer to the time, place, and 
sensations of the gap / the rupture; this was, in the end, the place from 
which the “work” emerged.  
 
With regards to the interviews themselves, they were meant to be as 
conversational as possible. This involves drafting questions to set the tone 
and scene without completely dictating either of them, something that was 
driven by a concern of power dynamics between interviewer and interviewee 
(Kvale, 2006). But interviews “tak[e] place for the purpose of just the one 
part – the interviewer” (ibid., p.483), which meant that it was crucial to keep 
track of the discussion, i.e. to understand the relationship between the artists’ 
practice and Hong Kong’s political urgencies. Relevant to Steinar Kvale’s 
notion of interviewer “dominance” (ibid.) is his psychologist colleague Svend 
Brinkmann’s idea that the interviewer is an equal participant in a “meaning-
making practice”, wherein she is neither a “receptive” listener or an 
“assertive” interrogator, but a co-producer in an “epistemic” interview process 
(Brinkmann in Denzin, 2015, p.230). While perspectives such as these have 
been helpful in understanding the accountability of the interviewer, the 
conversations still generated lives of their own. They typically took place in 
the middle or at the end of the artist’s work day, at their place of work or 
over a drink or meal somewhere informal. How much I was able to “co-
produce” was dependent on many factors beyond the interview’s specific 
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dynamics. They also have to begin with colder formalities, such as asking for 
permission to record and use the information from the conversation, as well 
as some initial introduction about the research and the intention of the 
interview, i.e. to find out what kind of role art played in Hong Kong’s politics. 
Yet as soon as the artists began to talk about their practice, there was an 
immediate need to step back and take it in. Many of the interviews turned 
into exercises of active listening, in which the researcher’s position – my 
theoretical approach, Eurocentrism, amongst other things – was being 
implicitly challenged. Rather than reassert interviewer dominance, it was 
necessary to reconfigure some basic assumptions about what art practices in 
the social realm look like. Regarding such adjustments of privileged 
positionalities, María Lugones and Elizabeth Spelman (1983) caution how 
power “asymmetries” weave through the making of different feminist 
theories. Their argument specifically concerns the need to differentiate 
perspectives of “white women” and those of “women of color” (p.580). The 
authors directly address the former in their article:  
 
You must also recognize and accept that you must learn the text. But 
the text is an extraordinarily complex one: viz. our many different 
cultures. You are asking us to make ourselves more vulnerable to you 
than we already are before we have any reason to trust that you will 
not take advantage of this vulnerability. So you need to learn to 
become unintrusive, unimportant, patient to the point of tears, while at 
the same time open to learning any possible lessons. (ibid.) 
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Clearly, the “text” is not completely a foreign one to me, but the time and 
distance away undeniably made it harder to “read” and to understand. As this 
became evident, so too did the need to step back from the desire to hunt 
down traces of artistic and political impact. For the research, it meant putting 
aside a project proposal to think about what of it was being dislocated and 
how. From this came the later emphasis on socially negotiated practices, 
which take bodies to be in constant contact with one another. This section, 
then, returns to four interviews that proved to be the most challenging yet 
pivotal to the development of this study. 
 
 
4.2.2. Contextualising the Hong Kong fieldwork 
 
The research trip for this study took place in the summer of 2014. I had 
chosen to go to Hong Kong because I was born and raised there; the city is 
therefore familiar and would require no extensive introduction. Additionally, it 
would be an opportunity to reacquaint myself with a cultural landscape that I 
know well from my youth but did not explore in much depth. The fieldwork 
period was bookended by the unofficial referendum for universal suffrage in 
June 2014 and the Umbrella Movement which began in late August 2014, the 
latter of which was a three-month long occupation of the city’s financial hub 
and arterial routes. At the time of the research trip, Hong Kong had already 
been “handed over” to China as a Special Administrative Region for seventeen 
years. This was based on the Sino-British declaration signed in 1984 between 
Margaret Thatcher and Deng Xiaoping, which officially confirmed Hong Kong’s 
 269 
return to China in 1997. Part of the agreement hinged upon what Deng called 
“one country two systems”, which vaguely promised a significant level of 
economic and political autonomy in Hong Kong for 50 years after the 
handover, until 2047. Yet universal suffrage is still not achieved across local 
governance: around 1,200 representatives with state and business interests 
are responsible for electing the Chief Executive, while only around a third of 
the Legislative Council is elected by popular vote. 
 
After the unofficial referendum of June 2014, the struggle for genuine 
universal suffrage quickly picked up momentum. The student movements that 
propelled it were becoming highly visible and their young leaders were often 
featured in the press. At the same time, uncannily similar organisations were 
also starting to show up in media coverage, including Silent Majority for Hong 
Kong and the Alliance for Peace and Democracy. The latter employed the 
same ground-level tactics as those working towards Occupy Central, which 
involved setting up street stalls, face-to-face conversations, and petition 
signing. Giving the appearance of citizen initiatives, the Alliance for Peace and 
Democracy had a message that deliberately confused the fight for universal 
suffrage with “peace”, as theirs was ultimately an anti-Occupy Central 
position in compliance with that of the government’s. They argued that 
universal suffrage would be “protected” by accepting the less-than-ideal 
electoral reform, whereby one of three or four Chief Executive candidates 
could be nominated by popular vote; the others would be vouched by the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in Beijing. Indeed, 
Alliance for Peace and Democracy were supported by pro-Beijing parties in 
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the government and were in effect trying to reterritorialise the same sites and 
affects of counterpublic making (see: 3.2.2. on corporeality of space).  
 
It was within this atmosphere that I started my research. The artists that I 
spoke with work through different modes of tactical in(ter)vention: using 
contemporary art as urban studies (Sampson Wong Yu-Hin); illegitimately 
occupying a storefront-turned-community art space (Wooferten); voicing of 
citizenship as artistic practice (Luke Ching Chin-Wai); and organising a range 
of artistic events and programmes that respond instantaneously to political 
issues (C&G Artpartment). The following excerpts and accompanying analyses 
are part of a much larger set of interviews. These have been selected to 
critique the turning point for the study, to reconsider the experience with the 
theoretical tools developed in its wake. As such, the four interviews here are 
most indicative of this study’s later focus on the relational material.  
 
The format from 4.2.3. to 4.2.6. is the same: first, some contextual 
descriptions for the interviews are given to situate the circumstances as part 
of the conversations. This is followed by an interview excerpt presented in the 
voice of the artist(s) that goes to the heart of their practice, which at the 
same time reflects the way they see it amidst political upheaval5. Finally, the 
excerpt is fleshed out with an analysis that encompasses critical as well as 
anecdotal dimensions. Together, they draw out the questions, problems, and 
complications that were engendered about a (lack of) situatedness. Indeed, 
                                                             
5 I have personally tackled the translation of the interviews from their original Cantonese into English; 
where there is no direct translation, I offer a transliteration in English pronunciation and a definition of 
the word or term. 
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the tools amassed over the last three chapters and the prepositional shift to 
“beside” are respectively theoretical reflections and a methodological shift 
that have resulted directly from the trip. With the means now to articulate the 
affective tensions, it is important to reconnect with the artist’s perspectives 
that unsettled the research trajectory in the first place. The aims, then, are 
twofold: to retrace four different dimensions of socially negotiated art that is 
specific to Hong Kong’s context; and to address the embodied and affective 
dislocations that were engendered during this part of the research process. As 
such, this chapter attempts to depict and examine research in greater 
proximity to the multidimensional way it is lived out, which therefore requires 
direct reference of the researcher – myself – within it. Retreating from the 
constructed objectivity used in the first three chapters, this move to the first 
person not only emphasises the researcher’s inextricability with her object of 
study, but also helps to vividly demonstrate how many different and often 
contradictory aspects of the relational material must be simultaneously 
maintained as part of any socially negotiated practice. 
 
 
4.2.3. Vangi Fong Wan-Chi and Roland Ip Ho-Lun 
 
Fong and Ip are members of Wooferten, a community-oriented art space co-
run by a small group of artists and neighbourhood residents. Started by ten 
artists in 2009, all but one of the founding artists, Lee Chun-Fung, have left. 
Wooferten was situated in the middle of Yau Ma Tei, a working class 
neighbourhood in the Kowloon peninsula of Hong Kong. When I interviewed 
 272 
Fong and Ip, they were in the middle of negotiating with the Hong Kong Arts 
Development Council (HKADC), who had stopped funding them a year before. 
When I spoke with them, they were occupying the space and continuing to 
hold regular as well as pop-up events. The following are two interview 
excerpts in which: 1. Fong talks about the potential loss of Wooferten and 2. 
Ip reflects upon the significance of community and the limits of what they do. 
 
(Fong’s words) 
I believe in a physical space. I think it empowers people’s actions and gives 
them motivation. Without [the space], it would be difficult to get involved 
with printed media or baai hui [set up a street market]. And there’d be no 
place to meet. It’s because of Wooferten that I’ve come to know Yau Ma Tei. 
[…] With regards to Hong Kong Arts Development Council (HKADC), we 
wanted to stress the importance of a physical space. We’ve also done some 
research on their involvement in Shanghai Street and found out that there 
were six more units on the block. At one point, artists and organisations were 
invited to come here but HKADC soon realised that there were structural 
issues with some of the spaces upstairs. The units have since been returned 
to the government one by one. There is now Wooferten and two remaining 
units upstairs, one of which is used as a workshop and the other for storage. 
When that initiative ended in 2012, HKADC threatened to return even these 
two to the government. But if the arts are already resource strapped, why 
would you give anything up so willingly and easily? […] Obviously having a 
space in Hong Kong for any artist or arts organisation is crucial. The fact that 
[HKADC] do not see it as an important resource […] is ridiculous. As a funding 
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body, they have to reflect on how their resources have not increased over the 
last decade. They can’t even safeguard what little they have got. What they 
do with their assets is ultimately their choice, but why are they spending 
HK$5 million on the Venice Biennial instead of supporting small to mid-size art 
organisations? That sort of money can mean the survival of tens of 
organisations like ours over a period of a year. There are currently so few 
independent art spaces that we have to ask what is going on, and why young 
artists do not feel they can [take the risk to] start anything. Now that 
Wooferten has lost its funding, there is no way we can afford supporting a 
space of our own. Does that mean we must now vanish? This is clearly 
suggested by their actions.  
 
(Ip’s words) 
My own definition [for community] is pretty narrow. For a project like 
Wooferten, it would be Yau Ma Tei residents. [Co-organising artist] Fung 
would say that anyone coming to the space would be a kai fong [an 
acquaintance, usually from the neighbourhood]. For me, it’s more district 
oriented. I sometimes feel embarrassed, since I am not from the area. You 
just aren’t as well positioned to know as much when you don’t live here. If 
you were somehow involved with the life of the neighbourhood, you would 
have memories embedded here. Otherwise, you are divorced from the 
context, without connection. Having said that, our projects try to make 
connections, like when we baai hui [set up a street market]. The connection 
lies in choosing the street where there are already small pai dong [street 
stalls]. And why pai dong? Because they are extremely suppressed. It is as if 
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there should be substantial networks when you speak of communities. For 
instance, district councillors: they have roots; they have strategies, resources, 
and people that they can mobilise. Vangi and Fung might feel differently. 
Personally, I want [our work] to be able to compare with district councillors. 
They have some dominance and are capable of attracting attention, 
establishing a presence. They can reach out to a community at a level that we 
can’t achieve. We can give little things away, like fai chun [greetings written 
for Chinese New Year] moon cakes, etc. But we just don’t have the power to 
multitask; there are points we touch but can’t sustain. A lot of the kai fong 
might think we are just “playing around” or making little gestures. 
Sometimes, you might be better off sticking with art and not getting too 
involved in thinking about matters of community. 
 
--- 
 
Wooferten was one of the first artist groups I interviewed for this study. 
Operating from a ground-floor storefront, they were one of the more visible, 
accessible artist projects that were attempting to make sense of their role as 
artists in Yau Ma Tei, a working-class neighbourhood on the brink of 
gentrification. The first time I visited was in 2013, when the initiative had 
already been there in different incarnations since 2009. Most of the artists 
involved had already moved on, leaving Lee Chun-Fung as the only original 
member along with a few more recent recruits, including Fong and Ip whom I 
interviewed. The space itself was casual and welcoming; part drop-off point, 
part living room. When I visited, the bright green walls were plastered with 
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newspaper clippings and poems written by a kai fong. Placards that sought 
political recognition and vindication for “June 4th” — the Tiananmen Square 
massacre of 1989 — were taped onto the shop windows, facing the public 
beyond. But for the interview, I met Fong and Ip at a tiny eatery called “So 
Boring”, which consisted of a small kitchen with outdoor seating right by an 
underpass. Fong was working there that night; she co-runs the enterprise 
with a few of her friends, who charge their customers on a pay-as-you-like 
basis. While I had hoped to discuss some of their recent projects, it was clear 
that their minds were on the survival of Wooferten. Our conversation centred 
around their negotiations with HKADC and their future work. As shown in the 
excerpts, Fong’s concerns were pragmatic — mainly to do with the initiative’s 
continuation and the infrastructures that enable/inhibit them — whereas Ip’s 
tended to be critical of their political efficacy as well as their ability to bring a 
community together. These are the two thoughts that I would like to hold 
onto for further examination. 
 
Firstly, Fong’s critique leans into the inseparability of their work at Wooferten 
from the relations that they have, in particular those with HKADC and the kai 
fong. When the group eventually dissolved in November 2015, they had been 
occupying the Yau Ma Tei storefront for two years without any official 
funding. In a statement released at the end of their tenure, the group noted 
how the networks and connections made through the space gradually 
dispersed elsewhere (Wooferten, 2015), in effect making their two-year 
standoff with the HKADC a transitional period for themselves and the core kai 
fong. The artists occupied because they wanted accountability; while the 
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project was over in the eyes of HKADC, the artists had nurtured relations as 
part of the art, which disrupt / extend beyond the normal art project timeline. 
Realistically, the occupation probably did little to the community-based art 
policies of HKADC, given that they finally threatened legal action against the 
artists to force them out of the space. So what did the occupation achieve? 
There are two main results that I would like to explore through the 
conceptual tools of this study: firstly, the disoriented relations between 
funder, artists, and kaifong; and secondly, the extradomestic work that 
opened up the (private) problems of administration.  
 
The occupation can be seen as a period of suspended expectations, which 
provided the critical space to ask different questions of funder, artists, and kai 
fong. While the impetus for staying put was, at first, to resist the detached 
mechanics of art administration, the actual results were two years of difficult 
yet productive dis-/re-orientations (see: 1.1.6.) that forged new relations 
between artists and kai fong. In the interview, Ip notes how artists “made 
[them]selves more kai fong” while the kai fong were becoming more like 
artists. These are the productive wrong turns that come out of non-
compliance, that cast a queerer notion on the notion of roles and 
responsibilities. At the same time, the occupation also brought out art 
administration from behind closed doors. Preferring the banal anonymity of 
background space (see: 3.2.2.), such government-run infrastructure tend to 
support specific sectors or interests, the latter of whom end up as living 
representations of the former. Yet the occupation period provided the 
opportunity, as Fong noted, to see into the administration’s poor asset 
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management and to challenge their dismissal of emerging art initiatives. Thus 
positioned, the occupation embodies a spatial resolve that demands face-to-
face renegotiation on the one hand and performs the community’s 
continuation on the other. 
 
Recalling the extradomesticity in chapter three (see: 3.3.1. and 3.3.2.) that 
seeks to interrogate care with regards to labour, the occupation was 
additionally a form of maintenance work, of housekeeping. From sitting in on 
the regular meetings between artists and kai fong, it struck me how 
infrequently the artists spoke, and if so, it was only to verify what a kai fong 
had said. Part of this was likely due to my intrusive presence; another is that 
the artists were performing the extradomestic work of active listening that 
would eventually see the kai fong take over the space completely (Ip 
recounted a draft three-year plan for Wooferten that would gradually cede 
accountability over to the kai fong). Also crucial to the occupation was calling 
for greater visibility and responsibility of the infrastructure, i.e. the funding 
body. The artists’ refusal to leave, while functioning as a physical reclamation 
of space, was also meant to invite and incite HKADC’s physical presence so 
that the latter might acknowledge, however awkwardly, the living aspects of a 
bodily and materially negotiated practice. Wooferten claim in their final group 
statement that one of their aims was pung jong sat yim — literally 
“experiments of encounter / collision”. Until the end, frictive contact was 
something the artists vigilantly maintained, not in order to satisfy a 
commissioning body’s public-facing, participatory narrative, but to take 
seriously the embodied uncertainties of a socially negotiated art context.  
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Especially difficult with this particular interview was the probable end of their 
project, which the artists were still trying to fight at the time. My former 
research parameters focused on the forward thrust of transformation, which 
gave little leeway to reflect on the pedagogies enabled through failed 
practices (see: 1.1.5.). Over time, I felt a growing need to think through the 
significance of failure as well as tackle the discomfort between the artists and 
me, a sentiment that shows up everywhere in socially negotiated practices. 
This early interview already demonstrated the need for a theoretical 
framework that would stretch beyond the impact-driven thinking of 
“transformation” to encompass these embodied relations between artists and 
kai fong, between artists and funders, and between the art and its reflection.   
 
 
4.2.4. Sampson Wong Yu-Hin 
 
Wong is an artist and geographer who co-founded the Hong Kong Urban 
Laboratory and EmptySCape. I interviewed him a few months after he and his 
colleagues of EmptySCape completed an intensive, year-long project in Ping 
Che Village, which is one of the last remaining rural areas in New Territories, 
Hong Kong. In collaboration with villagers, artists, and researchers, their 
efforts culminated into a two-week festival that brought a lot of footfall as 
well as some “much-wanted” media attention, to quote Wong. Within a 
matter of weeks after the interview, the Umbrella Movement began, for which 
he eventually co-
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afterlife of the cultural and material artefacts made during the three-month 
long protest. 
 
(Wong’s words)  
I’m dissatisfied with the discourse on ruins in Hong Kong as there is a 
predatory approach on finding beautiful ruins, taking pictures, and not telling 
you where they are from. Ruins have to do with political economy; why 
certain ruins appear allow us to understand the development of cities through 
their traces. 
 
I visited the northeast [of Hong Kong] and went to a village school that felt 
like a lost oasis. It had been abandoned for eight years and villagers were still 
taking people there. After we got the Hong Kong Arts Development Council 
(HKADC) funding, I wanted to do something with a positive resonance. In 
September 2012, we all went for the first time as a team. By January 2013, 
we got to know the villagers better and discussed the event with them. They 
were doing guided tours on the weekends and were happy when people 
came. So I said that we would like to do something similar, like a “big guided 
tour” that would bring lots of visitors to the village. That was what started the 
conversation. We collected oral histories about the school and put together a 
history of the place. The situation is complicated, because even though Ping 
Che is bound for urban regeneration, there are no solid plans yet. What they 
are doing now is getting people to visit, and to spread the word about the 
need to protect this place. Art becomes a political means of convincing people 
to travel the distance and pay a visit. As we started to get more involved with 
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the school, it felt less and less of a ruin. Artists coming to the village were 
fascinated with the stories and the villagers talked extensively with them. 
Within a few months’ time, the villagers could understand what the four-day 
event6 was about. 
 
[After the festival], there was some internal tension about whether to stay or 
leave. Opinion was divided within our group of eight; I wanted to stay in Ping 
Che [to think about] alternative development, the possibility of art in 
regeneration. […] To use art as part of development, to conceive of art as 
providing other possibilities, with other values: would that be enough to resist 
urban encroachment? That’s pretty ambitious. In this sort of environment, it 
is hard to imagine saying to the government, “hey, don’t touch this area, we 
have a vibrant artistic community!” Yet there is an urge to attempt that. 
 
--- 
 
In my interview with Wong, he gave examples about the clash between 
imagining “a poetic gesture” like the Ping Che Village festival versus its 
mundane, organisational reality. He recounted one of the first art projects he 
co-created – designed to be part kidnap, part Chinese whispers – which 
turned out to be a logistical nightmare. He also talked about his experience 
with Echigo-Tsumari, an international art festival set in a rural area of Japan. 
Wong volunteered there as a student and saw how it worked in surreptitious 
ways to revitalize the area and generate awareness for it. Though he was 
                                                             
6 The Ping Che Village Festival of 2013 took place over four days of events spread across two weekend 
blocks. 
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angered by the volunteers’ poor living conditions and lack of wage, he could 
also see “why so many young Japanese people went there for free”: it was 
the tangible relations and solidarity with the local villagers that seemed to 
resonate the most. Wong had hoped to do something in Ping Che that would, 
as he says in the excerpt, “provide other values” to the area the way the 
festival did for Echigo-Tsumari. This willingness to instrumentalise cultural 
capital in order to bring political issues to bear nonetheless results in a 
product that could very well be indistinguishable from urban regeneration 
projects.  
 
I thought about his deliberate avoidance of a more confrontational 
antagonism and what another artist Wen Yau (whom I also interviewed but is 
not featured here) said about the need for multiple agonistic approaches, 
even explicitly referencing Mouffe’s artistic agonism (see: 2.1.3. on dissensus 
and art). It alludes to a kind of opportunism that is an important lesson when 
outright refusal is not an option. This means renegotiating the terms of action 
to look for other openings, other resources to tap into. Such a pragmatic 
mode of operation is absolutely necessary for Hong Kong at this moment, 
itself an obvious fact for anyone who recognises the city’s political stakes. The 
fact that this was more of a realisation only heightened my already jarring 
sense of displacement, a feeling that would come to greater focus over the 
course of the research.  
 
These two questions, then, form part of a self-reflexive practice that I want to 
perform in this chapter. Both point towards the need for a physically 
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negotiated presence – and tellingly, it is the salience of body, affect, and 
spatiality that have become this study’s backbone. The brutal privatisation, 
property speculation, and dire lack of space have become urgent political 
issues that were being played out in some of the more socially oriented art 
practices in the city. Many of the interviewed artists were responding to the 
cycle of demolition and rebuilding that erase places along with the cultures 
and histories they enabled. In fact, a series of publications on the overlapping 
areas of art, activism, and the struggle for space have appeared in the few 
years since – for instance: “Creative Space: Art and Spatial Resistance in East 
Asia” (Hui and DOXA collective, 2014); “Wooferten’s Art / Activist in 
Residence” (Lee, 2014); “Community Turn: Social Practice in Hong Kong Art” 
(Phoebe Wong, 2016). It has been the focus of academic and activist 
reflection, with the richest pieces of research coming from those who are 
closest to the experience. More broadly, the lack of space also extends to the 
cultural landscape, which, in the scarcity of institutional exhibitions or 
collections, relies heavily on auction houses and art fairs for the city’s cultural 
offer (Watts, 2013). The social and intellectual space needed for the 
production and discussion of art, much like Hong Kong’s physical space, is 
similarly dominated by commercial interest. 
 
This demonstrates a concern that grew steadily during my time in Hong Kong, 
which relates to a professional responsibility of ceding narrative space to 
artists and other cultural workers whose interests are directly entangled with 
Hong Kong’s political and cultural dynamics. The examination of the 
corporeality of space (see: 3.2.2.) and how our bodies move through it – and, 
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more importantly, how they sometimes cannot move through it – enact 
borders that allow as well as limit intimacy. This ties in with the many bodily 
dissonances that I experienced while in Hong Kong: I was a conspicuous but 
not-quite foreigner; a nomad who comes and goes; a returnee using “work” 
to reconnect with a lost cultural identity. In acknowledging my own cultural 
and racial differences after years spent in white European territoriality (Hesse, 
1997), I unwittingly cemented a stable yet equally illusory Hong Kong identity 
that was shattered the moment I arrived. At the most sensory level, this 
meant that crowds felt too close, the pollution too severe, and the pace of life 
at street level too inescapable, something that is echoed in Grosz’s description 
of how cities and organic bodies “produce, regulate, and structure” (Grosz, 
2001, p.49) one another: when a body like mine is out of sync and place, it 
can no longer glide absent-mindedly along with the background, but rubs up 
against the incongruent textures of the city (see: 3.2.2. on the banality of 
flagging). These are moments in which friction is most clearly felt. 
 
At the same time, there was the powerfully emotional coalescence of a Hong 
Kong counterpublic that felt and appeared to be the complete inverse to my 
own displacement. In the Ping Che Festival that Wong co-organised, there 
was an earnest desire to witness and feel the physicality of community, which 
demonstrated how certain social affects were being negotiated towards a 
political focus (see: 1.1.2.). This was foregrounded in much of the 
conversation with him as well; the prerequisite for participation was not 
merely in the form of counterpublic longing felt from afar, but from a “here” 
that demanded direct action. Indeed, there was a more visible collective 
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praxis of speaking out, self-organising, and protest ambitions in the name of 
love and rage (see: 3.1.1. on Freirean consciousness raising on an emotional 
level), the convergence of which threatened to explode into a revolutionary 
event. It also posed a sobering question of commitment and presence that I 
could not adequately answer. Undeniably, the subjects of Hong Kong, 
transformation, and art would remain entangled with the study and with the 
issue of embodied displacement that would refocus the research entirely.  
 
 
4.2.5. Luke Ching Chin-Wai 
 
Ching is an artist and an occasional security guard. For the interview, we met 
for a meal at an underground station hall in Tai Po on his way back from 
work. He was one of the key founding members of Wooferten in 2009, 
though he left the group after the first two years. The conversation centred 
around a few topics, including the rift between art and the art market, the 
political importance of imagination, and the role of art as the “indicator” of 
the unnoticed. 
 
(Ching’s words) 
There are increasingly more people working in the arts whose identities are 
blurring: for instance, am I an artist or a social movement participant? What 
and how we produce is also telling; if it is a bit gwaai [strange; 
unconventional], then that might be read as art. We have really developed in 
terms of citizenship and voicing what we think. There is currently a group of 
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people in Hong Kong who happen to have an art practice or some art 
training. They will quite naturally voice themselves through a kind of 
imaginative lens, as citizens. If imagination turns into art, then this becomes a 
new genre. As far as I’m concerned, we are all voicing. Whether we do it in a 
gwaai or creative way, we are doing so as citizens. There is no substantial 
difference between [artists and citizens] except in expression. […] 
 
Recently, I was in Shenzhen’s cultural district. And as expected, it was 
basically populated by cultural institutions owned by rich people. They have 
an “Overseas Chinese Town” and the security personnel all wore camouflage 
army gear. It was funny and ridiculous, having these fake army people 
around. I decided also to dress up in camouflage gear for an art opening 
some time later. When the security saw me, they started to laugh. Everyone 
knew that I was a fake security person just like the guard was a fake army 
person. I indicate that fact [by] mocking his uniform in my little action. […] 
 
Over time, I worry whether this sort of [art] practice can become habitual, as 
it is already perfectly packaged in a set of flâneur aesthetics. What I think is 
important to ask is where we position the process of imagination within daily 
life. I find it hard to say whether this is art or not, but the point is to have a 
collision between imaginations. The action is a catalyst and I think that’s 
where we are heading. Every profession and every sector has its own 
framework, but art doesn’t. Or at least it challenges frameworks. For me, this 
is why it is radical. I like finding gaps in real situations. And I like change; you 
go to museums and other venues and the exhibitions are always the same. 
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[…] When things stay the same, imagination stops. People need to keep 
imagining. A docent leading you on a tour can show you unexpected things, 
for instance. Like, how much it cost for that tree outside [the Hong Kong Art 
Museum] to be imported from Canada; it’s the most expensive tree in Hong 
Kong! To be shown things like that and to indicate signs of other possibilities, 
that’s what I would like to see.  
 
--- 
 
To start with, Ching’s practice is not conventionally “socially engaged”, i.e. he 
does not seek to artistically collaborate with others. In fact, there was a slight 
shift in its meaning from one linguistic and cultural context to another. 
Knowing that I was in Hong Kong to do research on “socially engaged” 
practices, a few artist acquaintances in Hong Kong suggested Ching as a 
potential interviewee. Of the thirteen interviews conducted, the notion of 
“socially engaged” art was almost always taken to mean “politically engaged”, 
which sees art as a means of responding to socio-political concerns. The 
impossibility of aligning the history and practices of art in Hong Kong with 
those in the western hemisphere was one of the most important reminders of 
this research trip, stressing the localised iterations of art practices; where 
“socially engaged” art expands and contracts around a history of the avant-
garde, community art, and participation as explored in the Euro-American 
contexts, it takes on a more explicitly political dimension in the oppressively 
capitalist environment like that of Hong Kong’s. While I understood that 
Ching’s practice consisted primarily of performative pieces done in public 
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spaces, I wanted to meet him in order to have a better understanding of the 
ways in which his work is read as “socially engaged” specific to Hong Kong.  
 
At that time, he had already been looking into the labour conditions of 
security workers for a number of years (and he continues to do so now). As 
the excerpt of his interview illustrates, Ching does not see a hard and fast 
delineation between an artist and a citizen, a campaigner, or an activist. He 
substantiates: “I think that’s a capitalist problem, how you compartmentalise 
things. [….] Yet when you follow the rhythm of your daily life, you don’t have 
these borders”.  Despite fitting quite neatly into the “transformative” part of 
my former research parameter, it proved hard to situate him more 
convincingly within what I grasped as “socially engaged” art. My 
understanding of the latter was restricted by Euro-American notions of 
collaborative artistic work in extra-gallery spaces that did not yet account for 
the body or affect. In retrospect, it was this particular interview that both 
these aspects – body and affect – were first brought together with “socially 
engaged”, thus “indicating” (to use Ching’s descriptor) the trajectory of this 
study towards social negotiation. I would therefore like to examine more 
precisely how our conversation about his practice functioned as a gateway to 
theorising a more affectively ambiguous and embodied socially negotiated art. 
 
Ching expressed ambivalence about belonging to any artistic “category”, 
which led to a discussion about the contrivances of identities and borders. 
Motivated by the desire to continue making art in an environment where 
studio-like spaces were scarce and expensive, Ching was “forced” onto the 
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streets early on in his career. Yet he found flâneuring as an art practice “too 
easy” to achieve in a city as dense as Hong Kong. He said he wondered at the 
time whether there was “content” to his work – “or was it just texture?” He 
rephrased this question: “is it possible to [use my artistic point of view to] re-
imagine a different, more livable ‘daily life’”? His initial curiosity about security 
guards slowly bled beyond the boundaries of artistic labour into personal, 
political, and economic labour; he actually trained and worked as a security 
guard in different places, including the Hong Kong Museum of Art as well as 
at a fresh food market. He repeatedly states, “I’m not sure whether this is an 
artwork”, suggesting that the direction and commitment of what he is doing – 
the overidentification and subsequent decade of training, working, and 
campaigning as a security guard – can (no longer) be art. He has 
subsequently campaigned for labour rights, rather specifically for chairs and 
the right to sit down as a cashier or as a worker who mostly stands or walks 
as part of their job.  
 
The conversation with Ching influenced my research in what felt like a vague 
way at the time, because it unsettled many preconceptions that I have since 
hoped to resolve. How do such practices of embodiment (not) fit in within a 
landscape of so-called “socially engaged” art? Clearly, there is an assumption 
or performance of the security guard role that renders it a process of 
“becoming”. I have already examined Raunig’s framework of art and 
revolution whereby “concatenations” of the two are foregrounded in 
“constituent” change – namely, in a “becoming” that is set in deliberate 
contrast to the rupture of a momentous event (see: 1.1.5.). Yet his analysis 
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emphasises the meeting and divergence of art and revolution as separate 
machines, which does not account for their intertwining in an embodied 
hyper-performance such as Ching’s. At once self-reflexive and problematic, 
his enactment does in fact follow that slower, constituent temporality 
highlighted by Raunig; he also becomes more security guard, echoing Ip’s 
sentiment from the Wooferten interview and how the artist group made 
themselves “more kai fong (more like a neighbour)” (see: 4.2.2.). Crucially, 
Ching is neither concerned with processes of becoming nor with “socially 
engaged” tropes of intersubjective relationality, but with what he calls a 
“messing up of borders” that are constantly under negotiation and alive. This 
means that there is no bringing together of separate entities (be they 
relational bodies or machines); instead, he disputes the very discreteness of 
entities, of identities and occurrences, etc. In practice, this translates into a 
disorientation of everything that they sit within – of space, time, and bodies 
(but most of all his own body) – which engenders new corporealities of space 
(see: 3.2.2.).  
 
He observes: “[Gallery security staff] are trapped with works of art in a small 
space with no windows all day long; the people who are closest to art end up 
hating art the most”. Noting that they were never seated, Ching held onto a 
fleeting observation and used it as an entrance point to think through the 
emotional and physical effects of security labour (isolating, physically taxing, 
mind-numbing). As with the flâneur practice that immerses his body into the 
city, he likewise immerses his body into that of the guard – a move that I 
now recognise as a pivot point for a different research focus, allowing 
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knowledge to occur as you live it. From the perspective of a researcher 
coming to terms with my lack of situatedness, Ching’s security guard work 
was at once touching as well as brazen. It was an artistic mode that 
“indicated” towards other questions of art and social negotiation: rather than 
asking whether artistic practice has the potential to “transform” a site or 
thing, what if the practice is itself the transformation? That is, social 
“engagement” would no longer be an instrument for change but rather 
embody change. Art, body, and transformation meet and merge, which as a 
formulation still falls short of Ching’s active “messing of borders”. His practice, 
then, ultimately coaxed a different line of inquiry out of a research that no 
longer attempts to gauge the influence of art on society or vice versa. It 
defies the obligation to name and defend what this art is, opting instead for 
an evaluative sense of touch, for being beside, and for a material focus on 
how connections take place. This interview was the first palpable shift 
towards a method that is steeped in ambiguity and not-knowing, signalling 
the embodied, affective field out of which Ching’s unwanted “borders” or 
categories are created in the first place. From here came the means with 
which failure, displacement, encounters, and feeling-out – or re-imaginings, 
as Ching would say – were socially negotiated.  
 
 
4.2.6. C&G Artpartment 
 
The artists who run C&G Artpartment are Clara Cheung Ka-Lei and Gum 
Cheng Yee-Man who are partners both in work and life. They set up C&G 
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Artpartment in 2007 and have been running the space since then. They were 
also involved with Wooferten in its first two years from 2009 to 2011. Located 
on the third floor of a residential building in the busy Mong Kok district, C&G 
is found in amongst an assortment of businesses including a hair salon and a 
small hotel that “was a bridal shop” just a year before. Theirs is a compact, 
open-plan flat conversion divided into two halves: there is a painting studio 
on one end, where the artists offer classes to financially support the 
curatorial, project-based work they present in the other, emptier half of the 
space. They are deliberately self-funded in order to maintain artistic and 
organisational independence. 
 
Clara Cheung’s words: 
When we started, we felt that there were very few artists working in 
contemporary art who responded to politics and society. But pre-1997, there 
was a lot of politically engaged artistic content. For ten years after the 
handover, things got disquietingly still; the social climate itself was also still, 
which was part of the issue. The first exhibition we staged at C&G was called 
Gei boon wui gwai (2007; basic handover), in which we asked artists to 
respond to the Basic Law consultations.7 The exhibition themes turned into a 
platform for artists to respond to current affairs and events. We felt that there 
was a real lack at the time. It was around the year 2000 when (curator and 
critic) Johnson Chang noted how Hong Kong artists tended towards more 
private, material concerns than anything, suggesting that there was a 
distance between artists and society. Their perspectives were socially 
                                                             
7 The Basic Law was drafted between China and Hong Kong as a means of guaranteeing the city some 
form of legal autonomy in line with Deng Xiaoping’s “one country, two systems” formulation. 
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removed. 
 
Repeating shows and projects is quite beneficial to us, to our curatorial 
practice, and to the artists. In our second year, we did a project called Sick 
Leave (2008), which responded to the labour conditions in Hong Kong. “You 
can sooner die than you can be sick”: we hear that all the time here. So why 
don’t we all take sick leave together? Word got out to a much larger public 
than we are typically used to, possibly because everyone was having such a 
hard time at work. The title of the project really clicked, really resonated. Last 
year (2013), another organisation that we didn’t know posted that “today is 
international sick leave day”. The idea has been digested and reinterpreted 
into new concepts, but this couldn’t have happened if we had only put the 
idea into practice once. 
 
Gum Cheng’s words: 
The atmosphere is around us already. It’s not so much about us “entering” 
[public space]. When and how do we actually enter the social or political 
arena? We wanted a place to get on with our artistic practice, and within this 
time and place, this atmosphere, we create something that we hope will lead 
to other things. […] We are currently in a moment of political co-thriving, but 
we haven’t yet reached its pinnacle. I think when we do get to that point, 
some of us will have left this kind of work while others will have refined their 
practice. At the moment, things are rather dispersed. We have a common 
goal but different methods. Years ago when we took our wedding 
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engagement to the July 1st demonstration,8 we were doing it alone. There 
was no talk of going as part of the “arts and cultural sector”. 
 
C&G started off with very few programmes. We had two main strands: our 
practice and painting lessons. You can tell that we don’t have much space for 
exhibiting. We found ourselves a place that is accessible because we wanted 
people to come. But over time, you start to see that kai fong (neighbours) 
don’t come much, which really was not how we imagined it. Our position 
started to shift and we now do more projects that concern artists specifically, 
more so than they would the general viewer. How might you “engage” with 
the public? You’d be better off doing some kind of direct action on Sai Yeung 
Choi Street. You can’t do projects to “engage” viewers who you hope will later 
also “engage” with others on a given topic. You can’t. Our environment and 
our space don’t allow it. 
 
--- 
 
Buried in the crowded shopping and residential district of Mong Kok, C&G 
Artpartment is located amongst a range of retail enterprises and flats in a 
residential building partly reappropriated for commercial use in its lower 
floors. They have an open-plan space that is split down the middle for 
exhibition use on the one side and painting classes on the other. Like most 
places in Hong Kong, it is tiny and wedged between multiple lives and 
                                                             
8 A demonstration takes place annually on July 1st, the date that Hong Kong was handed over back to 
China. The concerns taken to the streets grow year by year, but still primarily target the lack of 
universal suffrage in the city. Dressed in traditional wedding costume, Cheung and Cheng performed 
their engagement during the 2004 demonstration. 
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businesses going on around you. Indeed, what Gum Cheng says about art not 
“entering” the social sphere as much as already being part of it makes a lot of 
sense when considered in this context; how can one not be “socially 
engaged” when the social is always present, felt, and heard?  
 
In fact, their space emerged in the mid-2000s just as public outcry intensified 
against the destruction and redevelopment of historically significant sites 
around the city. While C&G had hoped for “people” – i.e. non-artist 
neighbours, passers-by, etc. – to become involved, they were unable to 
generate any significant local interest. What their space did offer was a 
pedagogical base for cultural and art workers to explore political issues. This 
was a function that came about through a gradual process of feeling and 
testing out an “atmosphere” that, as Gum Cheng notes, cannot be “entered” 
when we are “already” within it. This is echoed in Luke Ching Chin-Wai’s 
“messing of borders” in the previous interview, which similarly feels and tests 
out social existence for alternative modes of living. In both, there is a 
sensitivity to the limitations of pre-defined relations, which in the case of C&G 
means recognising that the proximity of neighbours does not automatically 
provide the terms for “engagement”.  
 
Yet the failure of meeting expectations also brought about the search for 
different relational possibilities, something the artists have achieved through a 
process of experimentation that continues today. This can be seen in the 
breadth of their practice; a self-funded space, C&G teach painting classes to 
cover rent, their labour, and the projects they run within it. They put together 
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exhibitions, talks, art quizzes, and organise spontaneous public actions 
(artistic and otherwise) on Facebook. Their most prominent event is Sick 
Leave (since 2008), which invites anyone, anywhere in the world to call in 
sick on May 13 every year and do something for themselves.9 For both artists, 
the immediacy of their work is most important, i.e. the ability to act and 
respond to current affairs as and when they wish. Their primary aim is to 
mobilise beside what is happening currently, as soon as possible. As Cheung 
says, “we seem to be firefighting everywhere and there just isn’t enough 
time”.  
 
The priority of their practice, then, is to constantly negotiate the social, to 
shift with the “atmosphere” that they are “already” part of. This challenged 
my research at the time because of the range, the changeability, and the 
seeming absence of locational focus. Like both artists, I wanted to zoom away 
from the limitations of definition – in this study’s context, it has meant artistic 
collaboration and transformation – to tackle the experience of social 
“engagement”. To do so, the first cue into understanding C&G’s specific 
relational material was found in Karen Barad’s material-discursivity, which 
instates a making of agency in the intra-active spaces of the performatively 
engendered between (see: 1.1.4.). She argues that phenomena is where 
mattering takes place, where differentiation between bodies, spaces, and 
“apparatus” are produced. Instead of supposing any pre-existing agency a 
body possesses to “enter” an “atmosphere”, per Cheng, or even for two 
                                                             
9 A version of this idea has since shown up in the UK: German artist Maria Eichhorn’s 2016 project at 
Chisenhale Gallery in London requested that staff “withdraw their labour” for five weeks in order to re-
evaluate time.  
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bodies to meet / collide, she denotes a field of potentialities that take on 
more individual-like characteristics by way of material-discursive practices: 
 
The relationship between the material and the discursive is one of 
mutual entailment. Neither discursive practices nor material 
phenomena are ontologically or epistemologically prior. Neither can be 
explained in terms of the other. Neither is reducible to the other. 
Neither has privileged status in determining the other. Neither is 
articulated or articulable in the absence of the other; matter and 
meaning are mutually articulated. (Barad, 2007, p.152) 
 
From a “being-in-the-world” to a “being-of-the-world” (ibid., p.160, my 
emphases), Barad presents from her critical perspective of science studies 
that phenomena and the apparatuses developed to observe them are co-
constitutive of one another, since they are “parts of the world’s ongoing 
reconfiguring” (ibid., p.184). While her formulation questions bodily and 
conceptual boundaries that ontologically and epistemologically centre the 
“human”, I would like to hold onto this material-discursivity in a more 
particular way. In seeing how C&G operate, they value most of all the ability 
to mobilise in accordance to social and political urgencies, because it allows 
the artists to take part in the meaning-making (e.g. concerns, strategies, and 
reflexivity) specific to an emergent movement. This immersive embodiment 
reconstitutes a practice that is fully socially negotiated, i.e. it produces 
newness and boundaries from intra-related phenomena. These are what she 
calls “iterative becoming of spacetimemattering”, which “reworks the entire 
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set of possibilities made available” (ibid., p.234).  
 
What Clara Cheung and Gum Cheng attempt is precisely an emergent 
approach that only come to matter as well as significance in their doing. 
Barad’s analysis has now enabled a rethinking of the lived – indeed, living – 
practices that make up the varied, disparate projects at C&G Artpartment, 
with her representation of material performativity being particularly relevant. 
As with the agential cuts in Barad’s phenomena, the between does not pre-
exist as a space to be “entered”, but is instead relationally remade by human 
bodies and other nonhuman ones. This gives some shape to Gum Cheng’s 
notion of being “already” in the grips of an atmosphere. As such, the 
negotiating middle can be reconfigured into an “epistemological-ontological-
ethical” site (Barad, 2007, p.26) that is charged with ambiguous potentials. 
No longer, then, do we have to think of art practices working upon a socio-
political reality, but examine the mutual, intra-active implication of 
phenomena that bring about different meanings and realities.  
 
 
4.3. Reflecting on the frictive practice of research  
 
The title of the final section demonstrates the desire to highlight the most 
pertinent effects from the interviews and observations on practice: the 
acknowledgement of frictive contact and how to make sense of it. At the end 
of the fieldwork, the gap between the theorising and making of art became 
almost too wide to bridge; the concepts available to me were either too 
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distant or too polished when placed beside the practices they supposedly 
articulate. The “aboutness” of the initial research question made it impossible 
to confront the subjective doubts within a critical process; they would have 
had to be buried away as personal responsibility in order for the original work 
to be carried out. What was necessary was a means to incorporate the two. 
This meant shifting the focus from “transformation” to “negotiation”, which 
also enables the study to include practices that are normally seen as too 
instrumentalised for theoretical analysis. 
 
The interviews and art processes in this chapter would have made up the 
core of my original study, but instead ended up inciting a change of subject 
as well as research perspective. This was demanding on many levels, not 
least of which was the need to develop a new language that is capable of 
grappling with these experiences. The research trip has become a point 
around which the rest of the study grew, demonstrating just how “saturated” 
the fieldwork’s “temporality” has been (see: choreographic time 3.2.1.). 
Especially apparent now is how the exploration of such situated practices is 
fraught with difficulties, and cannot be done without some consideration of 
one’s positioning in the process (see: 1.1.3.).  
 
As such, this final chapter attempts to describe the raw relational material 
that engendered this study and to see how the disparate pieces of its 
assemblage are related to the fieldwork. In establishing a methodological 
insistence on being beside, the time in Hong Kong took on a different life, 
from a critically distanced proposition of evaluating transformation to a 
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critically proximal one that asks: what does it mean to live, practice, and 
reflect beside one another? What sort of perspectival shifts does such an 
embodied relationality throw up? How is the social reconfigured? Where does 
that leave us in terms of socially situated concepts whose good intentions are 
taken for granted: dialogue, love, even “socially engaged”?  
 
Through the defamiliarising experience of practice, it was necessary to 
develop a different account for an embodied criticality that ultimately offers 
material presence, emotional rigour, and an attunement to the negotiation of 
intimacy and livability. Yet the self-reflexivity I have engaged with over the 
course of the study articulates only some of the problem-sites; there are more 
that continue to unfold even at this late juncture. Most notable is the 
opportunity to further investigate the vexed relation between a researcher’s 
role with regards to politically situated practices presented here and 
postcoloniality, both in terms of Hong Kong’s handover to China in 1997 and 
the nomadic tendencies of the art form. Indeed, such an examination would 
be resoundingly relevant as the international art scene shifts away from a 
North American and European focus towards the periphery in a conscious 
move to be globally representative. What does such a decentring involve and 
what are its limits? As this chapter has attempted to clear some space for 
artists and practices, it is still constrained by the structure of the research. In 
relation to the subaltern, Spivak reminds us how their “speaking” is always 
already imbued in failure if framed within the “firstworld” intellectual context: 
“The historian, transforming ‘insurgency’ into ‘text for knowledge,’ is only one 
‘receiver’ of any collectively intended social act. […] [T]he historian must 
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suspend (as far as possible) the clamor of his or her own consciousness (or 
consciousness-effect, as operated by disciplinary training), so that the 
elaboration of the insurgency, packaged with an insurgent-consciousness, 
does not freeze into an ‘object of investigation’ or, worse yet, a model for 
imitation” (Spivak, 2003, p.28, my emphasis). In many ways, this study has 
precisely been about figuring out how to examine the intentions, desires, and 
connections that take place between bodies without smoothing over the 
textures and complexities of shared experiences. Even as the final chapter 
comes to a close, there are aspects of the relational material that continue to 
be re-negotiated. But the hope is that the resituating of praxis within 
emergent, self-reflexive practices can give life to the embodied criticality that 
has been so central to the study. 
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Conclusion  
 
 
Having attempted to wrestle with the slippery relational material of socially 
negotiated art, the thesis has come to argue for a critical and capacious 
understanding of its textures and connections, of which there are: intimate 
publics, frictive modes of speech, body borders, to name a few. Its (affective, 
subjective, political) inconsistencies need to be better amplified in order to 
make a different sense of the practices that are taking place in lesser or 
greater proximity to the art world. Generated by embodied negotiations, the 
“social” part of my study is not captured but given the space to work out its 
own form: what we find is something emergent, produced through iterative 
“blind fumbling[s]” (Halberstam, 2011) of bodies and affect. The research 
leaves behind the definitions or muddlings of doing art or politics, jumping 
instead into the deep end of relations, their articulation, and their navigation. 
The affective forces that surround the process, taxing as they are to sustain, 
pervade throughout the study. To focus on embodiment through negotiation 
and queer disorientations was a large part of the task set at the end of 
chapter one, suggesting potential to invent and co-create. At that stage, it 
took on a more evidently productive and thriving energy. But as the fieldwork 
in chapter four also reminds us, this does not necessarily sustain through the 
process; the saturated temporality of living out the material present leaves 
you out of joint with time, demanding a different mode of unpacking. Such is 
the affective upshot of socially negotiated practices: it produces more 
questions than answers.  
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One of the most challenging aspect has been the navigation of self-reflexivity, 
which is something that is emphatically advocated throughout the study. With 
the research focusing on informal channels of knowledge as well as the value 
of failures and emotional blockages, the weight of the study ends up resting 
precisely on sites of criticality that are normally ruled out as irrelevant or 
counterproductive. This shifting tension between what to include and how to 
address situations normally relegated to the private domain were some of the 
most difficult yet elucidating decisions made in reorienting the social and the 
subjective, both of the thesis and the practices it seeks to understand.  
 
This careful navigation of the personal comes as part of the socially 
negotiated labour that sustains the practice. From the slow building of trust 
with partners and collaborators to the maintenance of healthy institutional 
connections, the relational material is constantly under construction, though 
some areas tend to be given greater care while others are neglected. As 
much as possible, the study attends to these relational shifts, in particular 
those that are harder to bring to the fore. In using “beside” as a 
methodology, the frictive forms I have proposed throughout the study situate 
art practices as living endeavours in various relations to others, with the 
potential to create evaluative knowledges (see: 2.2.2. on gossip) and to offer 
critique on care (see: 3.3.1. and 3.3.2. on the extradomestic). Through 
theoretical analysis and a selection of art projects and interviews, I have 
attempted to shine a light on the relational material of socially negotiated art 
and, more precisely, on how an embodied criticality and self-reflexivity can 
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bring it into focus. 
 
Indeed, the relational material intended to rework specific living situations is 
just as prone to stalling as it is to imagining better futures. That many 
projects have limited resources and time frames means that it is difficult to 
make good on what artists, commissioners, and collaborators envision. This 
particular significance of failure (see: 1.1.5. on not renouncing failures and 
the past) applies from one socially negotiated context to the next, a fact that 
is taking on a greater significance at the conclusion of the study. In reflection, 
the phrase that echoes the most is Hannah Nicklin’s final evaluation of her 
project Teviot Tales (2014) (see: 3.3.2.): “I don’t know if it was successful”. 
 
 
Moving until you stand still 
 
Ambivalence was not a part of the plan at the outset. Rather, it was driven by 
a more straightforward curiosity to have a better scope of what constitutes 
socially “engaged” art as a field, its different desires and alignments with 
socio-political transformation. This stemmed from the need to take part in a 
different form of labour, something more steady and reparative than the 
precarity of producing independent art projects. Led by the hopeful conviction 
that the reflection of writing would bring about a (re)turn of perspective, the 
study was formatively shaped by the surge of activist energy in Paulo Freire’s 
“Pedagogy of the Oppressed” (1970), a heavily cited and relevant text for 
many practitioners in this field. As I have variously argued throughout the 
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study, his pedagogy is driven by active mediation, which immediately hits 
home for art workers interested in the active mediation of social relations. 
This concern of what happens in the middle – “to mediate” is etymologically 
“to be placed in the middle” after all – is part of a Freirean “humanisation” 
that falls in line with the Latin-American liberation theology of the time (see: 
3.1.1.). Against the colonial oppression that negates such an anthropological 
“vocation”, the oppressed will join the struggle “sooner or later” (Freire, 1970, 
p.44). This involves a consciousness-raising pedagogy that gives them the 
power to emancipate themselves as well as their oppressors, and to “restor[e] 
the humanity of both” (ibid.). Weaving through his praxis of activism, 
philosophy, and education, then, is the mobilisation that is up for the task on 
the one hand, which counteracts the immobilisation of a “fatalist” outlook 
(Freire, 1970) on the other.  
 
Despite the intention to critique Freirean concepts of dialogue, love, and 
praxis within the proposed context of socially negotiated art, the queer and 
feminist interventions were still largely yoked to an anticipatory hope that is 
similarly found in his pedagogy. The ambition can be found chiefly in the 
overall methodological aim (see: 1.2.2.) to be “beside” – to partake of 
research in the middle, to mediate. However, against the grain of Freire’s 
“humanisation” and its assumption of horizontality, I looked at differentiation 
and the uneven relations that exist between bodies: the coming-together he 
proposes through a dialogically oriented pedagogy has been questioned in the 
many facets of the relational material presented in chapters two, three, and 
four. While chapter one initially prepared for a forward thrust towards queer 
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and feminist embodiments, the deeper considerations of friction and impasses 
proved to tell equally critical stories of staying put and what it can also 
achieve. In particular, the revisiting of the fieldwork interviews in chapter four 
enabled a situated application of the concepts presented throughout the 
study.  
 
Another aspect that the research sought to confront was the lingering desire 
to prove and propel change in the relational in-between. Specifically, after the 
value of dissenting communication was presented in chapter two, the frictive 
took on an important dimension that was carried over to chapter three’s 
refractions on love. There, I attempted to insert a similar kind of intervention, 
which would unpack Freirean revolutionary love and its correlation with hope. 
Friction is meant to slow things down by definition, which transforms the 
effusiveness of love into something weightier and more peculiar: optimism 
can feel like broken loops and impasses (see: 3.1.2.) while care, usurped into 
affective labour, can also make a critical return through the extradomestic 
(see: 3.3.). The explorations of intimacy, body borders, and care in chapter 
three articulated some extremely significant considerations for the relational 
material of socially negotiated art. Love, as examined here, is both open and 
rigorous enough to recognise impasses on the one hand and to set 
boundaries on the other, thus (re-)shaping bodies and situations by staying 
put rather than mobilising. This particular disorientation of my original 
“transformation” focus – the halting, the stillness – made its impression on 
the research trajectory gently yet steadily, and is now its most important 
takeaway. The thesis has thus carefully considered that sense of displacement 
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found both in the research as well as practice of socially negotiated art. While 
chapter one concluded with a queer vision of socially negotiated practices that 
would be fit enough to tackle the pleasure, pain, discomfort, etc. of the 
relational material, the affective repercussions of chapters two, three, and 
four demanded a slowing down that would become a critical part of being 
“beside” in this study.  
 
As such, it is now ending at a point that befits a conclusion: the best 
relational intentions of socially negotiated art practices will still come into 
contact with friction and lose momentum. At times, this might generate a 
different energy altogether, one that is based on disagreement and 
disorientation. The hampering that is such a significant part of negotiation can 
potentially bring us to an affective tension – which includes the art worker’s 
tedium described earlier – that could do with its own consciousness-raising. 
Despite being labelled “fatalistic” in the Freirean sense, “immobility” comes in 
many forms, from standing still to being backed into a corner; from feeling 
emotionally depleted to treading water. That these occur in the very same 
socially produced space suggests the need to pay closer attention to the 
knowledge they carry. 
 
 
Weighty affects and the potential of hampering 
 
I would like to lead out of this study with some thoughts and speculations on 
a middling “beside” that feels like pushback, making limps out of galloping 
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desires. Meniality, as discussed in terms of their extradomestic reclamation in 
3.3., is one way in which the so-called limps can be critiqued in relation to 
social care and art’s role within it. In cases where the relation between the 
latter two is clear and explicit, the pushback can appear in a number of ways: 
project goals too large for the structural and critical support available; 
stressful emotional labour; frequent bouts of starting and ending to projects 
and the adjustments that is required at each turn; inconsistent work load; 
relatively small fees; and working time seeping into personal time. With 
regards to the artists specifically, a significant part of the task has to do with 
care – often where there is none otherwise (see: 3.3.2. on menial labour and 
the bare work of care) – which means coping with the affective repercussions 
that come with it. Indeed, the work of socially negotiated art amounts to 
affective inflation and deflation, beginning with the optimistic promises of 
funding proposals, the making and sustaining of precarious relations, and the 
presenting of an effective conclusion, all of which comes at a great emotional 
and physical expense. What interests me, should this research find the 
chance to refine and further itself, is drawing more significant connections 
between socially negotiated art and systems of support; between the 
maintenance of a hidden affective economies and the aims purported in 
official narratives (of social care, political change, cultural sensitivity, respect 
of difference, etc.).  
 
Why look at infrastructures of complex feelings when you could spend that 
same energy to “progress”? The answer has to do with sitting differently with 
the past, bringing it into a present, self-reflexive “disruption of politics as 
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usual” (Cvetkovich, 2012, p.117). Here, the queer tempo of the now (see: 
3.2.2. on choreography of assembly) makes another return: as everything 
else seems to pace on, your disorientation locks into a different time and 
place. The attention to frictive feelings is therefore aligned with research that 
draws upon negative or disquieting affects, which have turned out to be this 
study’s background atmosphere. For Heather Love, whose pathbreaking work 
in “Feeling Backward” (2007) explores turning back in the broadest sense 
(staying with the past, failing to align, sense of loss, etc. in relation to queer 
sexualities), “structures of feeling [are] crucial to queer studies where the 
analysis of uncodified subjective experiences is an important supplement to 
the study of the history of formal laws, practices, and ideologies. The 
saturation of experience with ideology is particularly important to queer critics 
because homophobia and heterosexism inflect everyday life in ways that can 
be difficult to name” (Love, 2007, p.12, my emphasis).  
 
The significance of everyday “inflections” is also an apt way to think about the 
different social scenes described in this study. It is possible, in fact, to 
consider how inflections have affectively transitioned throughout the 
research: in chapter one, the scene-setting is counterpublic and more eager; 
in chapter two, the refraction of dialogue leads towards dissensus and 
friction; in chapter three, love reincorporates impasses and body borders; and 
in chapter four, aspects of all three collide and converge, like Love’s 
“backwardness”, to the severe displacement experienced during fieldwork. By 
the end of the study, the most resonant inflection is the value of friction and 
hampering, which I hope to continue examining. While impasses and their 
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associated challenges may leave us “unfit for the redress of grievance” (ibid.), 
they are nonetheless incisive, daring us to go public with these feelings that 
hearkens to Cvetkovich’s careful unravelling of depression’s social dimension 
(2012). The analysis of the “relational material” has crept into the affective in 
ways that both exceed and reinforce its artistic potential. What is cohering 
here at the conclusion is how the critical modalities explored – through 
failure, friction, impasses, etc. – demonstrate the impossibility of pre-
positioning or directly implementing artistic or social intentions. While these 
motivations are bound for frictive contact, the renegotiation of borders also 
produce their own disoriented perspectives that are able to reparatively and 
self-reflexively critique the practices that engendered them.  
 
 
Towards a queerly oriented socially negotiated art 
 
The relational material emerged from the gradual crafting of a softer, queerer 
analytical touch that is methodologically developed “beside” the mandate for 
change. In doing so, this study has tilted the view of socially “engaged” art; 
the examination of its generative, relational stakes produces, in turn, other 
frameworks of understanding that question artistic, social, and pedagogical 
systems of evaluation. By insisting on the queerness of negotiation, the 
constructive desires and qualities of art practices are given a different 
dimension, e.g. empathy becomes complicit (see: 1.1.3. on dialogical art) 
while care becomes as a form of labour (see: 3.3.2. on meniality). As a term, 
“socially engaged” is likely to reinforce the comfortable ideal of art in extra-
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artistic situations and/or conciliatory artmaking. Not only does this 
underestimate the mechanisms that must be in place in order for disparate 
contexts to merge in the first place, but it also turns the encounter into the 
ground zero for ensuing social engagement. In the end, what social 
negotiation refracts is this moment of supposed coming-together; it reinstates 
the agency of the in-between by highlighting the many points of orientation, 
the different bodies, and the connections between them, from artist to 
participant, place to institution. This would require a different understanding 
of where a work begins or ends, as the social is no longer taken to be that 
event of convergence.  
 
By introducing the methodological notion of “beside”, I was able to anchor my 
research within the embodied conditions of sociality in order to question what 
happens and how. The parameters of dialogue, love, and praxis borrowed 
from Freire’s pedagogy offered a place from which to think about the social as 
collective transformation and “worldmaking”. This prepared them as sites for 
refractive analysis, leading to the following key ideas: that frictive speech 
forms like gossip and teasing present a challenge to the inclusive accessibility 
of dialogue by articulating counterpublic intimacies (chapter two); that the 
affects of political love exceed the urge to “mobilise” and is apt to getting 
stuck, to border-making, and to performing (menial) acts of care (chapter 
three); and finally, that a situatedness must be equally attentive to the 
frictions and impasses that are generated in the same social space as the 
progressive drive for praxis (chapter four).  
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Rather than forge ahead with the transformative potential of socially engaged 
art, I chose to stay put with the ambivalence and frustrations that are so 
rarely theorised in this field and re-centred them through embodiment and 
affect. Hence the “relational material” of this study; it is the feeling-out of the 
space between things, including above all textures of discomfort and the 
potential it holds. Indeed, constituting the relational material of socially 
negotiated art has meant travelling a convoluted route. At the start, it bore 
the hope of becoming a queer and feminist resistance that was nonetheless 
proportionately inverse to socially and politically engaged art: the relational 
material would possess the same counterpublic indignation that insists upon 
the rewards of an ambivalent yet always productive third space. But this 
project came to a difficult middle point when the constituent parts of art’s 
social desire were more closely scrutinised: disorientation led to impasses, 
dissent to the impossibility of full inclusion, and intimate publics never get 
their act together, amongst other reticences. In other words, the study’s 
intervention of refusal also refused to be wrangled into correlative, well-
meaning change. Queer and feminist indeed, which now seems plainly 
obvious when taking “beside” seriously as methodology and as embodied 
experience.  
 
In the end, there is no making sense out of something as inconsistent as the 
relational material, for it can never be claimed for specific uses, constructive 
or otherwise. Following Heather Love, backwardness remembers in other 
ways, which is especially critical when sentimentality is so often exploited by 
power structures. In the end, it has proven to be more fruitful to confront this 
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struggle with friction and hampering, both of which are underappreciated 
aspects of social desire; a queer and feminist relational material must 
recentre the chronic displacement that enunciates it. Not only does this mean 
the sharing of failures and impasses, but also the honing of a self-reflexivity 
in the theorisation as well as practice of socially negotiated art. 
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